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FROM THE EDITORS
There are times when the ship of state executes sharper turns than at others. In the
aftermath of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, whether coincidentally
or not, we have seen the emergence of a newly belligerent People’s Republic of
China (PRC). Ramped-up Chinese military activity on the country’s frontier with
India, a constant drumbeat of provocations in international waters in the East and
South China Seas, and unprecedented levels of vitriolic anti-Western propaganda
are developments that have been noticed widely, giving rise to an ongoing reassessment of China’s relationship to the United States, its allies, and the rest of the
world. In a series of landmark speeches by senior American officials, foremost
among them Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, the United States has signaled
as clearly as possible that there will be no more business as usual with the PRC. In
“China’s Global Navy: Today’s Challenge for the United States and the U.S. Navy,”
James E. Fanell provides an authoritative survey of the all-important maritime
dimension of the growing Chinese threat to the United States and the world. Both
the scale of Chinese shipbuilding activity and the apparent scope of China’s global
military ambitions are little short of staggering. The West appears to be paying
attention, finally. Captain James E. Fanell, USN (Ret.), is a former director of intelligence and information operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
At a time of growing tensions between Japan and the PRC over the Japaneseadministered Senkaku Islands, there has been growing discussion of the (somewhat tangled) history of the American position on this issue and its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance. In “Ameliorating the Alliance Dilemma in an
Age of Gray-Zone Conflict: Lessons Learned from the U.S.-Japan Alliance,”
Michael M. Bosack provides an overview and analysis of the international relations literature on alliance management and the twin dangers of abandonment
and entrapment. Using the U.S.-Japan alliance as a case study, he argues that
there is much more scope than often is recognized for creative adjustments of
alliance relationships to accommodate evolving security environments, especially one like the present, in which the nonmilitary aspects of such relationships have taken on increased importance. Michael M. Bosack is special adviser
at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies.
In “‘Things Done by Halves’: Observations from America’s First GreatPower Competition,” Benjamin F. Armstrong usefully reminds us that so-called
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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gray-zone conflict is not a new phenomenon, but rather long has been a dimension of great-power competition, to use another fashionable term. Taking the
neglected case of America’s Quasi War with France in 1798–1800, he shows
how the infant U.S. Navy adapted to the requirements of an undeclared conflict
with France in the complex and multisided strategic environment of the contemporary Caribbean. He argues that aspects of this experience have continuing relevance for the U.S. Navy today. Commander Benjamin F. Armstrong,
USN, is a military professor at the U.S. Naval Academy.
The U.S. military today embraces the idea of “jointness”—if not altogether
uncritically, then at least with a high degree of general acceptance. This can
cause us to lose sight of just how unnatural this state of affairs is in terms of
the basic dynamics of military organizations. In “‘Neither Fish nor Fowl nor
Yet Good Red Herring’: Joint Institutions, Single-Service Priorities, and Amphibious Capabilities in Postwar Britain,” Ian Speller acts as tour guide to the
checkered history of British efforts to do justice to the interservice character
and requirements of amphibious warfare within the context of an overarching
single-service military organization and culture. Ian Speller is director of the
Centre for Military History and Strategic Studies at the National University of
Ireland, Maynooth.
It is important to keep in mind that the history of the Cold War may have
some surprises for us yet. In “A ‘New Look’ at Cold War Maritime Defense: The
Royal Canadian Navy’s Seaward Defence Report and the Threat of the MissileFiring Submarine, 1955,” Michael Whitby opens a fascinating window into
planning that the Royal Canadian Navy conducted in conjunction with the U.S.
Navy to counter the new threat to North America posed by Soviet conventional
submarines armed with nuclear missiles in the early Cold War. His discussion
focuses on the recently declassified Canadian study Seaward Defence Report.
Michael Whitby is senior naval historian at National Defence Headquarters,
Ottawa, Canada.
The problematic relationship between science and public policy in times
of national crisis, now very evident in the current coronavirus pandemic, is
far from new. In “Peak Oil, Progressivism, and Josephus Daniels, 1913–21,”
Roger Stern revisits the efforts of Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of the Navy,
Josephus Daniels, to deal with what experts claimed would be an exhaustion of
America’s oil resources by the mid-1930s. This is a scandalous story of executive overreach and, indeed, patently illegal actions by the Navy during and after
World War I. (At one point, U.S. Marines seized oil from a California supplier
at gunpoint.) Stern reminds us that similar poorly substantiated predictions of
so-called peak oil have had an outsize effect on U.S. national security policy
in recent times—notably, in President Jimmy Carter’s formal commitment to
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1
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defend the Persian Gulf in the 1970s. As Stern shows, the Progressives’ habit
of straight-arming the American public in the name of scientific expertise has
been long with us. Roger Stern is a former fellow at the Collins College of Business of the University of Tulsa.
Franklin R. Uhlig Jr., Editor Emeritus of the Naval War College Press,
peacefully passed away at his home on 27 August 2020.
After serving in the Navy, Frank began his career in publishing with twenty
years at the U.S. Naval Institute. He visited U.S. Navy combat units in Vietnam and published an outstanding collection of essays on the war, Vietnam:
The Naval Story (1986)—efforts that earned him the Navy League’s Alfred
Thayer Mahan Award for Literary Achievement.
Frank then became the leading contributor to the Naval War College Press’s
publication of articles and books on sea power and naval operations. He
came to the College in 1981 as Editor of the Press and quickly revitalized
it; sixty-two issues of the Naval War College Review and fourteen books appeared during his tenure. He also authored the highly regarded book How
Navies Fight (1994). Frank’s commitment to the Navy, to its sailors’ history,
and to the promotion of education and research on naval affairs stands in
the highest traditions of the Naval War College.
We offer our deepest sympathy to his family and many friends among our
readers.
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Rear Admiral Shoshana Chatfield is the fiftyseventh President of the U.S. Naval War College and
a career naval helicopter pilot. A native of Garden
Grove, California, she graduated from Boston University in 1987 with a bachelor of arts in international relations and French language and literature.
She received her commission through the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps in 1988 and earned her
wings of gold in 1989. Chatfield was awarded the Navy’s Political/Military Scholarship and attended the
Kennedy School of Government, receiving a master
in public administration from Harvard University in
1997. In 2009, the University of San Diego conferred
on her a doctorate of education in leadership studies.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

the passage of my first year as Naval War
College President. As the fifty-seventh officer to undertake the
stewardship of this historically important and consistently relevant institution,
I find myself constantly looking back at the strategic moves made and lessons
learned by my predecessors going back 136 years. The challenges that these leaders considered as the nation faced times of war and peace have been many, and
I believe the situation we have faced, and continue to address, during the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic is similarly significant at the operational, intellectual,
and emotional levels. The thoughts that follow are not intended to be a litany of
what we have lost as the result of pandemic-driven changes but instead are targeted toward a necessary change of mind-set as our College identifies how we as
an institution of higher learning will forge a stronger organization and contribute
to an enhanced learning culture throughout the Navy that will serve us well as we
move through this pandemic and beyond.
In an operational sense, in August 2019 the members of the class of 2020
crossed the College’s quarterdeck with enthusiasm and an eagerness to learn that
was equal to that of any of the tens of thousands of students who preceded them.
They were embraced warmly by our world-class faculty and staff and together
formed a company of maritime, military, and international scholars unlike that
anywhere else in the world. The cacophony of different languages, professional
jargon, and occasionally esoteric terminology filled the classrooms and common
spaces with an electric vibrancy. The face-to-face interactions, including the inevitable exchanges arising from good-natured rivalries, were a pleasure to behold.
Then, just past the midyear point, we took drastic but necessary measures
to control the spread of the coronavirus, in effect setting “Condition Zebra” (to
AUGUST MARKED
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use shipboard damage-control terminology) across the campus, isolating most
students and faculty and staff members from each other. Our challenge then was
to convey as much educational and professional development as possible within
these new constraints and within the existing academic calendar.
Once the need for drastic protective measures became clear, our faculty members had to manage an abrupt transition from the physical to the virtual classroom during the term. While some had taught online previously, all needed to
learn quickly to navigate our available online platforms to create engaging virtual
seminars (synchronous online education). Lectures moved from the auditorium
to the small screen, with students able to watch on their own time (asynchronous online education) as they navigated balancing their classes with new home
responsibilities as their children’s schools closed. Small-group discussions transitioned from groups of students surrounding a physical whiteboard (in-person
education) to using online breakout rooms, with students collaborating on
virtual whiteboards and virtual documents (synchronous real-time education).
The faculty began using blogs, wikis, and online journals and discussion boards
so that conversations and critical thinking could occur outside of seminar time
(asynchronously). End-of-term surveys reported that, while everyone missed the
physical classroom, students and faculty members alike agreed that the unfamiliar environment and rapid transition were not barriers to producing high-quality
learning experiences.
During the summer 2020 intersessional period, the faculty focused its developmental efforts on learning more about remote teaching. Faculty members participated in workshops and webinars on teaching online, including a session on
remote war gaming. Twenty-four faculty members from across the College joined
a Teaching Online Learning Community to discuss techniques and approaches
to creating engagement and community; building effective online courses; and
technology, tools, and resources. They shared their recommendations in a panel
discussion prior to the start of the fall term, ensuring a cross-departmental exchange of ideas and tips. As a result, many faculty members adapted their courses, adopted new technology platforms, and developed innovative approaches
that incorporate greater levels of student-to-student collaboration and practical
exercises into their seminars. Many faculty members have reported that the insights and changes of the last few months will have permanent, positive impacts
on their teaching even after they return to the physical classroom.
Just as the teaching faculty learned to operate in a different manner, so did our
research and gaming faculty. Our team at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies
(CNWS) used the opportunities that the restricted COVID-19 environment presented to find creative ways to continue conducting research and gaming. Early
on, CNWS scheduled a modest workshop for academics and practitioners to look
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1
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at COVID-19 in the Arctic. The effort steadily grew in size and complexity, and
ultimately more than seven hundred registered! The Stockton Center for International Law also capitalized on the availability of experts and their willingness
to engage virtually on a variety of international law topics. The center conducted
several virtual workshops that included some of the field’s most influential
experts—something that is often more challenging, if not impossible, to do in
person. Finally, CNWS’s War Gaming Department worked closely with OPNAV
and fleet staffs to experiment with conducting games, including classified ones,
via virtual means. Our team continually is identifying and learning methods,
protocols, and technical requirements to improve the fidelity and expand the
scope of virtual gaming. This is important in the current COVID-19 restricted
environment but also for developing and executing virtual games going forward,
regardless of the environment.
The national media have reported frequently on the negative impact that the
current level of isolation can have on the well-being of individuals of all ages.
Even isolation in small family groups can create anxiety, lack of motivation, and a
general malaise. To counteract these negative effects, the College faculty and staff
aggressively embraced software platforms such as Zoom, Microsoft Teams, and
Blackboard to bridge the gulf between the College and our extended academic/
professional family. Frequent live “town hall” meetings routinely gathered hundreds from within our College community, and by using the available real-time
chat features the participants not only heard the topics College leaders were discussing but also interacted by submitting questions. Since the participants could
identify others who were logged on simultaneously, many one-to-one comments
also were facilitated, thus creating a shared experience similar to the random
hallway conversations that are so valuable in team building.
We also made a conscious effort to reach out to the spouses and significant
others of our students through a tailored Issues in National Security (INS) lecture
series. These lectures featured some of the College’s premier scholars addressing
many of the same topics that resident students encounter in their graduate-level
work. We then augmented these lectures by conducting Family Discussion Group
(FDG) meetings by partnering with on-base organizations and services to lead
informational sessions at the conclusion of each scholarly program. Those leading the FDG sessions have included the directors and managers of the Fleet and
Family Support Center; the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Department; and
our local health-care facility. By adding these discussions onto the INS lectures
we were able to connect further with members of our extended community who
would have lingered in the physical auditorium after the conclusion of the academic program. Once again, the chat function facilitated two-way communication. During the prepandemic portion of the 2019–20 academic year these events
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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were conducted in person on our Newport campus. It has been interesting to
note that overall participation has more than doubled since adopting the online
approach. For this series and for other conferences and symposia, we will plan to
keep online access an active part of our learning and outreach activities even after
the current crisis subsides. The 2020–21 INS lecture schedule has been expanded
to include eighteen lectures and FDG sessions spread over the full academic year.
This global pandemic has shown us once again that our military organizations
must remain agile and prepare and develop our people continuously to be able
to surge forward as new challenges arise. COVID-19 could have been viewed as
an obstacle to completing academic year (AY) 19–20, but we chose—and must
continue to choose throughout AY 20–21—to view it as a game changer in our
business of education. Our deans, directors, faculty, and staff continue to look
for ways that technology can enhance our programs that will endure long after
2020. For example, our College of Maritime Operational Warfare has increased
education opportunities for students who cannot travel to Newport, our Center
for Naval Warfare Studies has initiated distributed war gaming, and our College
of Distance Education now conducts virtual graduations. In the fall of 2019, I
never imagined that by March 2020 we would be 100 percent virtual, yet in June
I presided over a virtual graduation for more than five hundred resident students
and another 1,400 distance-education students from around the globe. As we
look to capture even more gains that we are developing through our response
to COVID-19, we also can begin to envision a new normal, one that integrates
new technologies and education modes and optimizes our students’ learning opportunities when they are available, wherever they are. I could not be prouder of
the Naval War College’s dedicated men and women who have answered the call
so effectively and truly have excelled in answering the challenges 2020 has levied
upon us.

SHOSHANA S. CHATFIELD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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Captain James E. Fanell, USN (Ret.), concluded a
career of nearly thirty years as a naval intelligence
officer specializing in Indo-Pacific security affairs,
with an emphasis on China’s navy and operations.
He most recently served as the director of intelligence
and information operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
He is a Government Fellow with the Geneva Centre
for Security Policy and the creator and manager of
the Indo-Pacific security forum Red Star Rising.
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2020, Vol. 73, No. 4
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CHINA’S GLOBAL NAVY
Today’s Challenge for the United States and the U.S. Navy
James E. Fanell

U

.S. national-security leaders must assess the speed and sustainability of the
national effort by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to deploy a global
navy. In June 2018, I stood on the fantail of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Navy (PLAN) guided-missile frigate Binzhou in the port of Kiel, Germany—and
it was never clearer to me than at that moment that Beijing has the national will
to dominate the seas.
Binzhou had been at sea for two and a half months patrolling the waters of the
Gulf of Aden, as part of China’s antipiracy naval task force. Binzhou had transited
the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean Sea (with a refueling stop), and the
English Channel and had sailed into the Baltic Sea. Moored among German and
American warships, Binzhou stood out for its immaculate appearance. The ship’s
officers, crew, and staff exuded confidence and preparedness to get under way—to
sea, the place where they looked as if they belonged. This contrasted sharply with
my recollections of a 2004 visit to the destroyer Luhu in Qingdao, as well as many
subsequent visits aboard PLAN warships over the next fifteen years.
The visit to Binzhou crystallized for me that in the short space of a decade and
a half I had witnessed the transformation of the PLAN from a timid, near-seas
assembly of ships into a global naval force whose ships’ crewmembers were true
mariners—as comfortable, confident, and capable as their German, British, and
American counterparts. We are witnessing the beginning of a global PLAN—which,
if left unchecked, will dominate the world’s oceans.
As recently as five years ago, the conventional wisdom held that the PRC’s
leaders were focused primarily on “domestic concerns” of ensuring regime survival or accomplishing military modernization for regional purposes, to resolve
territorial disputes within the so-called first island chain.1 Amid this all-toocommon failure to recognize the PRC’s true strategic intentions, the PRC has
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continued to build a naval force that, if left unchallenged, not only will be sailing
the seven seas but will be increasingly capable of achieving sea control in the
global maritime commons, reaching that point as early as 2030, and potentially
even the capability to achieve sea superiority by 2049.
After twenty years of transformation, the PLAN today operates around the
world, from the Baltic (and soon even the Barents) to the South Pacific, and from
the Arctic to the Antarctic. By 2015, it already was clear that China’s naval shipbuilding would continue unabated through the third decade of the millennium,
and that China’s leaders would move rapidly to increase the PLAN’s order of
battle to support an expanding set of missions, so as to fulfill their “China Dream”
of national rejuvenation and restoration.2
While the evidence supports the assessment that “a massive expansion in the
size of the PLA Navy” for the period 2015 to 2030 remains on track, there is one
impediment in the strategic environment that could stymie the PRC’s maritime
strategy: the Trump administration.3 For the first time in nearly fifty years of
U.S.-PRC relations, America has an administration that has broken away from
an unwritten, bipartisan “China policy” that promoted unconstrained engagement and accommodation with the PRC. The Trump administration’s definitive
decision to treat the PRC as a competitor may represent the only chance to stop
the PRC from becoming the dominant global naval power over the course of the
next two decades.
Yet, even given the extent to which the Trump administration has challenged
Beijing’s global naval strategy, there remain significant practical tasks that must
be completed if Washington is to disrupt Beijing’s designs successfully. If the
Trump administration is not able to follow through with these practical actions
to slow or disrupt the PRC’s global naval strategy, the world can expect to see a
Chinese naval force that enjoys a global presence composed of multiple aircraft
carrier and amphibious strike groups, a credible submarine-launched ballisticmissile capability, an ever-present network of warships at sea around the globe
24/7/365, and the concomitant influence and power this would provide to the
leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
THE PRC’S STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL MARITIME DOMINANCE
In 2013, President Xi Jinping unveiled his “China Dream” in a speech to the PRC’s
National People’s Congress (NPC).4 The theme of the China Dream only has
gained additional clarity over the ensuing seven years of President Xi’s rule. For
instance, at the Nineteenth National Party Congress of the CCP in October 2017,
Xi stated, “The theme of the Congress is: remain true to our original aspiration
and keep our mission firmly in mind . . . and work tirelessly to realize the Chinese
Dream of national rejuvenation.”5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1
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The CCP’s “Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation” includes the intention to
“secure China’s status as a great power.”6 For Kevin Rudd, a former prime minister
of Australia and acknowledged China aficionado, it means that “there now seems
to be a new national and/or global vision that now sits above the simple maximisation of national interests.” Mr. Rudd asserts that China has “become for the first
time a multilateral diplomatic activist,” launching “initiatives of its own beyond
its own immediate sphere of strategic interest here in the East Asian hemisphere
. . . rather than declining to reach beyond its own narrowly defined core national
interests as we have often seen in the past.”7
While Rudd’s examination of the CCP’s 22–23 June 2018 Central Conference
on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs focuses on the PRC’s diplomatic initiatives
and activities outside East Asia, he also includes the following revealing observation: that “China has also developed naval bases in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and now
Djibouti (the latter with some 5,000 troops based there), as well as participating
in naval exercises with the Russians in the Sea of Japan, the Mediterranean, and
even the Baltic.”8 While Rudd’s point may not be clear to all, he nonetheless is
making the case not only that the PRC’s achievement of the China Dream is
defined globally but that it will be supported by a global naval force—that of “a
great maritime power.”
Insights into the PRC’s requirements for securing its status as a great maritime power were revealed during a 10 March 2019 press conference at a session of the Thirteenth NPC in Beijing. This interview of the NPC’s Financial
and Economic Committee vice-chairman, Yin Zhongqing, laid out a view that
“the ocean is the cradle of life, the home of wind and rain, [and a] source of
resources” and that “the ocean, deep sea, and polar regions could be developed
and exploited.” Yin asserted that “strategically managing the ocean have [sic]
become the necessary path for China to open up and develop new space, give
birth to new economic industries, create new engines for growth, and build new
shelters for sustainable development in the new period and new era.” In support
of the goal of “accelerating the construction of China into a maritime power,”
Yin pointed out “a huge neglect of efforts to move to the far seas, enter the deep
sea, and move towards the oceans.”9
Vice-Chairman Yin also indicated that the plan for developing the PRC into
a marine economy and maritime power would include the goal of constructing
“a multi-faceted system of maritime cooperation.” This would require that China
“enter the deep ocean, move toward distant oceans until we reach Antarctica and
the Arctic[,] . . . safeguard maritime rights and interests, and protect maritime
security.” In other words, China would require a global naval force.10
The expansiveness of the PRC’s intentions, capabilities, and operations has
not gone unnoticed by the U.S. government. In December 2018, the Department
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of Defense published its “Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s
Expanding Global Access.” This unprecedented report points out that China has
“expanded its military operations further from the Chinese mainland” and that
it is “seek[ing] this presence based on its changing military focus and expanding international economic interests, which are increasing demands for the PLA
to operate in more distant maritime environments to protect Chinese citizens,
investments, and critical sea lines of communication.”11
The report goes on to state
that the “PLA’s expanding
[T]he PRC has continued to build a naval
global capabilities provide
force that, if left unchallenged, . . . will be inmilitary options to observe or
creasingly capable of achieving sea control in
complicate adversary activithe global maritime commons, reaching that
point as early as 2030, and potentially even the ties in the event of a conflict.”
The report further points out
capability to achieve sea superiority by 2049.
that “China’s military strategy
and ongoing PLA reforms reflect the abandonment of its historically land-centric
mentality,” as “PLA strategists envision an increasingly global role, which they are
actively implementing.” In general, these statements reflect the expansionism of
the PRC over the past two decades. One only need imagine the future presence
of the PLAN as the PRC continues to fulfill its grand vision for the hundredth
anniversary of the founding of the PRC: a China that is a “prosperous, strong,
democratic, civilized, harmonious, and beautiful modernized socialist strong
country.”12
Given this strategic context, it follows that this grand strategy is driving the
PRC’s subordinate naval strategy, which governs “the guidelines and approach
for planning and directing the overall construction and employment of the
navy.”13 Starting with President Hu Jintao’s direction at the Eighteenth National
Party Congress in November 2012 to “build China into a maritime power,”
along with President Xi Jinping’s multiple calls to “step up efforts to build China
into a strong maritime country,” the PRC has been transforming the PLAN
from a near-seas fleet into a far-seas force—one that now is operating around
much of the globe.14
While in the past there has been debate, and in some circles even doubt, about
whether the PRC has a naval strategy (or even a maritime strategy), it seems clear
that any such debate is over. For instance, as mentioned in a Global Times article,
a series of articles published in 2018 by the People’s Daily, an official newspaper
of the Central Committee of the CCP, stated that “building China as a maritime
power fits China’s development, the global trend, and is the necessary choice for
realizing the Chinese Dream of the national rejuvenation. . . . [I]t’s about time
to build a strong maritime country.” One of the authors of the three articles, Liu
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1
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Jixian, former head of the PLA Academy of Military Science, said that “building
a powerful maritime strength is the strategic mainstay of China’s development.”
Further, Xu Guangyu, a retired major general and a senior adviser to the China
Arms Control and Disarmament Association, told the Global Times that “these
articles sent a clear message that China will invest more efforts in strengthening
its ability to safeguard sea routes and overseas interests.” General Xu went on to
state boldly, “There is no need to hide the ambition of the PLA Navy: to gain an
ability like the U.S. Navy so that it can conduct different operations globally. . . .
[C]onsidering that China has already become a global economic power, it is entirely reasonable for China to boost its maritime power.”15
Is the PLAN’s jettisoning of the previous “hiding and biding” strategy having
an impact on its operations at sea? The simple answer is yes. The next section
explores how the PLAN is operating internationally today, and where it is likely
to grow in the following decades.
THE PLA NAVY: A GLOBAL PRESENCE TODAY
While official and unofficial statements assert the PRC’s global aspirations when
it comes to the issue of maritime power, the reality behind those assertions is assessed best by examining what the PLAN actually is doing at sea. In this regard,
it is accurate to say that as of 2019 the PLAN now has an established track record
of global naval operations. As noted in an August 2018 interview, Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral John Richardson characterized the PLAN as a global force
that is “both ‘ready and capable’ of operating wherever Beijing wants.” He even
acknowledged that PLAN warships were operating in the North Atlantic.16 While
this article will not cover every PLAN operation around the globe, it will provide
a broad representation of the various PLAN warships and the missions that are
being executed in support of the PRC’s stated goal of becoming a global maritime
power.
A Decade of Antipiracy Naval-Escort Task-Force Operations
The first and most obvious place to start is with an examination of the past decade’s worth of PLAN antipiracy naval-escort task-force operations in the Gulf of
Aden. The first PLAN antipiracy task force, in December 2008, consisted “of the
052B guided-missile frigate Wuhan (Hull 169), the 052C guided-missile destroyer Haikou (Hull 171), and the comprehensive supply ship Weishanhu (Hull 887)
of the South China Sea Fleet,” which departed the port of Sanya on Hainan Island
and sailed over six thousand nautical miles to waters off Somalia.17 As Erickson
and Strange noted as early as 2013, these escort task-force deployments, while
initially intended to “safeguard China’s economic interests,” over time have provided PRC and PLAN leaders with “irreplaceable naval training” and catalyzed
“the development of naval skill sets often taken for granted but absolutely critical
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for long-distance operations.” They now irrefutably portray Beijing’s emerging
approach to “maritime governance as a great power.”18
Since 2008, the PLAN has dispatched thirty-two escort task forces to the Gulf
of Aden. Each task force has been composed of a three-ship configuration of two
warships (consisting of various combinations of frigates, destroyers, or both) and
an underway replenishment ship. In the first three years of these operations (or
eight task groups), the PLAN relied on “ten domestic-made main battle ships
and three supply ships” to fulfill these escort missions in the waters off Somalia.19
However, from the deployment of the ninth task force in the summer of 2011,
the PLAN began to expand the number and type of new platforms for these farseas missions. For instance, “the 054A guided-missile frigate Yulin (Hull 569),
which had been commissioned for less than one and half years,” deployed with
the ninth task force, and just two years later three of the very latest Type 903
comprehensive resupply ships joined the PLAN escort task-force deployments.
As the PLA Daily noted on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of these deployments in the summer of 2018, “the Chinese Navy is no longer worried about
warship shortages. Not only were more warships built, the qualities had also been
improved on a gradual basis. From the ‘Chinese Aegis’ to 10,000-ton destroyers,
from a refitted Russian aircraft carrier to a new domestically manufactured aircraft carrier, the Chinese Navy is transforming from a green-water navy into a
robust blue-water navy.”20
Another indicator of the PLAN’s global expansion came in 2010 when the fifth
escort task force “did not return home directly after completing escort missions,
but continued to visit countries in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Oceania.”21 This
demonstration of operational readiness following three months of escort duty in
the Gulf of Aden marked the “globalization of the PLAN.”
This concept was expanded further in 2011 when the seventh task force dispatched the Type 054A / Jiangkai II–class guided-missile frigate Xuzhou (hull
530) to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) of PRC nationals
from Libya. While the People’s Navy acknowledged the difficulties that FFG 530
experienced in conducting this first-ever PRC foreign-soil NEO, by 2015 the
PLAN’s NEO capabilities had improved markedly, as the nineteenth escort task
force “confidently evacuated Chinese nationals from Yemen”—a first for the
PLAN in a hostile threat environment.22
Since 2011, the normal state of affairs has been two PLAN escort task forces
under way in the region a majority of the time, with one task force conducting
escort missions in the Gulf of Aden while the other conducts “goodwill,” or showthe-flag, port visits in surrounding areas of the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and
Mediterranean Sea, and even into the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. This
concept was highlighted, or “stress tested,” when the twentieth PLAN escort task
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1
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force conducted a five-month global circumnavigation in 2015.23 It is clear that
in the short span of a single decade the PLAN went from being largely confined
to the first island chain to having a global presence, with its escort task-force
program having visited over sixty nations (see table 1).
What these examples of expanded geographic operations in the far seas demonstrate is the ageless lesson that all seafaring nations learn about the capabilities
and confidence that navies gain from being at sea. These data represent a trend
line that foreshadows an expanding PLAN global presence, one that will continue
to improve its combat readiness as each new area of the maritime commons is
opened up to PRC influence.
While the PLAN has gained valuable experience from these years of merely
plying the waters of the Gulf of Aden and other far seas at all, the PLAN has
acknowledged that its improvements also are the “result of its new blue-navy
strategy.” A key element of that strategy was the PLAN’s planning and development of the two-task-force deployment system. This deployment system
provides PLAN leadership the means to “easily handle any emergency,” insofar
as is required at present.24 Given PRC leadership comments regarding its global
agenda, it seems likely there will be an increase in the number of task-force
deployments, especially as the size of the PLAN expands over the next twenty
to thirty years.25
One of the keys to the PLAN’s ten years of successful and expansive navalescort task-force operations has been the development of a robust underway replenishment capability. During the first four and a half years of these operations,
just three Type 903 supply ships (the so-called supply-ship troika) were used
to resupply all the deploying PLAN warships. This obvious limitation required
PLAN schedulers to keep one of these three resupply ships on station through
two rotations of task-force deployments.
This era of the supply-ship troika finally ended when the supply ship Taihu
(hull 889), the first Type 903A comprehensive supply ship, deployed with the
fifteenth antipiracy task force in August 2013. Since then, the PLAN has built
many more comprehensive resupply ships that have been able to support the
two-task-force schedule with a dedicated resupply ship for each task-force deployment. The increase in the number of fleet-replenishment ships has expanded
the PLAN’s knowledge and training surrounding this very important capability,
which serves as the backbone for all naval forces that aspire to conduct global
naval operations. As noted in the People’s Daily, “the Type-903 series supply ships
have greatly improved their replenishment efficiency and are able to conduct
alongside, astern, vertical, and skin-to-skin connected replenishment-at-sea at
the same time. Therefore, they can carry out underway replenishment missions
under more complicated conditions.”26
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020

23

20

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 1

TABLE 1
PLA NAVY ANTIPIRACY ESCORT TASK FORCE—FOREIGN PORT CALLS
Task Force Numbers and Years

Foreign Port Calls

Task forces 1–5
2009–10

Burma, Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Malaysia,
Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, United Arab
Emirates (UAE)

Task forces 6–10
2011–12

Bahrain, Brunei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Kuwait,
Mozambique, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles,
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand

Task forces 11–15
2012–14

Algeria, Australia, Bulgaria, France, Israel, Kenya, Malta,
Morocco, Portugal, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore,
Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam

Task forces 16–20
2014–16

Angola, Britain, Cameroon, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark,
East Timor, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Greece (×2),
Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia,
Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, South Africa,
Sudan, Sweden, Turkey, UAE, USA

Task forces 21–25
2016–17

Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, India, Kuwait, Malaysia,
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea,
Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, UAE, Vanuatu, Vietnam

Task forces 26–30
2017–19

Algeria, Belgium, Britain, Cambodia, Denmark, France,
Greece, Italy, Morocco, Philippines, Spain, Tunisia

Sources: Multiple, compiled by the author.

And while the ships of the Type 903 series have enhanced the far-seas operations of the PLAN greatly, they no longer are the Chinese navy’s most advanced
supply ships, as the first of the new Type 901 series / Fuyu-class large-scale resupply ships came into service on 1 September 2017.27 The Type 901 is comparable
in capability to the U.S. Navy’s forthcoming USNS John Lewis–class (T-AO 205)
fleet oilers, which are set to replace the aging Henry J. Kaiser–class (T-AO 187)
ships. The Fuyu-class replenishment ship is projected to be “a gas-turbine powered fast combat support ship that is designed to operate alongside an aircraft
carrier strike group.”28 While as of May 2020 the new Type 901 series had yet to
be deployed to the Gulf of Aden for escort task-force operations, its first overseas
operations likely will come within the next year or two when the PLAN conducts
its first aircraft carrier deployments into the far seas.
Not only have PLAN sailors deployed aboard their newest and latest
type warships and learned how to navigate and maintain their ships far from
home; PLAN leaders also have learned other valuable skills for maintaining
command and control over their expanding fleet operations. The PLA Daily
has noted that, “with the improvement of the Chinese Navy’s hardware, the
escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia have become
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1
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training opportunities to sharpen the Chinese Navy’s software capacity.”29 Some
of the software capacity improvements surely lie in the advanced weapons
deployed aboard these task-group warships, but another improvement relates to the PLAN’s ability to command and control its warships farther from
China. For instance, according to the People’s Navy, the PLAN commander has
conducted Lunar New Year video teleconferences (VTCs) with every task
force (save one) since the fourth escort task force in 2010. These VTCs demonstrate the PLAN’s commitment to maintaining a robust and global commandand-control capability.30
While the initial impetus for the PLAN escort task-force missions was to gain
blue-water experience, PLAN leaders now recognize, and publicize, that these
worldwide deployments have “become the vanguard to protect China’s interests
overseas.”31 This past decade of far-seas operations foreshadows the PLAN’s increasing ability to project power across the globe.
The real importance of the past decade of far-seas operations for the PLAN lies
not just in the service’s ability to navigate and sustain the material readiness of its
ships but in how those lessons are combined with the lessons the PLAN is learning through numerous war-at-sea naval exercises, held under real-world conditions, routinely occurring along the PRC’s coast. For example, in early August
2017 “the PLAN held a large-scale, multi-fleet live-fire exercise simultaneously
in the Yellow Sea and Bo Hai, with naval ships, submarines, aircraft, and coastal
defense units.”32 The combination of these near-seas live-fire naval exercises with
the past decade of far-seas operations is transforming the PLAN into a global
naval force that will be able to fight and win naval battles.
PLAN Aircraft Carriers
Beyond an examination of the PLAN’s current global operations, it is necessary to
predict where the PLAN may operate with new platforms in the future. Perhaps
no PLAN platform has received more attention than the aircraft carrier.
The most impressive display of PLAN power came in March 2018 when the service’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (CV 16), was flanked by other PLAN warships
and submarines in the South China Sea. President Xi Jinping attended what was
described as the largest parade the PLAN had ever carried out, with forty-eight
ships and seventy-six aircraft taking part.33 The state-run People’s Daily characterized the display as an “unprecedentedly” large-scale naval exercise—involving a
flotilla as large as the one the Royal Navy dispatched to fight the Falklands War
in 1982. The Chinese naval commentator noted that the exercise most likely was
used to “test China’s aircraft carrier formation, gathering data and experience for
the country’s future construction of carrier combat groups.”34
More importantly, the exercise could be characterized as a coming-out for
the PLAN’s power-projection capabilities. Uncharacteristically, the PRC press
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boasted that “the Chinese navy will conduct even larger-scale drills in the
future.”35 It even admitted a belief that to “be a world-class navy, the Chinese
navy has the right to catch up” with navies of developed countries in terms of
technology and scale, even beyond the PLAN’s recent advances. As a harbinger
of the future, Chinese commentators highlighted that “the problem of a relatively
small aggregate tonnage of naval vessels must be resolved, in order to increase the
navy’s capability to confront naval hegemonies in the world.”36
Following this unprecedented exercise, news of the PLAN’s aircraft carrier
program continued to receive enormous attention. Shandong (CV 17), China’s
first indigenously produced carrier, conducted three sea trials between March
and November 2018. FollowThe combination of . . . near-seas live-fire na- ing the last sea trial of CV
17, Xinhua reported that the
val exercises with the past decade of far-seas
PLAN’s third aircraft carrier
operations is transforming the PLAN into a
global naval force that will be able to fight and was under construction, most
likely at the Jiangnan Shipyard
win naval battles.
near Shanghai. While Chinese
naval experts predicted the third carrier would take two and a half years to be
launched, projections widely assert that this iteration will have a flat deck and
some form of catapult launch capability.37
Just how many aircraft carriers the PRC will build is a topic of great discussion in the PRC press. In December 2018, the PLA Daily ran an article quoting
two naval experts who assessed the PRC as needing at least five aircraft carriers,
if not six, to fulfill “strategic shifts in the geo-political environment.” According
to “China’s Military Strategy,” a white paper that the State Council’s Information
Office released in 2015, these “strategic shifts” were implemented to refocus the
PLAN from “offshore waters defense” to “open seas protection,” so as to “enhance
its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattacks, maritime maneuvers,
joint operations at sea, comprehensive defense, and support.”38
What seems clear is that the boasting about future aspirations in March 2018
was inspired by the speech President Xi delivered aboard one of the destroyers
during the naval exercise. In his speech, President Xi stated that “building a
world-class navy was part of his broader goal to ‘rejuvenate’ the nation.”39 Regardless of the rationale, given the scope and size of this event, the publicity about it,
and the subsequent testing of the second carrier and rollout of the third carrier,
there is little doubt the PRC still is expanding the size and scope of the PLAN
aircraft carrier program.
According to some Chinese military experts, the PRC plans to have “at least
six aircraft battle groups . . . in the water by 2035,” of which four “will be nuclearpowered,” as it builds up its naval capability closer to that of the U.S. Navy.40 Thus,
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given the PRC’s demonstrated efforts to be the “biggest” or “number one” across
so many areas of national power, prudence requires that we prepare for a PLAN
that has at least ten aircraft carriers by 2049—to match or surpass the capacity of
the U.S. Navy.
Expanding PLAN Submarine Operations
Expert observers consider the expansion of PLAN submarine operations into the
far seas to have begun in October 2006, when a Song-class diesel submarine was
sighted within four nautical miles of USS Kitty Hawk.41 Between 2006 and 2013,
PLAN submarine operations expanded into the South China Sea and Philippine
Sea and became a normalized pattern of activity. Since 2013, “the PLAN has
conducted regular deployments of nuclear submarines into the Indian Ocean,
and while submarines, especially nuclear-powered types, are suboptimal against
pirates, they are a highly useful threat against India.”42
The obvious question is where PLAN submarines will operate next. That
question can be answered by paying attention to PRC oceanographic-research
and survey operations. The PRC’s naval oceanography often is conducted “in
tandem with, or under the guise of, scientific or commercial oceanography, but
its real intent is to gain important data about the undersea domain, principally
anything of benefit to the PLAN elite submarine force.”43 Wherever the PRC
has carried out this ocean-floor mapping—in the East and South China Seas,
the Philippine Sea, the western Pacific Ocean, and the Indian Ocean—PLAN
submarine operations have followed.
For example, in December 2018 it was reported that two PRC vessels designated “distant-ocean research fleet” ships, Kexue and Haice 3301, had entered
Papua New Guinea’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and conducted operations
involving “even spacing between legs.” Such activity is a clear indicator of bathymetric data collection that would support future PLAN submarine and submersible operations.44
With regard to the Atlantic Ocean, in 2018 “China’s new generation of
ocean-going comprehensive scientific research ship Xiang Yang Hong 01 successfully completed China’s first global ocean comprehensive scientific examination
task.”45 While Xiang Yang Hong 01 is subordinate to the Ministry of Natural
Resources (MNR) and deploys to distant oceans as part of the PRC’s program
to collect oceanic data, as Martinson and Dutton have noted, one of the main
drivers for this data-collection program is to “support the development of
China’s blue-water naval capabilities,” a function that is “especially important
for undersea warfare.”46 Xiang Yang Hong 01 departed the port of Qingdao in
August 2017 and deployed more than 38,000 nautical miles across the Indian
and Atlantic Oceans and back into the Pacific before returning to its home port
on 18 May 2018.47 Interestingly, Xiang Yang Hong 01 spent the month of October
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FIGURE 1
CHINESE RESEARCH SHIP OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Source: Greene, “Chinese Surveillance near PNG Expanding.”

2017 conducting oceanographic operations in the South Atlantic, the third leg of
its circumnavigation of the globe.48 An article published in the November 2018
issue of the Chinese Journal of Applied Oceanography suggests that the PLAN is
laying the intellectual foundation for undersea warfare operations in the Atlantic
Ocean. Specifically, the authors highlight the military significance of the work,
stating that it “has practical value for exploiting seasonal variation in sound
propagation in the Atlantic Ocean to engage in target detection.”49 This is a clear
reference to future submarine operations.
In addition to the MNR’s fleet of nearly a dozen National Marine Research
distant-ocean research vessels, the PLAN operates some nine distant-ocean
survey ships that “perform bathymetric surveys” and collect oceanographic data.
For instance, the PLAN’s Type 636A Shupang-class oceanographic research ship
(designated AGS) Zhu Kezhen was reported to have conducted hydrographic
survey operations in South Atlantic waters off Brazil in 2015. In addition to
completing the East Sea Fleet’s first single-ship global circumnavigation, the mission of Zhu Kezhen was to conduct “an active exploration of understanding the
ocean” in support of the PLAN’s role in transforming the PRC into a maritime
power. Of particular interest, it was reported that Zhu Kezhen in recent years had
been “focused on the strong military objectives, [and] innovated the all-weather
survey and measurement model according to the requirements of ‘can fight and
win the battle.’”50
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Like the U.S. Navy, the PLAN “possesses a corps of meteorologists and oceanographers” who support weather forecasting and hydrographic chart production.
Most importantly, as Martinson and Dutton have noted, the “PLAN’s distantocean survey fleet has more than tripled since 2015.”51 As Rear Admiral James V.
P. Goldrick, RAN (Ret.), former head of Australia’s Border Protection Command,
has observed, the Chinese mapping of the world’s oceans is now on the same scale
as Soviet maritime operations during the height of the Cold War.52 Given the
previous pattern of MNR and PLAN oceanographic operations preceding PLAN
submarine operations, we should prepare for Chinese submarine operations in
the Atlantic over the course of the next decade, and most certainly by 2030.
This is to say nothing of PLAN submarine operations in the Pacific over
the past decade. One need only recall Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy’s 2015
testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, that the PLAN’s
submarine force was expanding its geographic area of operations as well as the
duration of subs’ deployments. Extrapolating from Indian Ocean operations,
Admiral Mulloy noted that in 2015 one PLAN submarine had been deployed
for ninety-five days.53 Given the global nature of the PLAN’s expansion, it is not
unreasonable for USN leaders to expect to see PLAN submarines operating in
Hawaiian waters; if they are not doing so already, they surely will within the next
five years. We also should expect to see PLAN submarines operating off the U.S.
West Coast by 2030.
As for the number of PLAN submarines that can be expected in the future, in
2015 Scott Cheney-Peters and I estimated that by 2030 the PLAN would have twelve
nuclear-powered attack submarines (designated SSNs), twelve nuclear-powered
ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), and seventy-five air-independent-propulsion
(i.e., AIP) and diesel attack submarines (SSPs/SSs).54 However, given recent developments regarding a possible new nuclear submarine–production facility under
the Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Company (BSHIC) in Huludao, the number of PLAN SSNs and SSBNs may be greater than originally estimated.
According to analysis of Google Earth commercial-satellite imagery of land
reclamation at BSHIC since 2014, a collection of large foundations and buildings—including “a main assembly hall, a pressurized hull production shop, a
paint shop, and a number of transport rails”—could be China’s newest nuclear
submarine–production facility. While the commercial imagery has “prompted
some Chinese military enthusiasts to compare it with interiors of other nuclear
production halls around the world,” others remain unconvinced.55 The case
against this facility being a new nuclear submarine–production hall is based on
two arguments: one, the existence of a concrete wall blocking the dual rail lines
from the construction halls to the dry dock; and two, doubt about the thickness
of the concrete slabs in the new halls and whether they have the load-bearing
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capacity for SSNs or SSBNs. With regard to the first issue—the wall blocking
the rail line to the dry dock—commercial imagery since mid-2017 clearly indicates that the concrete wall has been removed. Now the dual rail lines from
the production halls to the dry dock are unobstructed, thereby allowing any
newly produced SSN or SSBN to reach the waters of the Bo Hai. As for the
thickness of the concrete slabs and their load-bearing capability, the argument
is unconvincing, as the resolution of the commercial imagery is insufficient to
determine the matter.
Given the existence of this new facility, its internal configuration, and its estimated production capacity, such “an arrangement, once mature and properly
organized with efficient pre-assembly module fabrication, may enable two SSNs
and one SSBN to be launched every year.” If such a rate of production were to
begin in 2020, the PLAN could have as many as twenty-four SSNs and fourteen
SSBNs by 2030. While some may scoff at this projection, it is worth remembering that as recently as a decade ago similar doubts existed regarding Chinese
destroyer production—but in 2018 alone the PRC launched seven new destroyers
(three Type 055s and four Type 052Ds).56
Intelligence Collection
Another mission area in which the PLAN has been operating in the far
seas is intelligence collection. Beginning in 2012, the PLAN has dispatched
intelligence-collection ships (designated auxiliary general intelligence vessels
[AGIs]) to the waters off Hawaii during the biennial USN-sponsored Rim of the
Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise. While the PRC was not a participant in RIMPAC
2012, that did not prevent it from sending an AGI. The PLAN again dispatched
an AGI to the waters off Hawaii during RIMPAC 2014, even though the PLAN
was invited formally and participated with four ships. The PLAN did not send
an AGI to RIMPAC 2016, in which it again was a formal exercise participant.
However, during RIMPAC 2018, to which the PLAN was not invited, a PLAN
Type 815 Dongdiao-class AGI did show up off the coast of Hawaii, according
to the U.S. Pacific Fleet.57
PLAN AGI collection operations have targeted other U.S. naval exercises and
operations. For instance, in 2014 the PLAN dispatched a Dongdiao-class AGI
to spy on the U.S. Seventh Fleet–led Exercise VALIANT SHIELD in the waters off
Guam.58 Then, according to the Pentagon, in July 2017 the PLAN dispatched
another Dongdiao-class AGI, this time to collect intelligence against the U.S.
missile-defense test of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system (referred
to as THAAD).59 Coincidentally, this occurred as yet another PLAN Dongdiaoclass AGI was detected within the Australian EEZ near Queensland, where U.S.
and Royal Australian Navy warships and aircraft were conducting Exercise TAL60
ISMAN SABER.
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The PLAN’s AGI operations over the last several years have not confined
themselves to collection missions against the United States and its allies. In 2018,
in a first, the Russian Federation invited the PLA to participate in the strategic
VOSTOK exercise, billed as the largest exercise in modern Russian history. Sergey
Shoygu, the Russian defense minister, was quoted as saying that “about 300,000
troops, more than 1,000 planes, helicopters, and drones, up to 80 combat and
logistic ships and up to 36,000 tanks, armored personnel carriers and other vehicles” were involved in the exercise. Of the personnel, 3,500 were PLA soldiers
dedicated to the ground portion of the exercise.61
Remarkably, as has been the PRC’s pattern at RIMPAC exercises, a PLAN
Dongdiao-class AGI was dispatched to shadow “Russian Navy assets for the
length of the at-sea portion of the exercise while Chinese and Mongolian troops
exercised ashore,” according
to
U.S. officials. 62 InterestWhen it comes to the very important metric
ingly, there was no reported
of how many ships actually are being built,
launched, and commissioned, the PLAN con- presence of other PLAN warships in support of the VOStinues to surpass the U.S. Navy.
TOK 2018 exercise.
Despite AGIs being some of the most vulnerable platforms in any war-at-sea
scenario, the increasing presence of PLAN AGIs around the world provides the
PRC another layer of collection in its expanding maritime-intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture. The function they perform should be recognized as another important element in the PLAN’s overall global naval strategy.
Another aspect of intelligence collection that could generate future PLAN activity relates to international underwater cables, which are very important for the
amounts of information they carry. In this regard, it is worth noting the PLAN’s
activities in the islands of the South Pacific, particularly around Fiji. In December
2018, a “China-aided” hydrographic survey ship was handed over to the Fijian
navy. The ship, Kacau (named for a Fijian seabird), is reported to be “equipped
with high-tech equipment for hydro detection” for carrying out “hydrographic
and maritime surveys, providing detection data and real-time information.”63
An eighteen-member PLAN training team spent four months training the Fijian
crewmembers of Kacau. The Fijian minister for defense, national security, and
foreign affairs noted that the ship would provide “a range of operational capability, which is not limited to hydrographic survey but maritime surveillance, HADR
[humanitarian assistance / disaster relief], diving, [and] Search and Rescue.”64
Given China’s previous efforts to establish underwater-surveillance networks,
it is reasonable to expect that the hydrographic data the Fijian vessel generates
may be shared with China and processed by Chinese institutes, adding to China’s
undersea-domain databases.65 Further, this gift may open the door for joint-venture
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FIGURE 2
UNDERSEA CABLES CONNECTING AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND TO THE INTERNET

Source: CerCis Consulting, cercisconsulting.com/.

hydrographic expeditions that will include this ship and deployed Chinese research vessels, possibly including among the latter the 6,000- and 7,000-meterclass submersibles and their associated support ships. In a worst-case scenario,
this knowledge and access would allow the PRC to isolate both Australia and New
Zealand from receiving U.S. intelligence and communications. This is something
that bears close monitoring by the United States, and close coordination with
Australia and New Zealand.
Hospital Ship
As the lead element of its psychological operations, the PLAN operates its Type
920 / Anwei-class hospital ship Peace Ark (AH 866) globally. The PLAN deployed
Peace Ark on a 205-day around-the-world deployment, publicized as “Mission
Harmony–2018.” The PRC press reported that Peace Ark’s “goodwill” voyage extended over 31,800 nautical miles and provided medical services during foreign
port calls in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, Venezuela, Ecuador, the
Commonwealth of Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, and the Dominican Republic.66 During the port call in Ecuador, the chief of the mission noted that Peace Ark
had visited over forty-two nations since it was launched in 2008 and had treated
nearly a quarter of a million patients.67
But in addition to showing the flag and providing medical services, the officers
and sailors of Peace Ark gained invaluable training and experience in operating
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1
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at sea around the globe, as well as learning about foreign ports and the navies in
each nation. While it may seem counterintuitive, even a hospital ship deployment
provides—albeit in the smallest of ways—the kind of experience that contributes
to the PLAN’s overall combat readiness on a global scale.
Participation in Foreign Naval Exercises
One of the drivers of the PLAN’s global expansionism is the clear and unambiguous
benefit it obtains from participating in naval exercises with foreign navies. Despite
assertions to the contrary by some in the “China hands” community, the PLAN
gained valuable insight into naval warfare from its participation in RIMPACs 2014
and 2016. While the activities involved seemingly were innocuous, the PRC press
noted that the PLAN participated in “cannon firing exercises, comprehensive exercises, maritime security actions, maritime warship exercises, military medicine
exchanges, humanitarian aid, and disaster reduction, as well as diving drills.”68
Participation in these activities clearly provided the service with an unprecedented
intelligence windfall that ultimately threatens USN operational security, so disinviting the PLAN from participating, as of RIMPAC 2018, was long overdue.
Likewise, the PLAN has conducted joint naval-warfare exercises, named JOINT
SEA by the PRC, with the Russian navy since 2012. Since then the scope, scale,
and complexity of this exercise series have expanded. Each year the PLAN has
dispatched its warships to the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Mediterranean
and Baltic Seas.69 The most recent iteration of the exercise, JOINT SEA–2019, was
conducted from 29 April to 4 May, and focused on joint sea defense.70 The exercise involved Chinese aircraft and submarines and Russian submarines engaging
in joint maneuvering episodes, organized communications, rocket practice, and
engagement of sea and air targets with artillery fire.71
Not only did this experience catch the attention of U.S. military and intelligence communities, but it was observed by allies, including Norway. In February 2019, Lieutenant General Morten Haga Lunde, Norway’s chief of military
intelligence, highlighted Chinese and Russian Arctic cooperation in his annual
report. The unprecedented statement declared that “in the long term, we must be
prepared for a clearer Chinese presence also in our neighboring areas.” General
Haga Lunde went on to assess that “such development is in line with President
Xi’s goal to develop the military as part of the country’s superpower ambitions.
Beijing will to a larger extent use military power as a tool in its foreign policy.”
Lending credence to the Norwegian assessment, in 2018 Vice Admiral Shen
Jinlong, the commander of the Chinese navy, visited Severomorsk, the Russian
Northern Fleet headquarters north of Murmansk on the Barents Sea coast.72
While the PLAN never has conducted military voyages to Arctic waters, this
likely will change soon, given that in January 2019 the PRC conceptually laid
out a so-called Polar Silk Road in a white paper entitled “China’s Arctic Policy.”73
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Future PRC Naval Operating Areas:
The Belt and Road Initiative and the PLA Navy
One obvious indicator of future PLAN operations is a direct link to the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI). That concept first was presented in 2013 under the banner
of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road during
President Xi’s visits to Central and Southeast Asia.74 Then in 2015, President
Xi unveiled “the principles, framework, and cooperation priorities and mechanisms” of what was renamed the Belt and Road Initiative, which, according to
the PRC, was designed “to enhance regional connectivity and embrace a brighter
future together.”75
The importance of the BRI to the PRC’s future can be found in the January
2019 report from China’s Ministry of Commerce, which announced that the
trade volume between China and countries along the BRI totaled $1.3 trillion in
2018, up 16.3 percent from the year prior.76 Not only does the BRI involve substantial amounts of money deployed to buy access and influence; it also serves
to satisfy the PRC’s mercantilist designs to control markets, supply chains, and
access to the resources needed to control global economic development.
The Pentagon has taken note of how the PRC is using the BRI “to develop
strong economic ties with other countries, shape their interests to align with China’s, and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to sensitive issues.”77
In keeping with that view, the world has witnessed the PLAN expand its operations into the far seas in parallel with the BRI’s expansion throughout the IndoPacific, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas over the past six years.
In its “Vision of Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative”
white paper, released in 2017, the PRC describes three maritime corridors and
their importance to maritime-security cooperation. The first corridor runs from
China through the Indian Ocean to Africa and the Mediterranean Sea; the second runs from China to Oceania and the South Pacific; while the third transits
northward from China to Europe through the Arctic.78 By providing the PLAN
with access to various foreign ports, the BRI has created advantages for the naval
service that have allowed it to extend its operations around the globe. The United
States—notably and purposefully—is not included in the BRI; in the future this
could isolate us, leave us in a weak negotiating position, or otherwise bring
pressure to bear on us. However, neither option—being part of the BRI or being
excluded from it—is good for the United States; instead, we should continue to
resist the BRI entirely, not least for the naval advantages it grants to China.
So, where might we find the PLA operating in the future, as the BRI continues to expand? The answer to that question became clearer when President Xi
conducted a three-nation visit to Europe in March 2019. On 23 March, it was
announced that Italy had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1
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with the PRC, making it the first member of the Group of Seven industrialized nations to join the BRI. The agreement, ostensibly worth $2.4 billion, has
the potential to balloon to $22.4 billion, according to the Italian deputy prime
minister (although these numbers should be considered with great skepticism,
given that other announced billions of dollars in BRI investments have not materialized). But the compromising concessions that are front-loaded into such
agreements are very real. In the case of Italy, they include the state-owned China
Communications Construction Company (CCCC) signing two cooperation
agreements, with the authorities of the port of Trieste and
[T]his global naval presence will result in
with the commissioner suexactly what the world has witnessed in the
pervising the reconstruction
South and East China Seas over the past
decade, where PLAN forces have been used to of the bridge in Genoa that
collapsed in the summer of
bully and intimidate smaller and weaker na2018. 79 While it is not clear
tions into complying with Beijing’s dictates.
whether the MOU would
cover the port of Genoa project, the Italian press reported that Italian port authorities are preparing to set up a new company with CCCC to operate “major
works related to the port of Genoa.”80
Purportedly, the importance of this agreement to China is in relation to the
BRI, in that it “will allow it to build more ports that can handle large-scale container ships.”81 Yet even the mayor of Trieste acknowledged that, while the city
had much to gain from the agreement, “the Chinese had even more to gain from
his port’s deep harbors.”82 It should be anticipated that, as with other BRI port
projects, as the BRI expands into Trieste, Ravenna, and Genoa, PLAN warships
will follow. Ultimately, the PRC’s expanding access to ports in Europe offers the
PLAN more opportunities to resupply its forces, potentially even during a maritime conflict in other areas.
The linkage between the expansion of BRI projects and investment in and
acquisition of ports has been the topic of much analysis recently, most notably
by Thorne and Spevack, who assert that the BRI provides Beijing with “access to
vital sea lines of communication.” Port investments are being used as “vehicles”
whereby the PRC can “build dual-use infrastructure to facilitate Beijing’s longrange naval operations.”83 Likewise, O’Dea postulates that expansion by the
China COSCO Shipping Corporation (COSCO) is a “distinctly Chinese approach
to maritime development,” and that this “state-owned shipping company has
become the flagship of China’s ambition to become a global maritime power.”84
This expansion has not been limited to Europe, Africa, and Southeast and
South Asia. For instance, in February 2019 it was reported that the Peruvian port
of Chancay would join COSCO under the auspices of the BRI. The $225 million
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agreement was reported to be COSCO’s first port purchase in South America,
one that will provide deepwater (sixteen meters) access. Plans have been announced to build a new terminal at the port.85
Not all of the PRC’s port expansion is controlled by COSCO. For example,
in March 2019 came the formal announcement that Namibia’s new container
terminal in the coastal town of Walvis Bay—originally projected to be commissioned on 1 August 2019—was constructed by China Harbour Engineering
Company. Following a $300 million funding grant from the African Development Bank, construction work began in 2014 on forty hectares of land reclaimed from the sea.86 The terminal will more than double the cargo-volume
capacity of the port—and undoubtedly will provide the PLAN with an access
port on the Atlantic.
Even as the number of separate, specific cases in which the PRC has gained
access to foreign ports continues to grow, O’Dea already has provided the conclusive summation of the overall impact of this strategy. “By creating a global
port network for ostensibly commercial purposes, China has gained the ability
to project power through the increased physical presence of its naval vessels—
turning the oceans that historically have protected the United States from foreign
threats into a venue in which China can challenge U.S. interests.”87
CONTROL OF RESOURCES
One of the most sensitive factors relevant to the BRI and the future of PLAN
global expansionism is the PRC’s dependency on imported oil. As the Global
Times has reported, the PRC’s oil consumption is rising faster than its ability to
import crude oil. For example, in 2018 the PRC consumed 648 million tons of
oil, of which 460 million tons was imported, meaning the PRC’s dependency on
foreign crude was at 70 percent for the year—a clear strategic vulnerability for
the CCP. The PRC’s “domestic oil fields have generally reached the limits of their
oil production capacity,” and it is unlikely there will be any significant increase
in domestic production. This directly impacts the PRC’s strategic petroleum
reserve (SPR), estimated at forty to fifty days’ worth, given the increasing rate of
consumption each year, despite Beijing’s efforts to curtail energy consumption
and find alternative sources.88 International norms are for nations to have at least
a ninety-day SPR, so it seems likely the PRC will become increasingly concerned
about its ability to maintain access to oil sources around the globe. This contributes to the drive for the PLAN to expand globally.
With regard to petroleum, it is worth noting that in January 2019 the China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) announced a major new oil discovery off Aberdeen, Scotland. CNOOC Petroleum Europe, a wholly owned
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subsidiary of CNOOC, holds a 50 percent interest in the operating license.89
While deployments of PLAN warships to the waters off Scotland may not be
imminent, this discovery creates another area of attention related to the PRC’s
vulnerable SPR situation, and marks a locale where the PLAN may operate in
the future.
Protecting and Controlling the Diaspora
As noted previously, the list of factors driving the PLAN’s increasing global
presence includes the top-down determination of Chairman Xi Jinping to make
China a maritime power, supporting the BRI, increasing participation in naval
exercises around the globe, and achieving energy security. But another area relates to protecting Chinese citizens and controlling Chinese resources around the
globe, and the extraterritorial projection of Chinese law internationally.
As noted in a January 2019 Center for Naval Analyses study, the mission of
defending Chinese people and assets abroad is one of the major factors in the
PLAN’s expansive presence throughout the Middle East and the western Indian
Ocean. The authors of the study state that “the number of Chinese citizens and
investments in the region has grown considerably,” and that the PLAN, in particular, “has been given a mandate to protect those interests.”90 While the PLAN
has conducted NEOs in Libya and Yemen, some indicators suggest that conflicts
on the horizon potentially involving the safety of Chinese nationals could bring
the PLAN into action even in the Americas.
For example, in the South Atlantic in February 2018, an “Argentine coast
guard vessel fired shots at a Chinese fishing vessel that was allegedly operating
in Argentina’s EEZ without authorization.” This incident occurred after the
Argentine forces had pursued the poachers for eight hours. Interestingly, the
fishing vessel was not alone and evaded capture by the Argentine navy with
the help of four other Chinese ships.91 This was not an isolated incident, as a
year later, in February 2019, a Chinese “squid jigger” fishing vessel sank after it
collided with a Spanish trawler.92 According to the Argentine coast guard, the
Chinese squid jigger, Hua Xiang 801, “was detected illegally operating in mile
199 of Argentina’s EEZ, and was ordered to stop engines and prepare for boarding by the patrol vessel.” In a video provided by the Argentine coast guard,
Hua Xiang 801 was “not operating its satellite Automatic Identification System,
AIS, ignored repeatedly radio warnings and before escaping with all lights off
tried on several occasions to ram the Argentine patrol.”93 While collisions at
sea between fishermen are not uncommon, given the PRC’s hypernationalistic
sensitivities to international slights and “loss of face,” it is entirely possible that
in the future Beijing may call on the PLAN to provide long-range support to
Chinese fishing fleets in the South Atlantic.
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As China’s naval dominance increases, we also should expect and prepare for
increasing attempts by China to extend its extraterritorial laws from Chinese
citizens to citizens of other countries. We already have seen this in the case of
people who are citizens of countries such as Australia and Sweden but of Chinese
ethnicity.94 We also are likely to see this approach imposed against any ethnicity
in the future, as it was against Canadians after the Huawei dispute.95
Diplomacy Drives PLAN Expansionism
Not only does the PRC’s mercantilist quest for resources, via the BRI, provide an
impetus for PLAN expansion; so too does international diplomacy. For instance,
another place where we might see an increase in PLAN warship port calls is El
Salvador.
The country officially cut ties with Taipei and established a formal strategic
alliance with Beijing in August 2018. Just a month before the official recognition of the PRC, Luz Estrella Rodríguez, El Salvador’s economy minister, stated
that Beijing was interested in reviving the commercial port of La Unión in El
Salvador’s east, which “has remained largely deserted since it was completed in
2008 because its lack of maritime traffic has made it difficult to find investors.”
This concatenation of events led the American ambassador to El Salvador, Jean
E. Manes, to warn publicly of the PRC’s intentions to turn the commercial port
into a “military base.”96
The Pursuit and Sustainment of a Global PLAN
Since the PLAN’s expanded global naval capabilities and operations are linked
firmly to President Xi’s “China Dream,” and since the PRC has not yet achieved
its end state of becoming a “modern socialist country,” we should expect that
over the next twenty years the PRC’s naval shipbuilders will sustain, or increase
as required, the pace of shipbuilding needed to achieve the goal of “building a
powerful military in the new era.”97 While predicting the future with precision
remains a difficult endeavor, given the trajectory of PRC naval construction over
the past twenty years, the following three assertions in favor of a robust Chinese
naval shipbuilding program have remained firmly in place since this author first
listed them in 2016.98
First, the Chinese government will have the desire and ability to continue to
increase in real terms its investment in its shipbuilding for naval forces; second,
China will continue to enjoy cost advantages in its shipbuilding compared with
foreign naval shipyards; and third, Chinese shipbuilders will continue the trend
of indigenous technical mastery of complex designs and systems integration.99
While challenges to PLAN modernization and growth remain—including difficulties in systems integration and continued reluctance to collaborate at the
research stage—the past decade has demonstrated that previous challenges have
ended up being far from insurmountable.
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The PRC has continued to make military spending a top national priority. In
2019, China announced that it had raised defense spending by 7.5 percent, to 1.19
trillion yuan (about 177.61 billion U.S. dollars).100 This demonstrates, again, that
the PRC’s annual growth rate for defense spending continues to outpace the rate
of increase in its gross domestic product (GDP), which for 2019 is estimated to
have been 6.5 percent.101 The PRC’s GDP surpassed that of the United States in
terms of purchasing power in 2014—with troubling implications for the future
size, capability, and disposition of the PLAN relative to the U.S. Navy.102
When it comes to the very important metric of how many ships actually are
being built, launched, and commissioned, the PLAN continues to surpass the
U.S. Navy. It is worth remembering that between 2013 and 2014 China launched
more naval ships than any other country—a ranking it continued to hold through
2019, as shown in table 2.103
As table 3 depicts, by 2030 the PLAN surface force (including carriers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, missile-armed patrol craft, amphibious ships, and
mine-warfare ships) could approach 450 hulls (up from 331 ships in 2015) and
submarines could total 99 (up from 66 in 2015). However, considering the past
four years of actual construction, even this 2015 “maximal scenario” may underestimate the future growth of the PLAN. For instance, in 2015 Type 052D /
Luyang III–class destroyer production barely had begun, and the launching of
the first Type 055 / Renai-class cruiser was a year and a half in the future. Another way to understand PLAN growth is to look at the period between 2010 and
2018, when twenty destroyers and four cruisers were launched from Chinese
shipyards, whereas between 2000 and 2010 only ten destroyers and no cruisers
were launched.104
Considering all this new information, table 3 represents a “course correction”
to the 2015 prediction, indicating that by 2030 the PLAN will consist of a surface
force of over 450 ships and a submarine force approaching 110 boats. The biggest
unknown will be the rate of decommissioning of those warships and submarines
built before the turn of the
TABLE 2
USN AND PLAN COMMISSIONS, 2015–18
century (such as the Type
053 class of destroyers and
U.S. Navy
PLA Navy
the Type 035 class of diesel
2015
3
24
submarines).
2016

4

24

2017

8

19

2018

7

15

Total

22

82

Sources: USN data from Wikipedia; PLA Navy data from Meyer, China’s Maritime Forces.
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TABLE 3
PLA NAVY PLATFORM INVENTORY—PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Inventory
Platform

2030 (old
estimate)

2030 (new
estimate)

2015

2019

Aircraft carriers

0

1

N/A

6

Cruisers

0

0

N/A

16

Destroyers

26

31

34

45

Frigates

52

52

68

55

Corvettes

20

42

26

45

Missile patrol craft

85

86

111

100

Amphibious ships

56

56

73

75

Mine-warfare ships

42

56

55

50

Major auxiliaries

50+

50+

65+

60+

331+

374+

432+

452+

Total surface combatants
SSNs

5

8–9

12

24

SSBNs

4

4–5

12

14

SSs

57

50–54

75

70

Total submarines

66

62–68

99

108

Total fleet size

397+

436–
442+

531+

560+

Sources: 2015 data from Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy; 2019 data from Meyer, China’s Maritime Forces; 2030 (old) data from Erickson,
Chinese Naval Shipbuilding; 2030 (new) data from author’s calculations.
Note: Captain Fanell prepared his figures for presentation at the China Maritime Studies Institute’s “Going Global? The People’s Navy in a Time of Strategic
Transformation” conference, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, May 2019. Subsequent to this conference, the Congressional Research
Service published Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report
RL33153 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 18 March 2020), table 2 of which is reproduced below. The CRS report generally reflects
Captain Fanell’s original and updated 2030 estimates.

NUMBERS OF BATTLE FORCE SHIPS, 2000–2030
FIGURES INCLUDE BOTH LESS-CAPABLE OLDER UNITS AND MORE-CAPABLE NEWER UNITS
2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

Ballistic missile submarines

1

1

3

4

4

6

8

Nuclear-powered attack submarines

5

4

5

6

7

10

13

Diesel attack submarines

56

56

48

53

55

55

55

Aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers

19

25

25

26

43

55

65

Frigates, corvettes

38

43

50

74

102

120

135

Total China navy battle force ships,
including types not shown above

110

220

220

255

360

400

425

Total U.S. Navy battle force ships

318

282

288

271

297

n/a

n/a

Source: Table prepared by CRS. Source for China’s navy: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed
Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020–
2030,” February 2020, 4 pp. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and
used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission. Figures are for end of calendar year. Source for figures for U.S.
Navy: U.S. Navy data; figures are for end of fiscal year.
Note: n/a means not available.
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factors to the PLAN’s expansion that the United States and its allies can and must
empower if they are to maintain dominance of the seas.
The first factor is the stability of the leadership of President Xi Jinping. Some
have pointed out that Xi is facing “critical levels of political risk given the political and economic problems in the regime.” Some believe that his constitutional
amendments to remove term limits on the president suggest that a factional struggle exists within the CCP. These observers further argue that Xi’s failure to hold a
fourth plenum of the CCP’s current Central Committee on the normal schedule
means that “the factional struggle is extremely intense and Xi is in grave danger.”105
Second, some observers predict that the PRC’s economic growth is unstable,
and even on the verge of collapse. These observers note that “China’s $34 trillion
pile of public and private debt is an explosive threat to the global economy.”106
Given this, the future growth and expansion of the PLAN could be slowed, if not
disrupted, by purposefully impeding the country’s economy.
ASSESSMENTS, ACCURACY, AND ADJUSTMENT
As U.S. policy makers assess the speed and sustainability of China’s naval expansion, it is useful to look back on previous assessments of Chinese sea power.
Whenever such a function has been performed, we should expect to find errors
and misjudgments—assessments of the future are hard. However, in the case
of China we find that the most notable feature of previous assessments is that
all our misjudgments have been in the same direction—perfectly fitting the
definition of systematic error. The urn of history is filled with the ashes of nations, and navies, that suffered disastrous, if not cataclysmic, defeat by enemies
who were able to achieve strategic surprise. This is why it is unacceptable that
the majority of U.S. scholars and government analysts persistently have underestimated and downplayed the threat represented by the PRC and the rise of a
global PLAN.
Former commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Robert F. Willard noted in 2009 as follows: “I would contend that in the past decade or so,
China has exceeded most of our intelligence estimates of their military capability and capacity every year. They’ve grown at an unprecedented rate in those
capabilities.”107 In 2011, the director of naval intelligence, Vice Admiral David
J. Dorsett, stated that the PLA’s emerging military potentialities have “entered
operational capability quicker than we frequently project.”108 The sad reality
is that the U.S. Intelligence Community and academia have miscalculated the
scope, scale, and timing of the PLAN’s modernization and its impact on U.S.
national security.
One of the most important lessons to be learned is that the most accurate
predictions of the PLAN are not derived just from what the PRC declares or
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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what a select few scholarly China hands interpret, but instead are created from
in-depth and consistent observation of what the PLAN actually is building and
where its ships and submarines are operating on a continuous basis. It is only
by watching what China does with its navy—observing and recording its movements every day—that accurate and timely projections can be made.
Additionally, it must be remembered that all individuals and groups who view
such changes do so through a series of uniquely constructed “lenses,” based on a
set of fundamental assumptions. As Eyer notes, “the record is clear: In each case
of strategic military surprise, it can be demonstrated that when new information
was presented, regardless of its pedigree or import, if it was found to disagree
with the specific set of closely held assumptions that informed the thinking of
those nations’ civil and military leaders, it was rejected.”109
Because of this tendency, assumptions must be tested rigorously, and when
new or inconvenient data do not fit into the existing “conventional wisdom”
decision makers must step in and demand that the assumptions be challenged,
and thrown out if found to be wrong.110 Only then will the risk of surprise be
minimized. This is especially important when assessing catastrophic risks,
such as a shift in the balance of military power from the United States to
China. While many China hands proclaim the objectivity of their analyses,
the validity of their claims must be tested against their track records. This is
where policy makers must become more discerning—and ruthless—in their
decision-making.
What does the future hold for the PLAN in the far seas? China soothes reassuringly that its “global military presence is not an attempt to gain a sphere of
influence, interfere with the internal affairs of other countries, [or] invade foreign
territories or disrupt regional order, but to assume more international responsibilities and obligations according to its capabilities and play a more significant
role in maintaining regional stability and world peace.”111 Yet there are indicators
that this global naval presence will result in exactly what the world has witnessed
in the South and East China Seas over the past decade, where PLAN forces have
been used to bully and intimidate smaller and weaker nations into complying
with Beijing’s dictates.
The risk of conflict at sea is not lessened by the existence of a global PLAN,
one that has been charged to “fulfill its international obligations as a major global
power.”112 To the contrary, China increasingly will threaten U.S. and allied interests
abroad as its naval expansion allows it to do so. The United States will be forced to
fight back, increasing the risk of major-power war. Given the PLAN’s decadelong experience operating in the far seas, the service’s operational and naval-construction
trajectory, the PRC’s overall economic strength, and the regime’s established track
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1
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record of intimidating neighbors into forfeiting their coastal-state rights to China,
we can assess the PRC as being on track to become a global naval power as early
as 2030, that it may be able to dominate the seven seas by 2049, and that it will use
its power to expand China’s interests at the expense of all others.
It is popular to say that conflict with China is not inevitable; of course that is
so. However, the likelihood of conflict cannot be wished away by platitudes and
more unconstrained engagement. The best option to avert future conflict is for
the United States to take a whole-of-government approach to strengthening its
military significantly and confronting the PRC’s bad behavior at sea. We must
join the economic battle that Beijing long has been fighting against us, to contain
China economically until it stops its dangerous naval arms race. The current U.S.
administration has challenged assumptions about how to deal with the PRC and
is leading this whole-of-government challenge. Beating the PLAN at sea, or forcing it to stand down permanently, requires these efforts and more. Let us hope it
is not too little, too late.
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AMELIORATING THE ALLIANCE DILEMMA IN AN
AGE OF GRAY-ZONE CONFLICT
Lessons Learned from the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Michael M. Bosack

T

wo key concepts in alliance theory that remain ever relevant in practice today
are those of abandonment and entrapment. In short, whenever there is an
expectation of a military commitment, whether formal or informal, there may
be two accompanying fears. The first is that the ally will fail to meet its end of
the bargain—that it will abandon its obligations in a time of need. The second
fear is that a security commitment will draw an ally into a war it did not want
to fight; that is, it will be entrapped in conflict. These fears of abandonment and
entrapment influence alliance interactions, although their impacts on security
relationships are the source of debate among practitioners and academics alike.
These concepts, as employed in international relations studies, emerged in
the late Cold War era against the backdrop of bipolar superpower competition.1
Certainly, things have changed since the Cold War,
Michael M. Bosack is the special adviser for both in practice and in academic understanding.
government relations at the Yokosuka Council on AsiaA wealth of studies have been performed within
Pacific Studies. Previously he served as the deputy chief
the field of foederology; much of that work centers
of government relations at Headquarters, U.S. Forces,
Japan, where he was part of the team that drafted on the notions of abandonment and entrapment.2
and implemented the 2015 “Guidelines for Japan-U.S.
There also have been significant changes to the
Defense Cooperation.” Prior to that he was a Mansfield
Fellow, completing placements in Japan’s national Diet, strategic environment; the prevalence of interstate
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Defense.
and extrastate warfare involving alliance comHe is a graduated East-West Center fellow and is
pursuing a PhD in international relations from the mitments has decreased, and security conflict
International University of Japan.
among states has expanded into new domains,
with greater emphasis on the application of non© 2020 by Michael M. Bosack
military instruments of power.3 This has created
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an increased need for a “whole-of-government” approach to security issues that
goes beyond traditional defense sectors. At the same time, the nature and role of
alliances within competition and conflict have evolved.
From this, two problems emerge associated with collective understandings of
abandonment and entrapment. The first is the absence of a compilation of key
takeaways from scholarship, especially those that apply the two concepts to the
present security environment. But scholars have tested and refined the theories
surrounding the fears and risks of abandonment and entrapment, to a degree
sufficient to warrant an update to our understanding of what they, taken in
aggregate, mean for alliances in the present day.
The second problem is the gap between scholars and practitioners in understanding abandonment and entrapment. Academia offers much toward
comprehending those issues, but applying existing scholarship is difficult, given
the absence of a study that connects it to the current strategic environment in a
practical manner. There must be a way to compile existing scholarship in a way
that is useful to practitioners.
This article seeks to remedy those problems by answering the question of
how abandonment and entrapment can affect alliance management in a modern
strategic environment marked by gray-zone conflict. To accomplish this, it first
defines alliances and explains how they function in response to security incidents
that may warrant allied response. Next the article curates notable takeaways from
the wealth of scholarship on abandonment and entrapment. Then the article explains some of the defining characteristics of the modern security environment—
specifically, the type of security incidents that affect formal alliances. From there,
it applies the aggregated theoretical takeaways to the U.S.-Japan alliance to yield
better understanding of how abandonment and entrapment influence alliance
interactions.
This examination is important for academics and practitioners alike. It
aggregates seven key takeaways from existing literature on the concepts of
abandonment and entrapment. The article also posits that in the age of gray-zone
conflict adversaries can undermine alliance relationships without reaching the
threshold to trigger an alliance response. It further highlights that the influences
on traditional military alliances of diplomatic, information, and economic
instruments of power have increased. Those factors reveal that although alliances
formed in the Cold War era have succeeded in deterring interstate military
disputes, adversaries are seeking means of changing the status quo through
security incidents short of an armed attack. This means that designs predicated
on response to armed attack and focused primarily on military guarantees must
be adapted to meet the needs of the modern strategic environment. There are
examples of how alliances are adapting, and this article offers one in the form
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of the U.S.-Japan alliance and its employment of the negotiated “Guidelines for
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” to prepare seamless responses to gray-zone
threats.4
There are limits to this examination. First, the article focuses on formal alliances that contain an obligation for the use of military force in support of one or
more parties to a security relationship. In other words, the focus is on alliances
codified by an international treaty that includes a military guarantee. This is
necessary for a couple of reasons. Treaty alliances are recognized under international law, so decision-making related to those formal instruments has important
institutional and reputational impacts.5 It will be important for future studies to
examine alignments as opposed to alliances, but that is not the aim of this article.6
Also, the fears and risks of abandonment and entrapment are not uniformly applicable across neutrality, nonaggression, and consultation pacts as well, even
though some alliance scholars prefer to include those types in their examinations
of alliance reliability.
The second boundary is that this article focuses only on the present security
environment. While some conclusions detailed here feasibly could apply to other
eras of conflict, the article makes no claims of universal applicability.
Finally, the case study focuses on a bilateral alliance to minimize variables in
understanding how the fears of abandonment and entrapment operate within an
alliance relationship. However, the arguments made here open the door to applying them in future examinations of multilateral alliances.
DEFINING ALLIANCES AND HOW THEY FUNCTION IN PRACTICE
To understand abandonment and entrapment from a practical perspective, one
first must define an alliance clearly, since scholars and practitioners alike disagree
on the subject. For the sake of clarity, this article focuses on treaty alliances that
contain a formal obligation for the use of military force in support of one or
more allies. This use of force occurs when a certain threshold is met—the casus
foederis.
In many alliances, some rights and obligations apply even in the absence of
security conflict. This article refers to these as peacetime trade-offs. Such tradeoffs may include basing rights, security assistance, intelligence sharing, peacetime
military training, and transfer of defense technology. They are privileges and
obligations that distinguish allies from nonallies, even in the absence of conflict.
Still, at the core of any alliance are the casus foederis and the obligation for one
or more allies to use military force in support of another. The obligation kicks in
to use military force or to provide certain exceptional rights and privileges for
the purpose of responding to military conflict following a security incident. A
security incident is any event that has the potential for triggering the casus foederis
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(i.e., when the threshold for alliance response is reached). The incident can be
offensive or defensive in nature, meaning an ally can initiate it (such as by carrying out a preemptive strike against an adversary) or it can be reactive (such as
responding to an armed attack against an ally).
This is the point at which the potential for abandonment or entrapment comes
into play. The state involved in the security incident must decide whether to
invoke alliance obligations, and the ally (or allies) then must decide whether to
answer the call. If the state involved in the security incident decides not to invoke
the casus foederis, the alliance continues with normal peacetime trade-offs. If
the state does invoke it, there are four potential outcomes. First, an ally could
recognize the validity of the casus foederis but choose not to meet its obligations.
This constitutes abandonment. Second, the ally could argue that the security
incident does not meet the threshold for alliance response, and elect not to meet
the obligations expected. This is more nuanced, but ultimately represents a form
of abandonment, at least in the eyes of the ally invoking the casus foederis. Third,
the ally could engage in a conflict it does not want to fight, which would constitute
a form of entrapment.7 Fourth, the ally could answer the call unreservedly.
There are two takeaways from this. First, the casus foederis is important from a
practical perspective, because it is what a state uses to prompt its allies to provide
obligations that go beyond peacetime trade-offs. Second, there is no such thing as
an ironclad alliance guarantee or an automatic alliance response; there are always
the questions whether the casus foederis should be invoked and whether an ally
should answer the call.
KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM SCHOLARSHIP
Beginning in earnest in the 1980s and continuing since then, scholars have been
trying to define how the fears of abandonment and entrapment shape alliance
politics. This article summarizes relevant alliance literature from the intervening
decades and curates conclusions with a practical view in mind. There are seven
key takeaways.
1.	 Alliances tend to deter militarized interstate conflict. Scholars have
demonstrated that the formation of alliances contributes to a decreased
likelihood of military conflict among states, for various reasons.8 Not
only does this bear on the risk of entrapment, but it highlights an issue
for present-day security. Naturally, a decreased risk of military conflict
means less risk of becoming involved in war. However, it does not mean
that security competition among states ceases altogether, so in the context
of the modern strategic environment it suggests that adversaries will
compete in other ways and using instruments of power that do not result
in open military conflict.
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2.	 Risk of entrapment is low. Although some academics and practitioners
still support the notion that entrapment is a major risk for allies, newer
research compellingly argues that entrapment is a narrower concept than
previously discussed and not as prevalent as once thought.9 The narrow
scope of entrapment and the fact that states design alliances to minimize
the risk of entrapment mean that the possibility of being pulled into a
conflict that a state did not want to fight in the first place is low. In the
context of the modern strategic environment, this means that, while fear
of entrapment still impacts alliance politics, it often is inflated, and the
problem typically lies in the irrationality of one or more leaders within the
alliance-management framework.
3.	 Alliance designs matter in managing the risks of abandonment and
entrapment. States that enter formal alliances negotiate treaties in ways
that seek to maximize their interests while minimizing their costs. As part
of minimizing costs, leaders anticipate the possibility of entrapment and
carefully design alliance agreements accordingly, or they avoid entering
into alliances in the first place.10 The explicitness of the designs and the
language employed in alliance agreements help clarify arrangements and
thereby reduce the risk of abandonment and entrapment.11 Additionally,
alliance literature demonstrates that a state can leverage alliance designs
to influence its partner’s behavior. Those designs can be employed in
shaping the direction of a state’s military buildup, can influence foreign
policy decisions, and can be used in restraining potentially risky behavior,
among other things.12 The important point here is that alliance designs
matter significantly in managing abandonment and entrapment, which
means that alteration of those alliance designs can be an active tool in
alliance management for influencing those risks.
4.	 Alliance designs include nonmilitary benefits that factor into abandonment
and entrapment issues. In some alliances, a state cedes autonomy to a
militarily superior ally or allies—a key trade-off, especially in asymmetric
alliances in which only one member offers a guarantee for the use of
military force.13 Other trade-offs may include the provision of bases,
cost sharing (for the stationing of foreign forces), economic concessions,
public support for the ally’s policies, and coordination of foreign policy.14
The presence of nonmilitary benefits means that abandonment may not
be an issue of a failure to employ military force against an adversary;
rather, it simply may be a failure to provide some contribution that
is necessary for a state to achieve its security objectives following a
triggering of the casus foederis. Regarding entrapment, the provision of
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nonmilitary objects still may present a risk of being drawn into conflict,
the most obvious example being provision of bases for an ally’s military
forces.15 What this means for scholars and practitioners is that one
cannot overlook the risk of abandonment of nonmilitary contributions,
as well as the entrapment risk that is associated with provision of those
contributions. It also suggests that competition short of armed conflict
increases the importance of nonmilitary aspects of alliance rights and
obligations.
5.	 Risk of abandonment increases over time because alliance treaties remain
static, while other factors do not. Scholars have established that changes
in political administrations, age structures, and threats, among other
factors, all can affect alliance reliability.16 The simple fact is that an
alliance agreement, unless renegotiated or clarified through implementing
instruments, is static, while other variables are dynamic. Over time, this
could introduce gaps where alliance designs fail to meet particular threats
or where new expectations emerge that are not codified formally within
agreed-upon obligations.17 What this means for the present strategic
environment is that alliances that are not updated, through either
renegotiation of the treaty or the provision of clarifying instruments, may
be outmoded. Allies who fail to manage their core arrangements could be
unwittingly allowing the risk of abandonment to grow.
6.	 Adversaries attempt to undermine alliances, divide allies, or both. Existing
literature demonstrates that even as allies seek to manage the risks of
abandonment and entrapment, adversaries seek to undermine or break
up alliance relationships.18 In other words, adversaries actively work to
increase the risk of abandonment. They have attempted to exploit seams
in alliances and will continue to do so, especially in ways that lead to
ineffectual responses to security incidents.
7.	 Allies can take steps to reduce risks of abandonment and entrapment. Since
alliance designs can manage the risks of abandonment and entrapment,
since allies have the ability to influence partners through those designs,
and since circumstances change over time, there are steps allies can
take to reduce abandonment and entrapment risks. In the context of the
present strategic environment, allies can seek to alter alliance designs to
reduce risks of abandonment and entrapment. Allies then can leverage
those designs in attempting to influence their allies’ behavior. They can
do this through renegotiation of the alliance treaty or the creation of
clarifying instruments.
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ALLIANCES IN THE MODERN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
This section characterizes the modern strategic environment in the context of
security alliances that incorporate both peacetime trade-offs and obligations
that follow invocation of the casus foederis. As previously noted, alliances tend
to deter militarized disputes, but they do not eliminate security competition
altogether. States seeking to change the status quo simply have looked for
methods to achieve their goals without overtly violating international law and
thereby prompting responses from the international community, especially by
allies of the offended state.19 In circumventing international law, some states have
sought to act in new domains to achieve their interests, especially the cyberspace
domain.20 They also use nonmilitary instruments of power.21 This has made Cold
War–era alliance designs outmoded, since those were predicated on a military
response to an armed attack in conventional domains of conflict (land, air, and
sea). Outmoded alliance designs create seams within security relationships that
adversaries actively seek to exploit. Fortunately, there are ways allies can adapt.
The current liberal international order is predicated on the United Nations
system, which built on customary international law and institutions and reshaped
many of the rules of interaction among states.22 The central tenet related to security and defense is found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, specifically article 51,
which states as follows: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”23 In principle, postwar
alliance agreements are founded on this definition of conflict, in which the security guarantees inherent in those alliances are based on “collective self-defence”
to be exercised in the event of an “armed attack.”24
What is an armed attack? The UN Charter does not offer a clearer explanation,
but the 1986 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in Nicaragua v. United
States does.25 Stated plainly, the court held that an armed attack is an armed
incursion into another state’s sovereign territory attributable to a specific member
of the international community. It further clarified that, even in the event of an
armed-attack situation, a UN member state is not permitted to exercise collective
self-defense until the state under attack has declared the occurrence of an armed
attack and has requested support.
Thus, an armed-attack situation is the threshold for collective self-defense
under international law and it fulfills the casus foederis for many alliance relationships; however, there are many types of security incidents that may occur prior
to an armed attack. Some of these are depicted in the figure, arranged by level of
intensity and impetus for response.26
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SECURITY INCIDENTS, FROM PEACETIME TO “ARMED ATTACK”

Impetus for Response
Armed Attack
Loss of Life
Impact to Sovereign Territory
(damage to personnel or property)
Impact to Sovereign Territory (no damage
to personnel or property)
WMDRelated Activity
Violation of International Law / Sanctioned Activity
Violation of Domestic Interpretation of International Law

Level of Intensity

Violations of domestic interpretation of international law are incidents that
a state may view as legal violations but that do not necessarily comport with
internationally accepted legal interpretations. For example, Japan recognizes
only five of its maritime straits as constituting international passages, whereas
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) maintains that any strait
can be navigated under the right of innocent passage.27 If Japan were to respond
militarily to the transit of Chinese naval vessels through a strait that it does not
recognize as an international passage, this action would be based on a domestic interpretation of international law, and therefore would not necessarily fall
within the scope of alliance agreements.
Violations of international law or sanctioned activities may include situations
such as illegal arms transfers, piracy, and state sponsorship of terrorist
organizations.
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)–related activities are any that involve
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Examples include North Korean
nuclear testing and the illicit transfer of WMD assets and technologies.
Incidents with impact to sovereign territory but dealing no damage to personnel
or property could include a territorial incursion short of an armed attack (e.g.,
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nonmilitary personnel landing on an uninhabited island) or a failed missile test
from which debris lands in an empty field.
Security incidents with impact to sovereign territory that includes damage
to personnel or property represent the next level of intensity. In the missile-test
example, debris from a failed missile might fall on a housing area or in a commercial zone. Another relevant example is a cyber attack that disrupts a state’s
critical infrastructure.
The next level up includes any of those incidents that result in loss of life.
All those security incidents could occur before reaching the level of an armed
attack—the traditional casus foederis and international legal threshold for individual and collective self-defense. The space where security incidents occur
before an armed attack often is referred to as the gray zone.
Two types of gray-zone conflict have become prevalent in the present security
environment: lawfare and hybrid warfare. Lawfare is the “strategy of using—or
misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.”28 In other words, it is the misuse of customary international
law and UN-sponsored judicial systems to achieve strategic military or political
ends. An example is Chinese territorial expansion in the South China Sea. Even
though international tribunals have sided with other countries (e.g., the arbitral
tribunal’s 2016 ruling in Philippines v. China), China has managed to expand its
foothold by constructing man-made islands and conducting coercive engagements in the region.29
Hybrid warfare is the “synchronized use of multiple instruments of power
tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions
to achieve synergistic effects.”30 A key feature of hybrid warfare is that it often is
nonattributable, thereby avoiding international legal thresholds for any broad
response involving the use of military force.31 Russia provides the best example
of this threat, with its employment of cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns,
“volunteer” military forces, and other activities, all of which contributed to the
annexation of Crimea and pose an ever-present threat to NATO allies.32
Through gray-zone conflict, an adversary can challenge the status quo without
reaching the level of an armed attack, meaning that there is no clear impetus for
the use of military force for individual or collective self-defense in response. Yet
security incidents that contribute to changes in the status quo are likely to warrant expectations for response from a state and its allies.33
This tells us three things. First, traditional alliance relationships focused
solely on military trade-offs are inadequate for meeting contemporary security
challenges. Certainly, militaries are the principal actors in the execution of war,
but what about when conventional interstate warfare no longer is the primary
form of interstate security conflict in the world, as is the case today? Given the
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costs associated with militarized disputes, adversaries have incentives to employ
alternative instruments of power in their attempts to further their interests. Thus
it is no longer practical to treat alliances as principally military in nature, because
doing so privileges military responses, perhaps leaving other options for security
arrangements and activities unexplored or ignored.
Second, legal foundations that have not been updated to address evolving
security challenges create seams between allies. Conventional security guarantees
are predicated on the notion of interstate defense. When the term defense is not
clarified in formal or informal agreements, its definition defaults to customary
international law (as represented in the UN Charter and the ICJ ruling, as detailed
earlier). This does not prevent a state from acting in support of an ally without
an armed-attack declaration, but the absence of an armed-attack situation creates
ambiguity that increases the risk of abandonment within alliance relationships.
Third, adversaries can exploit those seams. Through lawfare and hybrid
warfare, adversaries can take actions up to but not exceeding the threshold of
an armed attack without triggering an alliance response.34 Since adversaries can
“make plays” in the gray zone, security relationships that have not been updated
to provide strategic and operational clarity are exploitable, and again the risk of
abandonment increases.
Fortunately, there are ways for allies to adapt. As the literature survey highlighted, alliance designs have a profound effect on the risks of abandonment and
entrapment, meaning that instruments that update, amend, or clarify alliance
designs are likely to help eliminate seams in security relationships. Two key features of these instruments should be formality and publication, since those have
institutional and reputational effects while signaling commitments to potential
adversaries.35
Given this, the simplest solution is renegotiation of the alliance treaty itself.
However, since treaty language typically is vague and not directed at specific
adversaries or security situations, a more practical solution is the creation or
renegotiation of clarifying instruments under the alliance treaty. Clarifying
instruments include exchanges of notes, agreements, memorandums, and other
formally negotiated documents. A variety of informal means of clarification,
such as joint statements, also exist, but those lack the institutional or reputational
checks that negotiated instruments provide.
CASE STUDY: THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
The U.S.-Japan alliance offers a prime case study for the consideration of
abandonment and entrapment. It is bilateral, meaning that there are only two
parties to the alliance agreement, which eliminates variables present in the case
of multilateral alliances. The alliance was formed in the Cold War era, meaning
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the treaty explicitly calls for response to an “armed attack,” with a focus on
military guarantees. Further, it is an operative alliance, meaning the rights and
obligations are still meaningfully in play today.36 The alliance is asymmetric, in
that one ally—in this case, Japan—receives a security guarantee, while the other
receives separate, nonmilitary benefits in return.37 Most importantly, there are
clear examples of the occurrence of abandonment and entrapment fears, as well
as an instance in which the allies responded to them.
The fears of abandonment and entrapment weighed heavily on alliance management for the United States and Japan in the early 2010s. In two scenarios in
particular those fears affected alliance politics: the Korean Peninsula crisis and
the defense of the Senkaku Islands.
The Korean Peninsula Crisis
The 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crisis and the missile launches of the late
1990s reawakened the U.S.-Japan alliance to the threat the Kim regime posed.38
For Japan, the fear of entrapment was no theoretical matter. The United States
already had used Japan as a rear-support base of operations during the Korean
War; that involvement had contributed to Japan’s desire for inclusion of a “prior
consultation” requirement in the renegotiation of the Mutual Security Treaty in
1960.39 Since then, the North Koreans have demonstrated missile technology
capable of reaching Japanese territory.40 With a demonstrated threat from North
Korea that included the potential for Japan to be drawn into a conflict on the
Korean Peninsula with nuclear consequences, the preexisting fear of entrapment
was renewed.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government had fears on the opposite end of the spectrum,
worrying that Japan might abandon its treaty obligations in the event of a crisis or
contingency on the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese government gave U.S. officials
cause for concern in 2010 following the sinking of ROKS Cheonan and the shelling
of Yeonpyeong-do.41 In each of those situations, personnel from Headquarters,
U.S. Forces, Japan requested activation of the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism
(BCM), but each time they were rebuffed because there had been no political
declaration of a Nihon Shūen Jitai (situation in area surrounding Japan, or SIASJ).42
Without activation of the BCM, U.S. officials were skeptical that they could garner
the necessary Japanese interagency support for U.S. operations in response to those
security incidents, should de-escalation efforts fail.43
The Japanese government further reinforced this concern with its treatment
of the “prior consultation” requirement. There long had been a debate within
the U.S. government regarding whether the requirement simply meant
“consultation” or it implied that “consent” from the Japanese government was
necessary.44 During a parliamentary committee meeting on 15 July 2014, Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe offered his government’s position on the matter, stating that
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Okinawa-based U.S. Marines would not deploy to support Korean contingency
operations without Japanese government consent.45 This served as a strong signal
to the United States that it might not receive the level of support it had expected
in responding to security situations on the Korean Peninsula.
If not guaranteed military support, what sort of assistance does the United
States expect? The Mutual Security Treaty and its associated status of forces
agreement legally afford the U.S. government access to all Japanese air- and
seaports and permit free transit through and across Japanese territory.46 There
also are arrangements for the support of logistical, medical, and billeting needs
for military personnel, civilian officials, and noncombatants; the list goes on.
However, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense do
not have purview over civilian authorities or organizations. Therefore, execution
of alliance obligations following those security incidents would have required
interagency coordination and exceptional authorization from the Japanese
cabinet in the context of a SIASJ—something the Japanese government was not
prepared to perform in 2010.
Defense of the Senkaku Islands
The Senkaku Islands are a group of small, uninhabited land features located
along the first island chain, and are the focus of territorial disputes among Japan,
China, and Taiwan. The Senkakus have been under Japanese administration
since U.S. reversion of the Ryukyu Islands in 1972, but China and Taiwan both
have laid sovereignty claims to the islands.47 While Japan has worked out and
maintained exceptional fishing agreements with Taiwan for activity in the waters
surrounding the islands, the PRC’s China Coast Guard (CCG), fishing, and
(occasionally) military vessels have operated in the vicinity of the islands for
years, especially following the Japanese government’s purchase of the Senkakus
from private Japanese landowners in 2012.48
When the Japanese government nationalized the Senkakus and tensions grew,
it introduced fears of both abandonment and entrapment within the U.S.-Japan
alliance. For Japan, there was a fear that the United States would not respond if
the Chinese seized the islands by force. For the United States, the fear was that
explicit security guarantees would increase Japanese adventurism; that is, Japan
would be more emboldened in its responses to Chinese activity in the vicinity of
the Senkakus, which might drag the United States into a war with China.
But the issue was even more nuanced than those basic fears might suggest.
The question emerged of what would happen if a paramilitary group landed on
the islands.49 If Japan could not declare an armed-attack situation, what authority
would the U.S. military have to provide collective self-defense in support of its
ally? What if there were a clash between coast guards, not militaries? Would the
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U.S. Navy have any authority to get involved if the dispute were between lawenforcement entities? What if the CCG vessel capabilities were equivalent to
those of naval forces?50
While some dispute the nature of Chinese intentions in the East China Sea, the
Japanese government’s assessment is clear.51 Chinese activity in the vicinity of the
Senkakus aims to create a situation of “coadministration” rather than Japanese
sole administration of the islands and their surrounding waters. From there,
China could make a play for sole administration. The Chinese use of gray-zone
tactics around the Senkakus is a clear example of seeking to change the status quo
without triggering a militarized dispute under international law, and gray-zone
tactics that fail to trigger the casus foederis increase the risk of abandonment.
The Alliance Response: The “2015 Guidelines”
After and while dealing with this pair of scenarios, the two allies in question
addressed their fears of abandonment and entrapment, and pursued other goals,
through renegotiation of the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.”
The guidelines are a bilaterally agreed-upon framework of alliance roles,
missions, and capabilities (RMCs). They are not a direct supplement to the
existing alliance treaty; instead, the guidelines exist as a separate implementation
framework dependent on each nation’s own laws. There have been only three
versions of the guidelines in the nearly seventy-year history of the alliance, those
of 1978, 1997, and 2015.
More than simply providing a road map for cooperation, the guidelines represent a de facto clarification of the casus foederis. They reorient the alliance for
different threats, clarify core values, and manage expectations for when and how
the allies will apply their respective capabilities in response to both peacetime
conditions and security situations.52 In places the content of the guidelines is aspirational; in others it serves as a starting point for the allies to initiate a new RMC;
in still others it formalizes initiatives already under way. Whatever the case, once
published the guidelines provide a constant point of reference for the allies, as
illustrated by the repeated references to them in joint statements at all levels of
alliance management, but most notably by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative
Committee.53
The “2015 Guidelines” dealt with the fears of entrapment and abandonment
in the following four ways. First, the document explicitly defined the role of
the alliance in all situations, from peacetime through armed attack. For the
allies, an armed-attack situation is the explicit casus foederis under article 5 of
the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation.54 With the “2015
Guidelines,” the allies formally broadened the casus foederis to include grayzone threats as well, calling for “seamless responses,” highlighting the need for
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whole-of-government approaches to security issues, and identifying categories of
security incidents that require alliance response.55 Those categories of cooperation
include “Cooperative Measures from Peacetime,” “Responses to Emerging
Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security,” “Action in Response to an Armed Attack
against Japan,” “Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country Other
Than Japan,” “Cooperation in Response to Large-Scale Disaster in Japan,” and
“Cooperation in International Activities.”56
Second, the guidelines called for establishment of the Alliance Coordination
Mechanism (ACM).57 There are three reasons the U.S.-Japan alliance requires a
coordination mechanism. The first is the necessity to manage policy decisions that
affect the alliance in times of crisis or contingency.58 The second is the operational
coordination that must occur among separate organizations, given the alliance’s
bilateral structure, as opposed to a combined-forces structure.59 The third reason—which is not stated explicitly, but lies at the core of the purpose for the coordination mechanism—is to manage the risks of abandonment and entrapment.
The Mutual Security Treaty establishes specific rights and obligations, and the
ACM helps ensure that the allies honor their commitments. For example, if there
were to be a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. government would use the
ACM to provide the entire Japanese interagency structure with the information
and requests for support needed to be able to ensure provision of necessary access and support codified under alliance designs. These could include garnering
Japanese civilian and defense logistics support for an operation or the opening up
of Japanese civilian airports for use as intermediate staging bases and safe havens
for noncombatant evacuees. Conversely, the Japanese government might use the
ACM to ensure that it influences U.S. decision-making and gets its say before the
United States attempts to take potentially escalatory actions that could lead to
retaliation against bases in Japan, thereby entrapping Japan in conflict.
Third, the guidelines expanded the domains within which the allies may cooperate. As part of the desire to prepare to provide seamless responses to security
threats, the two governments decided to broaden alliance responsibilities beyond
the air, land, and sea domains, to include space and cyberspace. For the United
States, space and cyber had been recognized domains for security operations for
some time, but the same was not true of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF).60
Hampered in part by budget restraints, the JSDF did not have its first military-use
satellite in orbit until 2017, and its first cyber unit did not stand up until 2014.61
The “2015 Guidelines” capitalized on Japan’s unilateral expansion in those domains to incorporate alliance cooperation.
Fourth, the “2015 Guidelines” expanded the reach of the alliance to the whole
of government. Previous iterations of the guidelines focused on foreign policy
and defense organizations, but the “2015 Guidelines” recognized the challenges
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of gray-zone conflict and sought to incorporate law-enforcement and other organizations that wield nonmilitary instruments of power. While the guidelines
did not succeed in incorporating an explicit call for cooperation with the Japan
Coast Guard, National Police Agency, Ministry of Finance, or others, they were
included under the scope of “relevant agencies.”62 Similarly, the guidelines called
for cooperation with civilian authorities for the conduct of site surveys necessary
to prepare for U.S. contingency operations, such as those that may occur on the
Korean Peninsula.63
How have the guidelines done in managing entrapment and abandonment?
Since publication of the “2015 Guidelines,” the two governments have employed
the ACM in response to numerous North Korean provocations, coordinating
alliance responses and exchanging information on the incidents.64 The U.S. military has conducted site surveys at multiple civilian airports in preparation for
potential contingency operations. Meanwhile, while much of the intra-alliance
discourse on the Senkakus is classified, U.S. officials have reiterated the security
guarantee over the islands while supporting development of the Japan Ground
Self-Defense Force’s amphibious brigade and continuing bilateral training on
missions specifically tailored to remote-island defense.65 All of this demonstrates
the effectiveness of the guidelines in updating the alliance for the modern strategic environment, since they redefined the casus foederis, provided a list of applicable RMCs, declared mechanisms for managing them, and presented a road
map for implementation.
The fears of abandonment and entrapment continue to influence alliance relationships today. Scholarship offers seven key takeaways for academics and practitioners alike. First, alliances tend to deter militarized interstate conflict, which
decreases the risk of warfare for alliance members but suggests that adversaries
will compete in ways short of military conflict. Second, the risk of entrapment is
low, although individual leaders within alliance management may inflate this risk
in intra-alliance bargaining. Third, alliance designs matter in managing the risks
of abandonment and entrapment. States carefully craft alliances to mitigate the
chance of being abandoned or entrapped, and once the security relationship is
formed they leverage alliance designs to support their desired security outcomes.
Fourth, those alliance designs include nonmilitary benefits that factor into abandonment and entrapment issues. States are concerned with what the fulfillment
or nonfulfillment of those obligations may mean for their own security objectives.
Fifth, risk of abandonment increases over time because societies, administrations,
and expectations change but alliance designs do not—unless the allies deliberately
take steps to modify them. Sixth, adversaries attempt to undermine alliances,
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divide the allies, or both, which increases the risk of abandonment. Seventh, allies
can take steps to reduce the risk of abandonment and entrapment through renegotiation or clarification of alliance designs.
Understanding these takeaways is necessary for determining what posture allies should take in the modern strategic environment. Alliances have worked well
in deterring armed-attack situations, but adversaries intentionally are avoiding
the thresholds for military conflict while seeking to change the status quo in their
favor through gray-zone tactics. Alliance designs that have not been reworked to
respond to security incidents short of an armed attack require updating. Fortunately, there are examples of allies that have taken the necessary steps to modify
alliance arrangements for present-day security challenges, including expanding
the casus foederis beyond armed-attack situations, incorporating new domains
for cooperation such as space and cyberspace, and focusing on coordinated
employment of nonmilitary instruments of power. The U.S.-Japan “2015 Guidelines” document provides a useful model for other alliances today.
While this article offers useful conclusions for academics and practitioners
alike, additional research is necessary. First, the conclusions drawn here should
be applied to case studies in alignments rather than alliances. There has been a
decline in usage of traditional treaty alliances and a rise in alignments, and initial
impressions are that abandonment fears will increase as a result, since the resulting
obligations are not explicit, merely implicit.66 Second, additional research is necessary for examining abandonment and entrapment in multilateral as opposed to
bilateral alliances. For example, how do those risks influence alliance management
in NATO compared with the U.S.-Japan alliance? Finally, more research should
be dedicated to understanding the tools that allies have to mitigate the risks of
abandonment and entrapment. This article offered one example—the “Guidelines
for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation”—but other institutions and instruments are
available, demonstrating varying degrees of effectiveness.67
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“THINGS DONE BY HALVES”
Observations from America’s First Great-Power
Competition
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T

he return of great-power friction and competition to the world’s oceans has
initiated a good deal of self-reflection in naval and maritime circles. The
U.S. Navy, in particular, has begun to reassess how it approaches the tactical and
operational questions of establishing sea control during wartime. At the same
time, the Royal Navy (RN) seeks to understand how Britain’s departure from the
European Union will change its role in world affairs, and Japan continues to adjust its defense policies and the norms of its naval involvement in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans. These are just a few of the shifting dynamics among the United
States and its maritime allies.
A great deal of the official U.S. response to the developing power dynamics of
the twenty-first century is focused on capability for conventional, or nation-state,
warfare. Yet, concurrently with calls for developing greater lethality and greater
high-end naval capability, observers have identified a second challenge: maritime
conflict outside the boundaries of peer combat, or short of the threshold of highCommander Benjamin F. Armstrong, USN, is end warfare.
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France, illuminates key questions for strategists and planners considering the
interactions among great powers.
Our contemporary National Defense Strategy assures readers that the world
has entered an era of renewed “great-power competition.” Unfortunately, much
of the strategic and national-security writing that has adopted the phrase then
immediately turns the discussion to the ability to conduct or deter peer-combat
operations. Over centuries, however, maritime conflict short of declared war or
open hostilities has been a fundamental part of the competition and maneuvering
among powerful nations. Rather than looking only at our immediate past, or at
most at the history of the post–world war era, strategists must open their aperture
to a wider understanding of how the international dynamics of earlier eras might
inform what great-power competition means for military and naval forces beyond
great-power war. For the purposes of this article, debates over the theoretical
and definitional constructions of gray zone, hybrid, asymmetric, and other labels
are less important than seeking to understand how this history can inform our
understanding of the present and our thinking about the future.1
Concepts surrounding the advancement of hybrid war or conflict in the
gray zones—or whichever contemporary buzzword is a strategist’s or planner’s
favorite—have developed from Russian activity in the Black Sea region and Chinese activity in the South China Sea.2 Much of the writing implies that modern
Russian, Chinese, and Iranian efforts have introduced something new to the
maritime world. Admiral James G. Stavridis has written that “the fundamental
idea of hybrid warfare is to find the space short of clear-cut military action with
direct and recognizable tactical, operational, and strategic impact.”3 He suggests
that the maritime versions of these conflicts will be conducted in the coastal or
littoral regions of the world and will involve both naval “gray-hull” warships and
civilian vessels. Other commentators have pointed out that the mixing of lawenforcement responsibilities with more-traditional naval missions complicates
the situation for naval planners who think in Mahanian terms of decisive sea
battles or Corbett-inspired bombardment and power projection ashore.4 Despite
the fact that some identify these hybrid or gray-zone conflicts and competition as
a particularly complicated and somewhat unprecedented change to the maritime
world, they actually are nothing new to naval history.
The very beginning of the history of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps is as
good a place as any to take up an examination of unconventional conflicts, irregular operations, and great-power competition. The conflict between the United
States and France from 1798 to 1800 was, after all, a maritime conflict, caused by
great-power friction, that remained short of declared war. It led the U.S. Congress
to form the Department of the Navy and to outfit and deploy U.S. warships for
the first time. Originally known as “the war with France,” the conflict became
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1
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known more commonly in the twentieth century as the Quasi War, and the new
nomenclature suggested its unusual and unconventional nature.5 By looking back
on the U.S. Navy’s first conflict—an undeclared war that occurred in the gray area
between peace and war, but resulted in both combat among nations and fighting
against nonstate groups in a hybrid manner—observations emerge that may help
today’s strategists and planners examine our modern challenges. Understanding
the long history of American involvement in maritime operations short of declared war will lead to better-informed questions to help us understand our contemporary challenges, and will help us develop twenty-first-century approaches.
A WAR THAT WAS NOT A WAR
Today, the history of the Quasi War is largely unknown to naval planners and
national-security professionals. It also lacks a wide body of literature from academics and historians themselves. The Barbary Wars of early American history
have attracted a cottage industry of recent publishing on the topic, from academics to Fox News hosts—even sportswriters. The bicentennial of the War of 1812
also brought a wealth of recent scholarship on that declared war. In contrast, in
the past half century there has been only a single book about the U.S. Navy and
the Quasi War: Michael Palmer’s excellent Stoddert’s War. As a result, returning
to the historical primary sources, alongside the work of Palmer and older and
related scholarship, can offer a useful and generally unfamiliar case study for the
twenty-first century.
The French Revolution was an enormous event in world history, with effects
that rippled across oceans. In the still-infant United States, the uprising that
overthrew and executed Louis XVI created both international and domestic
political problems. Britain’s reinitiation, in the aftermath of the Revolution, of
its intermittent eighteenth-century wars with France put the United States in the
middle. The revolutionary government (known as the Directory) demanded that
the United States fulfill its responsibility to France, in accordance with the alliance
that had helped Americans win their own independence. However, President
George Washington did not want the two great powers of Europe—each of which
had constituencies and supporters in the United States—pulling the young nation
into a war it could not afford, economically or politically. Instead, Washington
followed a circuitous line of diplomatic reasoning to escape the alliance that had
helped ensure his own victory at Yorktown. His administration, claiming that
the country’s treaty had been with the recently guillotined Louis, explained that
the alliance had died with the king, and that as a result the United States had no
responsibility to support revolutionary France.6
The U.S. government tried to walk the fine line of neutrality, while at the same
time American merchant traders set sail to carry supplies to both sides in the
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conflict. American merchants knew that when great powers were at war they
could make high profits carrying cargoes under a neutral flag.
The Directory, however, also realized Americans’ profit motives. Following
Washington’s declaration of neutrality, the French abrogated the 1778 treaty with
the United States. In doing so, it went beyond simply ending the alliance, also
repudiating the treaty’s support for the American belief that “free ships make
free goods.” This uniquely American ideal claimed that a neutral flag protected a
ship from seizure regardless of whether the ship’s cargo constituted contraband
of war. Instead, France returned to the traditional interpretation of maritime law,
which believed that the destination of the cargo was what mattered in determining whether it was contraband and legal to seize, not who was carrying it.7
The 1794 commercial treaty between United States and Great Britain, which
became known as the Jay Treaty, was seen as yet one more insult to the French,
who interpreted it as an effort by the Americans to assist the British enemy.
The French accused American merchants of allying themselves with London,
and privateers and warships sailing under the tricolor opened up a campaign of
guerre de course (commerce raiding) against American ships in the Caribbean
and western Atlantic. 8 In June 1797, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering
would report to Congress that French privateers and cruisers had captured 316
American ships during the previous year.9
After the election of 1796, Washington turned over the presidency to John Adams. In an attempt to negotiate a solution, the new administration sent a diplomatic mission to Paris. Instead of a diplomatic success, the negotiators came back
with a story of solicitation of bribes and other covert dealings in what American
newspapers called the XYZ Affair.10
President Adams and Congress began putting the United States on a war footing.11 American political leaders authorized the final outfitting and deployment
of the U.S. Navy’s first three frigates. They appropriated funds to finish building
the second group of three frigates, whose construction an earlier Congress had
halted to save money, in 1794. They authorized the president to buy or build a
dozen small warships, of twenty-two guns or fewer. And finally, the legislature
formed the Department of the Navy, under the leadership of the newly created
Secretary of the Navy, to administer and lead naval operations against French
depredations.12 However, Congress did not pass a declaration of war. The forces
began to deploy in the summer of 1798, in what President Adams and Congress
both considered a defensive measure. Between Congress’s first authorization for
combat operations—ordering U.S. warships to engage armed French vessels in
the early summer of 1798—and the Convention of 1800—which ended the conflict in September of that year—the U.S. Navy deployed dozens of warships into
the Caribbean and western Atlantic.
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FOUR OBSERVATIONS
In today’s maritime and military concepts and jargon, those ships’ mission can
be described quite accurately as carrying on a maritime hybrid conflict brought
on by great-power competition. Studying the records of the nascent American
naval force to examine how the ships operated during the Quasi War yields four
observations about the experience and how the Navy and its leaders approached
the conflict.
The remainder of this article will examine those four observations rather than
continue a chronological retelling of the story of the war.13 These observations
can help inform our understanding of how naval forces interact within the alleged “gray zones” and offer a starting point for considering hybrid maritime
conflict in today’s era of great-power competition.
Presence Matters
Initially, the American warships deployed in 1798 patrolled only the nation’s
coastlines, but it was only a matter of weeks before Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert realized that these operations were insufficient—French ships
were attacking American merchant ships not only on the coast but also far from
their own shores.14 The French had established a privateering base, with supplies
and a court for adjudicating prizes, on their colonial island of Guadeloupe in the
Lesser Antilles.15
With Adams’s approval, Stoddert deployed the first small squadrons of warships into the Caribbean. Under the command of captains who were elevated
to the largely honorary title of commodore while in command of multiship
squadrons, these units patrolled the common transit routes, convoyed American merchant ships when they could gather them, and discovered and captured
French privateers. The first cruises were relatively successful, especially for a
naval service that had existed for only a matter of months. However, after several
months of continuous operations the ships required maintenance and supplies,
so commodores and their squadrons began returning home—whereupon the
French privateers surged back out of the safe havens they had found to renew
their attacks.16
Despite how it appears when you draw a straight line on a map from the
United States to the Caribbean, the Navy was operating far from home. Because
of the prevailing winds and currents, in the age of sail a ship leaving Chesapeake
Bay had to sail east into the Atlantic to find the winds that would allow it to tack
back to the southwest toward the Caribbean. This route resulted in a passage that
sometimes took American warships almost as long to get to the West Indies as it
took them to reach Europe.
When reports of the renewed French attacks reached American newspapers,
Stoddert and his commodores quickly realized that dealing with an adversary that
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was using both state naval forces and privateers required constant presence.17 The
squadrons appeared to work well when they were on station. However, the Navy
could not wait for the first squadron to make it home before deploying a second.
The gap in presence allowed privateering attacks to surge and the admiralty court
at Guadeloupe to fill with cases as General Edme É. B. Desfourneaux, the French
governor, issued more commissions for privateers and reinvigorated the guerre
de course.18
So Stoddert worked with President Adams to design a rotational deployment
model for American squadrons. The secretary planned to order multiple squadrons to cover different parts of the Caribbean, and almost immediately he began
preparing the new squadrons needed to replace them. Stoddert then issued the
original commodores orders that forbade them to leave their stations until relief
arrived.19
The American experience in the Quasi War revealed that in a hybrid conflict
physical presence and patrolling constituted an important part of addressing the
ebb and flow of the threat. The occasional appearance of a warship, to prove the
simple possibility of presence, was insufficient; the number and types of adversary efforts quickly adapted to a strategy that left the seas uncontested, or at least
unpatrolled. The resulting solution was the U.S. Navy’s first use of rotational deployments—a method that has become a hallmark of modern global operations.
In the Quasi War, for the Navy to remain operationally and strategically effective,
the secretary had to ask, “How do I maintain regular, physical presence?”
Multiple Adversaries
When the U.S. Navy initiated operations in the Caribbean in the summer of 1798,
its leaders knew they would be facing at least two different adversaries.
The French Navy. France’s navy had a small but capable presence in the West
Indies to patrol the country’s colonies and protect its trade. This force, at different
points in the conflict, included several frigates, such as L’Insurgente, Volontaire,
and La Vengeance. They were roughly equivalent in capability to the American
frigates, although each ship was of slightly different size and had a slightly
different armament. These vessels represented a conventional threat, and one that
Americans had designed and armed their larger warships to be able to handle.20
French Privateers. But in addition to the French naval adversary were the French
privateers. Varying widely in size, these ships deployed from French colonies in
the Western Hemisphere to prey mostly on unprotected merchant ships from
both the United States and Great Britain. Guadeloupe, located in the heart of the
West Indies, was a primary base of operations.
The first privateer captured by an American warship was a typical example
of the threat. In the summer of 1798, the American naval ship Delaware, a
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twenty-gun converted merchantman commanded by Captain Stephen Decatur
Sr., confronted La Croyable off the coast of New Jersey. After a brief exchange
of gunfire the French surrendered, because they thought their opponent was a
British warship.21 The privateer was relatively small, with a schooner rig and a
total burden of approximately one hundred tons. Armed with a dozen small (sixpound) guns, it was strong enough to overtake any merchant ship, but the captain
knew he would have a hard fight against a warship.22
The rig and size of La Croyable, which generally matched the type built in
the United States known as Baltimore clippers, became familiar throughout
the nineteenth-century Caribbean as commerce raiders, not only as licensed
privateers, with government-issued commissions, but also as pirates, engaged in
maritime crime.23 These French privateers attacked hundreds of American ships,
although exact numbers are hard to come by. In 1827, Henry Clay collected the
records of 444 ships that were taken as prizes and brought into French ports,
yet that total does not include an unknown number that simply were robbed of
supplies, sunk, or burned without a French legal proceeding.24 The line between
privateer and pirate could be blurry.
Insurgents. Congress authorized combat operations against any armed French
vessel, whether a warship or a privateer. Yet as the American commodores began
operating throughout the West Indies, they discovered that there were other adversaries as well. In 1791, following news of the revolution in France, a slave revolt
and black insurgency had erupted in the colony of Saint Domingue (known today
as Haiti). Between 1791 and 1804, when Haiti declared its independence from
France, its island was in a near-constant state of civil war and violence.25 American merchants wanted to trade with the island, but the instability made it difficult.
The involvement of American merchants, despite initial government claims of
neutrality in the island’s fighting, and the fact that Haiti was still ostensibly French
pulled the U.S. Navy into the surrounding waters and embroiled its ships in the
local fighting. Aligning themselves with the revolutionary François-Dominique
Toussaint-Louverture (who sometimes returned his allegiance to France), American naval forces found themselves involved in operations against other factions
both ashore and in the littorals around the island. Forces loyal to André Rigaud,
who claimed to be fighting for France against Toussaint-Louverture, launched
raiding attacks from shore with small boats on the southern coast of the island.
Sometimes they sailed under the tricolor of France and sometimes under the red
banner commonly flown by pirates in the West Indies. American warships found
themselves in combat with both flags.26
Other Threats. In the closing year of the conflict other threats popped up as well.
The Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico began to involve themselves in the
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turmoil in Caribbean waters. The United States, France, Great Britain, and local
revolutionary forces all were pursuing their own agendas, and Spanish authorities
did not want to be left out. Reports of Spanish privateering and pirate bases began
to reach the American commanders, so they deployed ships along the Cuban
coast to patrol against the new threat.27
Thus, the commodores who commanded the American squadrons during the
Quasi War did not have the luxury of contending with a single naval adversary.
The French navy certainly posed the greatest danger in ship-versus-ship combat,
but French privateers perpetrated the bulk of the attacks on American shipping
and were the most important target of American operations. Yet despite the clear
congressional direction toward French forces, the commodores and leaders in
Washington could not ignore the civil war raging in Haiti, the insecurity it caused
in the maritime world, and the threats of other great powers entering the fray.
Initially, it seemed clear that America’s adversary was “the French,” but as the
conflict developed and introduced other threats American leaders had to ask the
question “Who are our adversaries, and what do they really want?” if they were
to come up with operationally and strategically effective plans.
Keeping an Eye on Allies and Partners
U.S. naval forces discovered that they had numerous adversaries in the Caribbean. However, they also could count on a number of potential partners in their
conflict with revolutionary France.
Toussaint-Louverture. While the Haitian leader appeared to present more
demands than offers of assistance, Toussaint-Louverture and his forces regularly
shared information and intelligence with American naval commanders and
diplomats. The civil war raged in Haiti among groups that at various times
received backing from British, Spanish, French royalist, and Directory forces.
At the start of the conflict between the United States and France, ToussaintLouverture had pushed back effectively against British and Spanish attempts to
gain control of Haiti. President Adams saw the opportunity to reestablish the
profitable commercial connections that Americans had had with the island
previously while encouraging Toussaint-Louverture to maintain the separation
between his territory and the government in Paris. The Americans, the British,
and Toussaint-Louverture signed a secret three-way alliance in June 1798, just as
the first American warships deployed into the Caribbean.28
The relationship with Toussaint-Louverture and Haiti was a conflicted one
for the Americans. The fighting on the island, and with it the possibility that
France would lose control of its most valuable colony in the Western Hemisphere,
was clearly a positive development for American interests. The territory that
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Toussaint-Louverture held at Cap-Français (now Cap Haitien) and Port-auPrince offered places for American ships to obtain supplies such as food and fresh
water. And American merchants made sure the Navy and politicians understood
the future commercial benefits.29
But the Haitian Revolution also was a movement that started with a slave revolt. The racial politics of the era created massive fear that the revolution in Haiti
would lead to unrest within the slave populations of states such as Georgia and
the Carolinas. This fear was not unwarranted, since a Haitian veteran eventually
would play a role in the “German Coast Uprising” in Louisiana in 1811.30 There
also was a more desperate concern: that the French might launch an invasion of
the Southern American states using black troops, with the goal of fomenting a
full-fledged slave revolution.31 Yet despite the concerns of politicians and Southerners back home, American naval commanders in the Caribbean realized that
even an imperfect partnership could be beneficial, so they continued to work with
Toussaint-Louverture and his army.
Britain. The most powerful partner with which the United States worked during the Quasi War was the world’s dominant naval power: Great Britain. There
still were plenty of bad feelings between the two nations, which had gone their
separate ways barely more than a decade prior. Yet both were fighting revolutionary France, and many of their interests in the Caribbean appeared to coincide,
as witnessed by the joint secret pact with Toussaint-Louverture. During the first
summer of American operations, Secretary Stoddert and Vice Admiral George
Vandeput, who commanded British naval forces on the North America station,
created a shared set of codes and signals that allowed American and British captains to communicate and coordinate their efforts.32 At the start, the partnership
appeared to be a solid one, as the Navy Department distributed the signal book
and the commodores became aware of the common cause in Haiti. American
merchant ships sometimes sailed in convoys under British protection, and the
two nations’ warships passed intelligence to one another.33
However, it was not long before the relationship began turning sour, at least
occasionally. In the middle of November 1798, the American sloop of war
Baltimore (twenty-four guns) was escorting a convoy of merchant ships along
the north coast of Cuba toward Havana. As the convoy neared its destination
lookouts called out several sail on the horizon, and a squadron of British warships
approached. The squadron’s flagship, the ship of the line HMS Carnatic, hailed
Captain Isaac Phillips aboard Baltimore. Commodore John Loring asked him
to come aboard the British ship to consult, and the American officer crossed
in a boat. Phillips then was surprised when Loring refused to acknowledge his
papers and instead ordered a press-gang aboard Baltimore and the other ships
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of the convoy. The Royal Navy removed fifty-five seamen from the ships who
they alleged were British subjects. Although about half eventually were returned,
when the British sailed off they left Phillips impotent and embarrassed. Not long
after, Secretary Stoddert relieved him of command.34
Cooperation and conflict ebbed and flowed between the Americans and the
British throughout the war. Washington continued to receive reports of British
assistance to American merchants, and the passing of intelligence between warships remained a regular occurrence.35 However, there continued to be occasions
on which the interests of the two nations diverged, including incidents of impressment and the occasional capture of American merchant vessels.36
One of the most dramatic examples occurred on the island of Curaçao, a
Dutch colony, in the closing month of the conflict. In September 1800, French
forces launched an invasion of Curaçao by landing over a thousand troops,
who marched on the primary town, Willemstad. The port did heavy trade with
American merchants, and there were many American ships in the harbor as the
French approached.37 The U.S. warships Merrimack and Patapsco arrived to help
protect American interests, and the British sent the frigate HMS Nereide to ensure
that the French did not take control of the island. The Dutch initially appeared
ready to concede to the French, but with the arrival of the Anglo-American
naval forces and the subsequent landing of marines and sailors to strengthen the
defenses, they stood to fight the French attack. The two smaller American ships
positioned themselves so their guns could support the town’s small fortifications,
and the combined force successfully repulsed the attack, leading the French to
withdraw from the island.38
After the end of the combined defense, the American ships reembarked their
Marines and sailors and set off to patrol around the island to try to capture some
of the retreating French ships. While the Americans were gone, Captain Frederick Watkins landed British forces and annexed the town for Great Britain. He
placed seven American ships in quarantine under British control, took custody of
all the gold and cash of the American merchants in Willemstad, and sent orders
for RN ships to seize all American vessels in nearby waters. Watkins’s perception of British interests appeared to outweigh both his promise to the American
captains that he would protect American merchants and any appreciation for the
American contribution to the recent joint defense of the island.39
Alliances and partnerships are always a complicated part of military and naval
operations. In maritime conflicts short of declared war, awareness of the motives
and intentions of friends can be just as important as understanding adversaries.
Because these conflicts rarely appear existential, and because they remain below
many nations’ threshold of what they consider war, members of defensive
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alliances can be conflicted over their responsibilities to one another. The result
is that while multiple nations may become involved in the same conflict, they do
it for mixed reasons and with mixed rules of engagement. This may result in a
situation counterproductive to American interests.
In the Quasi War, Secretary Stoddert and his commodores discovered that
the partnership with Toussaint-Louverture produced both operational and
political limitations, alongside its local benefits. They also experienced a complex
relationship with the Royal Navy in the West Indies. As a result, during the Quasi
War American leaders repeatedly had to ask the question “What are my partner’s
motives, and do we have the same goals?”
The Role of Fleet Architecture
Congress founded the Department of the Navy to manage, organize, and command
the Navy for the Quasi War with France. In the opening month of the conflict, the
House and the Senate began authorizing the funds to build up the fleet. They
started with finishing the fitting out and commissioning of the first three frigates,
funding the completion of the second three frigates (whose construction had been
suspended to save money), and appropriating funds to build or buy a dozen ships
of up to twenty-two guns each. The Navy also took command of the cutters of the
Revenue Service, reflagging them as warships. The department aimed to obtain
converted merchant ships that were on the larger size and could carry around that
limit (twenty-two guns). Examples are Delaware and Baltimore, which the Navy
generally classified as sloops of war. These were the first ships deployed.40
What the commodores quickly discovered once they were on station, however,
was that larger ships with deep drafts had operational limitations. The squadrons
had to complete much of their required patrolling in archipelagic waters—the
littorals and shallows of the Caribbean. The privateers that made up the vast
majority of the French threat tended to have shallow drafts and fast schooner rigs,
which made them maneuverable and harder to chase with a big, square-rigged
warship. Instead of squadrons made up of a handful of large, strong ships, with
an overwhelming firepower of thirty-six to forty-four guns, the commodores
discovered that in their hybrid conflict they needed larger numbers of smaller
combatants.
Two of the warships purpose-built for the Quasi War demonstrated the value
of small combatants both in combat and in patrol and presence work. Built in
Baltimore, the schooners Experiment and Enterprise put to sea in 1799. Approximately eighty-five feet long, with a draft of just nine feet and a small armament of
twelve six-pound guns, Experiment first sailed with the squadron of Commodore
Silas Talbot in the waters around Haiti.41 Generally the same size and with the
same capabilities as the privateers it hunted but with a trained crew, Experiment
made more captures than any other ship deployed that year. Henry Spencer built
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Enterprise on lines similar to those of its sister ship, and the second schooner
deployed a month after Experiment. In the ship’s first year of operations, its crew
captured eight privateers and recaptured eleven American ships that the French
had attacked and taken. These two small ships appeared more operationally effective than most of the frigates in the conflict. Commanded by aggressive young
officers, they quickly made reputations for themselves, and the name Enterprise
would enter American naval lore.42
The commodores realized they had a problem with the architecture of their
squadrons. They simply did not have enough small combatants to patrol their
areas of responsibility properly. To address the problem, many of them began using ships they had captured as American warships. This solution was a relatively
common practice of navies in the age of sail. For example, British captains regularly purchased ships they had captured back from prize courts and called them
“tenders” for their larger vessels. Placing a favorite junior officer in command
with a handful of sailors from the larger ship, commanders deployed the tenders
to patrol the littorals where the larger ship could not reach.43
American commodores such as Silas Talbot and Thomas Truxtun began using this method to augment their forces. In early 1799, within days of Constellation’s defeat of the larger French frigate L’Insurgente, Truxtun and his men also
captured the privateers Le Diligente and L’Union off Guadeloupe. Truxtun took
L’Union into American service and manned and deployed it as a tender to hunt
more privateers.44 Talbot followed the same path in the spring of 1800 when
when the Americans captured the French sloop L’Ampherite. Talbot renamed the
small ship Amphitheatre and placed it under the command of a young Lieutenant
David Porter, with orders that suspicious vessels “may be stop’d, and examined
strictly, and brought to the Constitution if she is near to be found.”45 Talbot also
used the American smuggler Sally, which his boats had captured along the beach
on the north coast of Hispaniola, as a raider to attack the privateer Sandwich in
the harbor of Puerto Plata.46
The American commanders in the Quasi War discovered that a balanced
architecture for their squadrons, including a range of capabilities in their ships,
was important for prosecuting an irregular campaign successfully. This is not to
claim that big warships, with the ability to conduct conventional naval battles, were
unnecessary; on the contrary, Truxtun and Constellation’s battles with the French
frigates L’Insurgente and Vengeance demonstrated that units deployed for hybrid
conflicts must be able to participate in high-end naval combat when threatened.
However, the administration back in Washington was not happy with the
commodores’ practice, and none of the tenders operated for more than a
couple of months.47 But the success of purpose-built small combatants such
as Experiment and Enterprise and the commanders’ desperate use of captured
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vessels as tenders to expand the low-end capability of their squadrons suggest
that in hybrid conflict a balanced force is vital to efficient operations.
CONSIDERING QUASI WARS
In his report to Secretary Stoddert on Constellation’s victory over L’Insurgente,
Thomas Truxtun lamented the complex character of the operations he was leading.
He wrote, “The french Captain tells me, I have caused a War with France, if so I
am glad of it, for I detest Things being done by Halves.”48 Maritime great-power
competition is complicated, rarely conforming to the popular image of great naval
battles and other decisive moments on the sea. Despite many officers’ dislike of
the circumstances, the very first U.S. armed conflict following independence was
a maritime hybrid conflict conducted with a backdrop of great-power competition
in the Caribbean. Close examination of the records of the conflict demonstrates
a number of parallels and similarities to the challenges that have been identified
in the study of irregular or hybrid conflicts and gray-zone operations in the
twenty-first century. In their study of these similarities, today’s scholars, policy
makers, and planners can start with four observations that might help guide their
questions about modern maritime insecurity and complexity.
The leaders of the early American navy discovered the necessity for presence
as an operating principle in maritime hybrid conflicts. Benjamin Stoddert, with
President Adams’s concurrence, developed the first use of rotational deployments
and other efforts to maintain physical presence. In the modern world, there is a
temptation to view the virtual presence of air- and subsurface-based intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms as providing a technological solution
for the twenty-first century. Yet the physical presence of surface combatants is
likely to be just as important as it was two centuries ago, because it provides the
maritime equivalent of what strategist Rear Admiral Joseph C. Wylie Jr., USN,
described as “the man on the scene with the gun.”49 The possibility of a ship arriving and the actual physical presence of one already operating in theater affect
the adversary’s operational planning in fundamentally different ways. Virtual
presence denotes actual absence.
The U.S. Navy struggles with this challenge in the twenty-first century. The
occasional presence of American warships in the waters of the South China Sea
sends important messages—but so does the absence of presence between those
visits. In maritime regions that share many of the hallmarks of hybrid conflicts
of the past, such as the Baltic or the South China Sea, regular naval presence has
been hard to maintain; instead, episodic exercises and occasional patrols have become standard. Strategists considering regions that have the potential to escalate
into hybrid or quasi wars may benefit from considering the same issues regarding
the maintenance of regular presence that Secretary Stoddert addressed.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020

83

80

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 1

Early American naval leaders also discovered that hybrid conflicts usually
offer up multiple adversaries. These adversaries typically have differing motives
for their involvement in the conflict and employ different tactics or operating
concepts. Planners must work actively to understand these differences if they
are to prepare operations effectively. If they appreciate these divergences as a
fundamental part of the maritime challenge, they even can use them as an opportunity. Recent developments of Yemeni rebels deploying coastal-defense missiles raise these kinds of concerns. It is unclear whether the group that fired on
USS Mason (DDG 87) and other American ships in October 2016 did so with the
full knowledge of its proxy supporters.50 In the Quasi War, the French privateers
frequently were more aggressive than the warships, and this complicated some of
the Directory’s efforts to resolve the conflict. The government in Paris eventually
recalled General Desfourneaux, the French governor at Guadeloupe, for being
too antagonistic and aggressive toward the Americans. The maritime militias the
People’s Republic of China has developed have the potential to impose similar
complications on their alleged supporters and commanders.51 There is potential
that the militias, operating under the assumption that People’s Liberation Army
Navy forces will support them, will become more aggressive than their government expects, and they may place China in an untenable position. American and
allied planners must understand not only that this possibility exists but also how
to identify it when it happens.
Likewise, partners and allies constitute a complicated element of hybrid conflicts.
Just as with potential adversaries, most partners bring their own goals and their
own limitations to a conflict. These sometimes will make cooperation difficult, and
even may be counterproductive to American interests. This will be particularly
true when neither side sees an existential challenge, but instead perceives a slow
“salami slicing.” Balancing the differing interests of partners and allies will require
just as much attention as understanding the motives of and differences among
adversaries. U.S. interests already have experienced this challenge in recent years
with the developments in the Philippines. Asking explicit questions about the
interests of potential partners also raises important considerations about other
nations, such as India or Vietnam, whose interests appear on the surface to match
those of the United States but may not connect at a deeper political level. This
truism may seem obvious when one reads it in an academic journal, but strategists
and planners sometimes overlook it when they work from an American-centric
view of the world and the country’s challenges, as issues of rules of engagement,
caveats, and relationships from Afghanistan have shown.52
Finally, the force architecture that commanders employ in the gray zone
requires a hard examination of the capabilities available and the best way to
balance the force employed. Large, powerful warships offer important deterrent
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effects and address the challenges of survivability and force protection. However,
they also tend to be inefficient and operationally limited when engaged in
missions that fall short of war between major powers or ship-on-ship battles.
Likewise, their expense results in smaller numbers, which adds to the presence
challenge. Early American naval leaders were forced to recognize that small
combatants are a vital part of the mix needed to address the myriad capabilities
that hybrid adversaries may deploy. The large, forty-four-gun superfrigates
such as Constitution were superior in a fight with other warships and eminently
survivable; however, they had significant operational and acquisition limitations.
Recent discussions of force architecture and fleet design in the U.S. Navy have
focused on the big numbers—a 350-ship fleet, and how many large, powerful,
guided-missile destroyers and globe-spanning aircraft carriers should be
included.53 But if the U.S. Navy is going to prepare itself for the hybrid maritime
conflicts of the future, it should remember the experience of the quasi wars of
the past and recognize the insistent need for small combatants as a fundamental
part of a balanced fleet.
In his Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority Admiral John M.
Richardson suggests that today’s challenges “will require us to reexamine our
approaches in every aspect of our operations,” but he immediately goes on to
remind sailors that “as we change in many areas, it is important to remember that
there will also be constants.” The Chief of Naval Operations wrote that the best
way to identify these constants and to balance them against the ever-changing
character of conflict is to “[b]egin problem definition by studying history.”54
While this call to historical context and wisdom appears fresh and new, Professor
Andrew Lambert has written that the very founding of the academic discipline
of naval history was “driven by the requirements of naval education, doctrinal
development, and strategic reflection.”55 It is natural that, to understand our
present, we should return to the maritime past.56
History provides an important starting point for the examination of these
kinds of challenges in the modern day. The suggestion that twenty-first-century
threats are unprecedented or that consideration of them cannot be informed by
experience does not stand up to critical scrutiny. However, it also is important
to understand that there are limitations to historical analogy and the use of
historical study in military strategy. Modern planners, policy makers, and naval
officers will not find “school solutions” or easy answers derived from the study of
America’s first maritime hybrid war. Instead, the observations that can be made
from studying history may help refine the questions asked and the assumptions
made, so as to develop better the underlying principles of a strategy or operational
concept. As Alfred Thayer Mahan himself wrote, “The instruction derived from
the past must be supplemented by a particularized study of the indications of
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the future.”57 The character of war is ever changing, even if parallels continue to
resonate, and historical study offers us ways to build frames of reference, context,
and background knowledge.
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“NEITHER FISH NOR FOWL NOR YET GOOD
RED HERRING”
Joint Institutions, Single-Service Priorities, and Amphibious
Capabilities in Postwar Britain
Ian Speller

I

n December 1948, the U.S. Marine Corps Gazette published an article by Lieutenant Colonel Rathvon M. Tompkins, who reported on British policy on and organization for combined operations, the term the British used at the time to describe
amphibious operations.1 Tompkins was a U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) veteran of
landings at Tarawa and Saipan during the Second World War and had just completed a period working with the British at their School of Combined Operations
in North Devon.2 He praised them for their development of amphibious techniques during the war, but was less than complimentary about their postwar structures. In particular, he was critical of the “joint” (interservice) nature of the Combined Operations Organization, stating that “[b]elonging to no one in particular
and belonging to everyone in general, it is neither fish nor fowl nor yet good red
herring.” Reflecting on the lack of priority given to amphibious operations, Tompkins argued that, as it was not “squarely the responsibility of any one service,” the
subject tended to “take on the aspects of an orphan
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of older members of the family.”3 When times were
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specifically the Royal Marines, primary responsibility for amphibious warfare. In
contrast, British policy consistently had emphasized the importance of joint approaches and joint structures or institutions in one form or another.
In the years immediately before the war, interservice activity in this field was
enabled by work at the staff colleges, by joint committees, and at a small joint
training and development center. Next, wartime requirements saw the establishment of an entirely independent joint organization, with responsibility for
amphibious policy, training, and development and the conduct of minor raids.
Major operations remained the responsibility of the established services, relying
on nonspecialist forces. This system survived the end of the war and the independent organization endured, in truncated form, until the early 1960s. At that
point, the existing institutions were absorbed into a wider “joint warfare” structure, losing their independent status. In some respects, the result was a return to
the prewar system, with interservice coordination achieved through joint committees and a small joint-training establishment. However, the Royal Marines
now were identified as the “parent arm” for amphibious warfare, giving the naval
service primacy in a role that previously had been considered entirely joint. This
represented an important break from previous practice.4
This article explores institutional responsibility for amphibious warfare from
the late 1930s until the reforms of the 1960s. It will argue that a joint approach
served British needs during the Second World War but contributed to poor
results after 1945. British capabilities did not recover until amphibious warfare
became the particular responsibility of the naval service, lending credence to the
argument that Tompkins advanced. The key point is that joint imperatives tend to
prosper when they have the support of a powerful patron or when key furnishers
of support and material (usually the army, navy, or air force, or some combination
thereof) recognize the value of the service or capability provided and are willing
to make sacrifices to support it. This case study suggests that the most effective
way to promote the development of joint capabilities is to link these explicitly to
the self-interest of the key provider(s) and to build joint structures that encourage rather than inhibit this. These issues have wider relevance, and the article’s
conclusion explores them with reference to contemporary joint initiatives in the
United Kingdom (U.K.) and U.S. armed forces.
THE EMERGENCE OF JOINT INSTITUTIONS
It sometimes is argued that, discouraged by the failure at Gallipoli in 1915, the
British ignored amphibious warfare during the interwar period. This was not the
case. The army and navy both retained an interest in amphibious operations in
the 1920s and 1930s and some useful training and experimental work was undertaken, particularly at the staff colleges, which combined annually to conduct
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1
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a joint exercise. Lack of funds and lack of priority meant that the results were
relatively modest, but practical exercises were conducted, doctrine was updated,
and prototype landing craft were built. In accordance with long-standing practice, amphibious operations were understood to be a joint responsibility, and
coordination among the services was achieved by employing joint committees
and through cooperation at the staff colleges. The idea of employing the Royal
Marines as a specialist amphibious force gained occasional backing within naval
circles but had little support elsewhere.5
In 1936, a subcommittee of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee was established to support interservice training, and this group (DCOS[IT]) also was
given responsibility for updating doctrine, in the form of the Manual of Combined Operations. The new manual, completed in 1938, addressed all forms of
“combined” (interservice) operations, although over half the text was devoted to
topics relating to amphibious operations.6 DCOS(IT) also proposed the creation
of what became the Inter-Service Training and Development Centre (ISTDC),
established at Fort Cumberland (Portsmouth) in 1938.7 The ISTDC was tasked
with training and development across the range of interservice operations, but
amphibious considerations quickly came to dominate its work.
The ISTDC was an overtly joint organization. Prior to its establishment the naval staff college had proposed an entirely different approach, in which a training
and development center would be built around a military force provided by the
Royal Marines and supported by joint assets “as requisite.” The notion was that
the navy and the marines would be given primary responsibility for amphibious
warfare and that joint cooperation would be maintained on that basis.8 These
ideas did not gain support from the other staff colleges or from DCOS(IT), despite the support of the deputy chief of the naval staff. The joint vision prevailed.9
The ISTDC had a small staff consisting of a naval commandant, one staff officer each from the army and air force, and a Royal Marines (RM) adjutant. It was
instructed to study all joint operations and not to focus primarily on amphibious
matters, in accordance with the prevailing view that combined operations encompassed any operation that the army, navy, or air force might have to conduct in
cooperation with another service.10 In the event, the ISTDC ended up devoting
much of its time to amphibious warfare. This reflected the sympathies of its first
commandant, Captain Loben E. H. Maund, Royal Navy (RN), who was enthusiastic about amphibious operations and was able to push the center’s focus in that
direction. However, his attempts to win for the ISTDC a role in planning such
operations proved unsuccessful.11
The ISTDC managed to do some good work before the war, particularly in
supporting the design and construction of a small number of new, modern landing craft. In this respect Britain was ahead of the United States.12 Unfortunately,
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amphibious capabilities were not accorded a high priority in prewar British defense planning. Lacking any obvious requirement for amphibious operations in
the war they expected to fight, the British naturally prioritized other capabilities
in an environment in which both time and money were desperately short. The
approach was logical, but it left Britain ill prepared to deal with the unexpected
realities of war. Lack of a dedicated amphibious force available at short notice
undermined the British response to the German invasion of Norway in April
1940. The absence of such a force made evacuation from Dunkirk more difficult
in May–June 1940, and it forced the army to leave all its supplies and equipment
on the beach. The fall of France brought a new requirement for raids to harass the
enemy coast and a need to prepare for the kind of large operations that eventually
might allow Allied armies to return to Europe, but Britain was not well placed to
perform either role in the summer of 1940.
THE COMBINED OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION
The story of the wartime Combined Operations Organization has been told
many times and will not be addressed in detail here.13 This new joint organization
began as a tiny directorate set up within the Admiralty in June 1940, safely under
the control of the navy. Within weeks, however, the prime minister intervened
and appointed Sir Roger Keyes as Director of Combined Operations. Keyes, an
old acquaintance of Churchill and veteran of operations at Gallipoli (1915) and
Zeebrugge (1918), was a retired admiral of the fleet and had been an outspoken
critic of the Admiralty’s conduct of the war to date. His appointment was not
popular with the Chiefs of Staff; the First Sea Lord was particularly aggrieved.
One of Keyes’s first steps was to relocate his command out of the Admiralty and
into a separate building in Whitehall, establishing Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) as an independent joint headquarters—a move that further
alienated the navy, which viewed the new organization with suspicion.14
Unfortunately, Keyes achieved rather little in his new role, lacking the tact, organizational skills, and intellect required for a position that naturally trespassed
on ground that other, more-powerful groups considered to be their concern.
He was replaced in October 1941 by the dynamic young naval officer Louis F.
Mountbatten, who was promoted from captain to commodore and given the title
of Adviser of Combined Operations.15
Mountbatten, like Keyes, had been chosen by Churchill rather than the Chiefs
of Staff. He rapidly expanded the staff of COHQ, from twenty-three individuals
under Keyes to around four hundred, drawn from all three services. He was at
pains to emphasize the interservice nature of the organization, particularly to
those within COHQ.16 Reportedly, he succeeded to the point where his staff “almost forgot the colour of their uniform.”17
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Like Keyes, Mountbatten sought to establish COHQ as an operational command
independent of the services and, like Keyes, he failed. COHQ was responsible for
planning minor raids employing special-service troops (i.e., commandos) but was
not responsible for the conduct of major operations, responsibility for which remained with the army, navy, and air force. COHQ’s key role remained the provision
of technical advice on all aspects of opposed landings, coordination of training policy, command of training institutions, study of tactical and technical developments,
and research and development (R&D) into new equipment and landing craft.18
The importance of amphibious warfare within British policy was reflected in
the March 1942 decision to promote Mountbatten to the acting rank of vice admiral and the honorary ranks of air marshal and lieutenant general (to reflect the
joint nature of his appointment). He was given the new title of Chief of Combined
Operations (CCO), and as such sat as a full member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee when major issues were discussed or when amphibious matters were on
the agenda—a major elevation in status. COHQ had a representative on the Joint
Planning Staff and a representative on the British Joint Services Mission in Washington. Mountbatten remained in this position until August 1943, by which time
COHQ had done much to develop British proficiency in amphibious operations.
Departing to take up his new position as Supreme Allied Commander Southeast
Asia, he was replaced as CCO by an army officer (and former commando leader),
Major General Robert E. Laycock, who remained in the post until 1947.19
From humble origins the Combined Operations Organization grew into
something that began to resemble a fourth service. At the top of the organization was CCO, who sat as a full member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee when
relevant issues were discussed. He presided over an independent, interservice
headquarters in London, and by 1942 was responsible for administering around
a dozen training and experimental establishments in the United Kingdom and for
providing advice to a similar number of training centers overseas.20 COHQ issued
advice on a vast range of topics relating to amphibious warfare and maintained
liaison with the United States to keep abreast of developments there. The arrival
of nine American officers in summer 1942 made COHQ one of the first joint
interallied headquarters in London. Combined Operations was also responsible
for training landing craft officers and crewmembers and for administering the
growing amphibious fleet. The Admiralty viewed this with concern, and in late
1942 moved to regain control of something that was beginning to resemble a
rival navy.21
Starting from a low base, British amphibious capabilities expanded dramatically, and amphibious operations evolved from a neglected art into a war-winning
instrument. In 1939, the ISTDC had reported that a shortage of landing craft
meant that Britain lacked the capacity to land even a brigade with less than six
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months’ notice.22 By June 1944, the British were able to play the leading role in
the largest and most complex amphibious operation of all time; 70 percent of the
landing ships and craft employed during Operation NEPTUNE were RN vessels.23
Small-scale raids became the business of amphibious specialists (commandos)
but—as anticipated before the war—major operations were conducted largely
by conventional military forces, assisted by a joint organization created for this
purpose. Combined Operations played an important part in this, promoting
training, development, and the identification of new techniques and new equipment. It was aided, of course, by close collaboration with the United States.24 The
independent organization grew out of an immediate need—in an environment
in which amphibious forces were accorded a significant priority—and resources,
while never sufficient, were plentiful in comparison with the 1930s. The organization enjoyed the support and sponsorship of the prime minister, as evidenced
by his appointment of Keyes and promotion of Mountbatten—rather against the
wishes of the Admiralty.
COMBINED OPERATIONS AND AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AFTER 1945
The British established the principles that would govern the postwar organization for amphibious warfare in 1944, at around the same time as the Normandy
landings were taking place. It is not surprising, therefore, that they remained
wedded to established ideas about combined operations being a joint responsibility. Despite this, the navy continued to advocate an approach that would put
it in the driver’s seat. The Admiralty never had been reconciled entirely to the
establishment of COHQ as an independent headquarters, nor did it maintain an
easy relationship with either Keyes or Mountbatten, both of whom owed their
position to Churchill, not the sponsorship of the First Sea Lord. Laycock was a
less divisive character than either of his predecessors, but he often found himself
facing the Admiralty as an adversary rather than an ally.25
In May 1944, the First Sea Lord, Andrew B. Cunningham, advanced the notion that in the future the Royal Marines should become the main source of
amphibious advice and expertise and that they should be given responsibility
for the provision, training, and development of all special-assault forces. He
accepted the requirement to retain an interservice aspect to combined operations but believed that in the future CCO should be an RM officer acting with a
“divided responsibility.”26 In many respects, this was a return to the general idea
the navy had advanced before the war; joint liaison would be maintained, but
the Royal Marines (and therefore the navy) would take primary responsibility
for amphibious warfare. An interservice committee was set up to investigate the
matter, with Air Marshal Sir Norman H. Bottomley, the Deputy Chief of the Air
Staff, as chairperson.27
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The Bottomley Committee submitted its report to the Chiefs of Staff on 29
June 1944. The report emphasized that amphibious warfare had to be accepted
as a permanent commitment for the whole armed forces. This, the members argued, would require maintenance of the existing system, whereby CCO acted as
the central advisory body, while the individual services remained responsible for
the provision of equipment and personnel, and force commanders were responsible for actual operations. They recommended the maintenance of a permanent,
central, independent, interservice combined-operations organization, because
amphibious warfare, “whilst involving all three services, is the exclusive province
of no one of them.”28
The possibility of creating a specialist amphibious corps along the lines of the
USMC was investigated but was rejected as being uneconomical and ill suited to
British requirements. The committee thought primarily in terms of major operations such as the one so recently undertaken at Normandy. Under this model, a
specialist corps would not fit into the framework for postassault operations, which
would call for conventional military forces. Nor would the British be able to afford
to maintain a specialist force of the size required to conduct operations on the
scale envisaged. The report concluded that “[t]here is no escaping the conclusion
that the Army itself must be ready to find the assault force required in war.”29
The committee did consider the possibility of maintaining in peacetime a permanent amphibious brigade of Royal Marines, available at short notice for emergencies short of war, but, mirroring prewar assessments, it rejected the idea as
being of doubtful utility. However, it was proposed that the Royal Marines should
provide most of the personnel for a Special Service Group of 1,094 men, consisting of a headquarters, two commando units, and a Small Operations Group.
The main role of this group was to facilitate training and to act as a nucleus for
expansion in war, but it was acknowledged that it also might provide a small and
highly mobile unit for imperial defense, reflecting prewar ideas about the value
of a Royal Marines Striking Force.30
To maintain proficiency in amphibious warfare, the committee argued for
the retention of the post of CCO and of COHQ as the central advisory body. It
also called for the establishment of a permanent training organization designed
to keep the armed forces as a whole competent in the practice of amphibious
warfare, and for the maintenance of a Naval Assault Force. The latter (consisting
of sixty-four ships, 135 major craft, and 256 minor craft) would support training
and act as the nucleus about which to expand in any future war. A portion of the
force would need to be kept available permanently, but the majority would be
manned only during the annual training season.31
Admiral Cunningham was not happy with these conclusions. He considered
the Naval Assault Force to be too large, arguing that establishing a force of such
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size would prejudice the maintenance of the postwar fleet. More fundamentally, the committee had rejected his proposal to make amphibious warfare the
particular responsibility of the Royal Marines, thereby leaving responsibility in
the hands of an independent interservice organization not subject to Admiralty
control. In response, he revived proposals made in 1943 to replace COHQ with
an interservice committee along the lines of the Joint Planning Staff.32
Cunningham was opposed on this point by the other chiefs and CCO. The
“Report by Committee on Inter-service Responsibility for Amphibious Warfare”
was approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 29 July 1944.33 The armed
forces thus agreed to maintain after the war an independent joint organization
with responsibility for amphibious warfare; to set up institutions able to train
joint forces and to promote R&D; and, in principle, on the need to establish a
Naval Assault Force.
These plans did not long survive postwar austerity. The divisional-size lift envisaged for the Naval Assault Force soon was downgraded to brigade group–size
lift, and even then the Admiralty complained that it could not resource this without denuding the regular fleet of personnel. The Admiralty preferred something
more modest: at most, sufficient lift for a commando brigade, smaller than its
army equivalent and with fewer vehicles and supporting arms.34 It argued with
CCO and the army over the requirement, but the debate was largely academic.
Whatever the headline policy, only a handful of vessels was maintained in commission after the war, making large-scale or widespread training impossible. The
requirement eventually was reduced to the maintenance of sufficient lift for a
battalion group, and this finally was achieved in 1951 with the establishment at
Malta of the Amphibious Warfare Squadron (AWS).35
The failure to maintain a large training fleet undermined the aspiration to keep
the army as a whole conversant with amphibious operations. Similarly, ambitious
plans to maintain a major training establishment also failed. The large wartime
training centers were closed and were not replaced. In the event, only a small
Combined Operations School and a Combined Operations Signals School were
retained to develop and teach the techniques of amphibious warfare, supported
by the Combined Operations Experimental Establishment, which undertook
R&D work. For reasons of efficiency and cost, these were brought together—in
1949, at Fremington in North Devon—to form the Combined Operations Centre
(from 1951 known as the Amphibious Warfare Centre). The center did some
useful work, despite Tompkins’s criticism that its approach confined amphibious
warfare to an academic niche from which it was “removed annually, for a few
days at a time, to satisfy a requirement in a staff college syllabus.”36 The center at
least did maintain a fruitful relationship with the USMC, hence Tompkins’s spell
in North Devon.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1

96

Naval War College: Autumn 2020 Full Issue

SPELLER

93

Army interest in amphibious warfare was reflected in Exercise SPEARHEAD,
a major joint exercise conducted at the Staff College at Camberley in May 1947.
In addition, during the postwar years the army provided COHQ and CCO with
much-needed support in the Chiefs of Staff Committee, frustrating numerous
attempts by the Admiralty to downgrade or abolish the organization. In some respects, it was easy for the army to support COHQ—it cost it little to do so. However, the army’s interest did not extend to maintaining the army commando units
that were raised during the war, nor did it translate into regular or systematic
training for army formations. Joint amphibious exercises did occur, but tended to
be small-scale and rather ad hoc, much as they had been before the war.37
The Royal Marines retained three battalion-size commandos, organized into 3
Commando Brigade, and these undertook commando training at the Commando School, Royal Marines (based first at Towyn, then Bickleigh, later Lympstone).
In 1948, the Amphibious School, Royal Marines was set up to train landing-craft
crewmembers, and the school also absorbed several joint combined-operations
units that were too small to administer themselves.38
Apart from a small number of combined-operations specialists, the Royal
Marines were the only British troops to receive anything like regular amphibious
training, although even they were unable to focus on this role as much as they
might have wished. Commando units often were employed ashore in imperial
policing or counterinsurgency duties, reducing their availability to perform their
amphibious role. When the British agreed to send a commando unit to Korea to
assist the United Nations in 1950, they had to raise a new unit, 41 (Independent)
Commando, from volunteers and from a draft of reinforcements that had been
due to be sent to Malaya, where 3 Commando Brigade was being employed
ashore to chase Communist insurgents. The marines of 41 Commando undertook a number of successful raids behind North Korean lines and participated in
the epic action with U.S. Marines around the Chosin Reservoir and in the retreat
to Hungnam, earning a Presidential Unit Citation in the process. That they did
so with American equipment; carrying American weapons; and landed from
American ships, craft, and submarines may say something about the state of British preparedness for amphibious operations in 1950.39
Lack of priority was particularly apparent with reference to the amphibious fleet. Despite the return to the United States of Lend-Lease vessels and the
scrapping of hundreds of worn-out craft, the British still had many amphibious
ships and craft available at the end of the war. However, shortage of finance and
manpower made the navy reluctant to keep many of these in commission, and
most quietly rotted away in low-priority reserve. Vessels built to wartime standards and designed to meet wartime contingencies were beginning to show their
design limitations by the 1950s, and many were becoming rather dilapidated.
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COHQ pressed for new construction to replace these, and also for new ships to
fill the gaps that existed within the fleet (particularly with respect to fire-support
and infantry-assault vessels).40 The Admiralty successfully resisted such pressure
and, with the exception of a handful of minor craft, no new amphibious ships or
craft were built before the 1960s.41
The key problem was that, while lip service was given to the notion that amphibious warfare was important, it was not as important as other, more-pressing
concerns. The army was keen to retain expertise in amphibious operations, but
the cost of doing this fell largely on the navy. The admirals had other things to
worry about and preferred to prioritize more-traditional sea-control tasks. CCO
could advance the cause of amphibious warfare in the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and did so, but he was not well placed to force any of the services to devote
scarce resources to the matter. The prevailing concept remained for amphibious
operations on a similar model to Normandy in 1944. It was clear that such operations could not occur in the early stages of any war against the Soviet Union,
when once again survival might be the major issue. If they were required only
in the later stages, then the immediate need was for developmental work to keep
techniques up to date and for a small cadre to provide a basis on which to expand
after mobilization. Raiding might be needed in the early stages of war, although
even here lack of priority meant that equipment, training, and personnel were
recognized to be inadequate to meet planned requirements.42
In some respects, the overall approach was logical enough, given the type of
war that Britain expected to fight. Once again, however, the British armed forces
neglected to recognize the potential for amphibious forces to provide the ability
to deal with the unexpected. Failure to maintain in peacetime a credible amphibious force made it harder for Britain to respond effectively to several crises
beyond Europe, as was evident in the case of Korea. A shortage of appropriate
ships available at short notice undermined British planning during the Abadan
crisis in 1951.43 It complicated planning for reinforcement of the Suez Canal zone
in the event of major trouble in the early 1950s. And, most seriously, it badly undermined the British response to Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal in
July 1956.44 Humiliation at Suez helped to illustrate the shortcomings in Britain’s
amphibious capability, notwithstanding the innovative use of helicopters to land
marines on the beach at Port Said in November.
The navy’s attitude to the independent Combined Operations Organization
always had been, at best, ambivalent. Its leaders did not appreciate being harassed and held to account by CCO on matters relating to amphibious warfare
when they lacked sufficient resources to support roles to which they accorded a
much higher priority. In the period between 1944 and 1954, the Admiralty made
repeated attempts to undermine COHQ’s independence, reduce its staff, or have
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it abolished entirely. The Chiefs of Staff discussed the matter numerous times.
Army support for Combined Operations prevented the Admiralty from getting
its way but could not stop a steady reduction in staff and resources; by 1949, there
were just thirteen officers based at COHQ, and additional cuts followed.45 The
navy’s preferred approach was to amalgamate the post of CCO with that of the
Commandant General, Royal Marines (CGRM), but the prevailing concept of
amphibious operations as a joint responsibility within the context of major war
scenarios conspired to frustrate these plans.46
This all began to change in the 1950s as British military planning began to
reflect the implications of the emerging nuclear stalemate. There was growing
appreciation that a major war in Europe was now unlikely and, if it did occur,
probably would be characterized by an early and devastating nuclear exchange.
In such circumstances, the need for sustained, large-scale, conventional military
operations appeared doubtful. This posed challenges for all the services, but
especially the Royal Navy, whose primary role—sea control in a major European war—began to lose credibility. The wider availability of nuclear weapons
certainly posed problems for a concept of amphibious operations rooted in the
Normandy model. On the other hand, there was a growing understanding that
there was an increased likelihood of crises and conflicts beyond Europe, and the
navy began to explore the potential to use flexible maritime forces as a means of
responding to these.47
In July 1954, the Chiefs of Staff endorsed the conclusions of a joint working
party chaired by the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff. The joint working party argued
that the advent of the hydrogen bomb meant that the requirement for amphibious
operations in a major conflict now was limited to small-scale raids; operations
on a larger scale would have to be sponsored by the United States. Given this,
the requirement for training in peacetime could be limited to staff-level studies,
with exercises up to the strength of a reinforced battalion group. There was no
longer a requirement to keep the armed forces as a whole conversant with the
principles of amphibious operations. Now, for the first time, such operations
could become the primary responsibility of one group. The working party argued
that the interservice nature of the amphibious warfare organization should be
retained, but it concluded that the time was right for the Royal Marines to play
the “predominant part.” The members also recommended that the Amphibious
Warfare Centre should move from Fremington to amalgamate with the Amphibious School, Royal Marines at Poole. The Chiefs of Staff endorsed this move and
the conclusion that the Royal Marines should become the “parent body” for amphibious warfare. It was accepted that there was “no requirement for the Army
as a whole to be trained in amphibious warfare.”48 As a result, Amphibious Warfare Headquarters (AWHQ), as COHQ had been renamed in 1951, continued
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to represent amphibious needs in Whitehall (with a reduced staff), and a Joint
Services Amphibious Warfare Centre (JSAWC) was created at Poole with the
amalgamation of the Amphibious Warfare Centre and the Amphibious School,
Royal Marines.49 Amphibious warfare remained a joint responsibility, but for the
first time the navy was in the driver’s seat.
Ten years earlier this might have caused a problem; the Admiralty had been
less than enthusiastic about amphibious operations. But by the mid-1950s things
were beginning to change. In a context in which major war in Europe appeared
unlikely, and any such war was expected to “go nuclear” in its early stages, the
navy’s focus on sea control in a third Battle of the Atlantic began to look less
than credible; the service was preparing for the wrong war. As a result, the navy
underwent a radical change in approach. Even before the 1956 Suez crisis, the
Admiralty had begun to think about the provision of flexible options for limited war and crisis management beyond Europe, and the failure of Operation
MUSKETEER reinforced the need for change. Within this context, amphibious
forces gained a new relevance within a broader expeditionary approach.
A DIFFERENT TYPE OF JOINTERY
From the late 1950s, the Admiralty embraced amphibious forces as a key element
within an expeditionary approach designed to provide Britain with flexible options for crisis management and limited-war contingencies beyond Europe. The
inherent mobility of amphibious forces had the advantage of reducing reliance on
a diminishing number of overseas bases and of providing access without the need
to negotiate overflight or basing rights. The utility of this was demonstrated on
numerous occasions, notably including the interventions in Kuwait (1961) and
East Africa (1964). The role also gave the navy a means of justifying retention of a
large, balanced fleet and could be mobilized to support the case for the next generation of large aircraft carriers. Thus—for the first time since the Second World
War—amphibious warfare became a major priority for the navy, in support of an
expeditionary strategy requiring balanced forces.50
To support its new expeditionary approach, the navy replaced the aging AWS
with two new assault ships (LPDs), commissioned in 1965 and 1967, and converted two light aircraft carriers into landing platform helicopter (LPH)–style “commando carriers” in 1960 and 1962. Six new logistic landing ships (LSLs) were
built to carry follow-on forces and provide logistic lift for the army in peacetime.
Operated initially by the British India Steam Navigation Company on behalf of
the Ministry of Transport, the LSLs transferred to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary in
1970. This new capability was designed to carry, land, and sustain in combat a
balanced army brigade group; it was not intended only for marines. The commandos could provide a very useful light “fire brigade” designed to deal quickly
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with minor conflagrations, but British policy was built on the idea that larger and
more heavily equipped forces might be required in some circumstances. Thus,
the LPDs and LSLs were designed specifically to carry and land the full range of
army equipment, including tanks. They were to be part of a joint capability that
the navy dubbed the Joint Services Seaborne Force.51
Nonetheless, this was all good for the Royal Marines. The Commando Brigade
expanded from three to five active battalion-size commandos. (Plans to raise a
sixth were dropped quietly owing to fear of opposition from the army.)52 From
1962 the commandos were reinforced with 105 mm pack howitzers, provided by
the Royal Artillery, further enhancing the offensive potential of the commando /
commando carrier combination and reflecting the evolution toward an expeditionary role, as distinct from their previous rationale of wartime raiding.53 It
should be stressed that, despite these additions, 3 Commando Brigade was an RM
unit with joint elements attached—it remained firmly within the naval service.
The Admiralty rejected suggestions that the army routinely should contribute
infantry battalions to the Commando Brigade, and that command of the brigade
should rotate between the army and the marines, accurately surmising that these
reflected gambits designed to protect army regiments from cuts rather than any
serious or sustained interest in amphibious operations. It was not difficult to
show that rotating line battalions through the brigade was a poor substitute for
the employment of well-trained amphibious specialists, although this did not
stop army battalions from working with the brigade, as they did during the 1982
Falklands War.54
The 1958 edition of the Naval War Manual noted only two forms of amphibious operations, raids and invasions, and both within a major war context.55 But
by the time the edition was published, it already was apparent that Britain required a new concept of operations, one that focused less on tip-and-run raids or
ponderous, large-scale assaults against defended beaches, but instead promoted
enhanced range and mobility and greater responsiveness within a limited war
context. The matter was explored in detail by AWHQ and by the Land/Air Warfare Committee, the two bodies responsible for amphibious and for airborne
techniques. This led to the development of the “seaborne/airborne concept,”
which was studied and refined in collaboration between these two organizations
and the Staff Training Unit at the JSAWC and the School of Land/Air Warfare
at Old Sarum (Wiltshire). The concept sought to exploit the complementary
strengths of seaborne and airborne forces to enable a rapid and flexible approach
to expeditionary operations overseas, with the idea that a light but adaptable
force immediately available might be more effective than larger forces requiring
a longer timescale. It represented a major departure from the traditional (1940sstyle) amphibious operations envisaged to that point. Amphibious forces now
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were to be viewed as being part of a single team that also included airborne and
air-transported elements.56
Under this new concept, seaborne and airborne forces were to cooperate in
a seamless manner. Given this, it made little sense to divide responsibility for
developing the concept between separate amphibious and land/air organizations; a new institutional structure was needed. A new Joint Warfare Committee
(JWC) was established in January 1962, replacing both AWHQ and the Land/Air
Warfare Committee. It reflected the latter more than the former, as it was not an
independent headquarters but rather an interservice committee responsible to
the services via the chiefs. The JWC met ten times in its first year, chaired by the
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, with individual representatives from each service and the Director of the Joint Warfare Staff (see below).57 Additional members
were co-opted as required.58
The JWC had three subcommittees, dealing with offensive support, airtransport support, and amphibious warfare. The first two reflected the focus of
the two main wings of the old School of Land/Air Warfare.59 The Amphibious
Warfare Sub-Committee was responsible for providing advice and recommendations on policy, techniques, tactical developments, and training for amphibious
operations. It also was to advise on the collection of intelligence required for
amphibious operations and to ensure standardization and compatibility of equipment. Its remit was narrower than that of AWHQ, and responsibility for matters
such as amphibious equipment and logistics was given to the services; for practical reasons, this fell largely on the navy.60
The JWC was supported by a small interservice secretariat, known as the Joint
Warfare Staff (JWS). This consisted of a two-star director, a one-star deputy, and
ten other officers drawn from the three services. The first director was Major
General Robert D. “Titch” Houghton, RM, who had been the last Chief of Amphibious Warfare (the Chief of Combined Operations had adopted this new title
in 1951). His new role lacked the direct access to the Chiefs of Staff that had been
a feature of his previous post. Instead he was to submit an annual report to the
JWC, which would forward it to the chiefs for consideration. The JWS inherited
AWHQ’s location and its staff and adopted the old Combined Operations badge;
it was, however, a very different type of organization. It had a much broader remit
than had AWHQ, having also to address wider issues relating to joint warfare.61
The inevitable result was that it could devote less time to consideration of amphibious warfare than had the previous organization.
An important role for the JWS and JWC was the production of doctrine, in
the form of a Manual of Joint Warfare, building on the principles outlined in
the seaborne/airborne concept. The first edition was issued in February 1964.
It focused on all aspects of nonnuclear joint warfare beyond Europe. The topic
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1

102

Naval War College: Autumn 2020 Full Issue

SPELLER

99

of amphibious operations was addressed in volume 4 of the manual, which emphasized that such operations were essentially joint in nature. The manual was
revised three times in the 1960s, with updated versions released in 1965, 1967,
and 1970. By the time the last version was issued it no longer focused on nonnuclear options beyond Europe but instead covered all aspects of joint warfare.
It reflected the growing reemphasis within British defense policy on war fighting
within the NATO region.62
In addition to the above, the Staff Training Unit of the JSAWC and the School
of Land/Air Warfare were brought together to create a new Joint Warfare Establishment (JWE) at Old Sarum. This was responsible for formulating and teaching the tactical doctrine, procedures, and techniques required for joint warfare.
The Royal Marines retained an Amphibious Training Unit and a Trials Section
at Poole, where they continued to undertake amphibious training—a task more
readily conducted there than at the JWE, which was situated thirty miles inland.
The Chief of the Air Staff wanted the JWE always to have a Royal Air Force (RAF)
officer as director, clearly believing that airpower issues predominated. However,
neither the army nor the navy supported him in this matter, and the directorship
rotated among the services.63
The JWE concentrated initially on training and the development of doctrine
designed to support the type of expeditionary operations envisaged in the seaborne/airborne concept. However, it later expanded its scope to all forms of joint
warfare, particularly as, by the early 1970s, British defense policy once again was
focused heavily on the NATO region and the conduct of expeditionary operations began to be regarded as an unlikely requirement. The bread and butter of
the JWE was a two-week Joint Warfare Course that focused on the conduct of
conventional joint operations.64 The JWE ran a number of other courses, including an Amphibious Warfare Planning Course, but amphibious operations were
never its primary focus.
Christian Liles has emphasized that these new structures reflected the longestablished British preference for a joint approach to amphibious operations. He
argues that attitudes toward amphibious warfare reflected those that had existed
in the 1930s, when the approach had focused on combined operations more generally, not solely on amphibious warfare. Thus, he notes, the remit of the ISTDC
was similar to that of the new JWE, with its focus on air, land, and maritime
cooperation. The new Manual of Joint Warfare covered much more than just
amphibious warfare, as had the 1938 Manual of Combined Operations.65
It is true that the British continued to identify amphibious operations as being
a joint responsibility. There was no suggestion that amphibious operations were
the sole preserve of the navy and the marines. This was evident in the institutional
structure described above and in the new Manual of Joint Warfare. It was reflected
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in the design of the new amphibious ships constructed during the 1960s, which
were built to accommodate a balanced military force, including the full range of
army equipment. The Commando Brigade—the unit most likely to be at the forefront of any amphibious operation—had joint forces attached. The joint approach
also was apparent in the Admiralty’s vision for expeditionary operations in the
early 1960s, the aptly named Joint Services Seaborne Force. However, the decision
to make the naval service the “parent arm” for amphibious warfare represented
an important change in policy and practice, with broadly positive consequences.
It became apparent to the Admiralty that the new joint institutions were neither staffed nor organized to do the work that AWHQ had done formerly, and
that therefore, “in the absence of a joint organisation,” additional responsibilities
relating to policy and development now would fall on the Admiralty itself.66 The
Director of Tactical and Weapons Policy, restyled the Director of Naval and Tactical Weapons Policy from 1965, became responsible for amphibious warfare and
for the coordination of joint-warfare matters, and he sought additional staff to
help carry the weight. He was advised by the CGRM on the military aspects of
amphibious warfare and on all matters pertaining to the Royal Marines.67
In a practical sense, amphibious training and development centered on the
navy’s amphibious ships and the Royal Marine commandos. In 1965, the AWS
changed its base from Bahrain to Singapore, prompting the Commander-inChief, Far East Fleet to request that a commodore be appointed to command
these ships, promote amphibious training and development, and work with
the commander of 3 Commando Brigade. This resulted in the appointment of
Hardress “Harpy” Lloyd as Commodore Amphibious Forces, Far East Fleet in
May 1965.68 The post was relocated to the United Kingdom in 1971, with the
Commodore Amphibious Warfare (COMAW) now responsible to the two-star
Flag Officer, Carriers and Amphibious Ships.69 In the years ahead, COMAW
and his staff would represent the main repository of expertise in amphibious
operations within the Royal Navy. The only military force to undertake regular
training and exercises in such operations, and to work closely with COMAW, was
3 Commando Brigade. The institutional structure and latest doctrine may have
stressed the joint nature of amphibious operations, but in most practical senses
expertise in amphibious warfare was limited to those wearing dark blue uniforms
and those in green berets.70
The reorganization of the early 1960s was initiated at a time when expeditionary operations were emphasized within British defense policy and when there
was interest in enhancing joint cooperation within the Ministry of Defence. This
was evident in the reform of that ministry in 1964 and the adoption of unified
(joint) commands in the Middle East (1959), Near East (1961), and Far East
(1962).71 By the end of the decade, things had begun to change. The refocus on
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Europe that accompanied the British withdrawal from “East of Suez” was characterized by growing doubts about the need for expeditionary capabilities and by
the services retreating toward what were seen as core roles. Those roles tended to
revolve around single-service priorities. As Admiral Sir Jonathon Band recalled,
“The 1970s heralded the start of a bleak period for jointery.”72 The unified commands were abandoned and command and control was subsumed within NATO
structures. The JWE was disbanded in 1979 and incorporated (with reduced
staff) into the National Defence College at Latimer, as the new Joint Warfare
Wing. Two years later it was decided to close this wing entirely—a decision reversed only after the Falklands War demonstrated the value of joint operations.73
The change in policy meant that amphibious forces were confined, once again,
to the periphery of British defense interest. In the 1970s, the Commando Brigade
contracted back to three commando units, and the two commando carriers were
decommissioned without replacement. In 1975, replacements for the LPDs were
removed from the Ministry of Defence Long Term Costings, and by 1981 existing
ships appeared under threat within the context of a defense review that sought to
force the navy to focus ever more narrowly on sea control in the eastern Atlantic.74 Perhaps typically, Major General Julian H. A. Thompson, RM, recalled that
as a student at the joint Royal College of Defence Studies (1979–80) he submitted
a paper on expeditionary warfare that was sent to the Ministry of Defence for
comment. It was returned with the suggestion that he had wasted his time; such
operations never would happen again.75 Two years later, Thompson commanded
3 Commando Brigade during the Falklands War, in a campaign that included a
brigade-level amphibious landing at San Carlos. Success there rested on the aging remains of the 1960s amphibious force and on the expertise possessed by the
Royal Marines and by COMAW (Commodore Michael C. “Mike” Clapp) and his
staff. This expertise was not evident in other elements of the joint force.76
The Falklands War did not lead to an immediate change in overall British
defense policy. Joint warfare and expeditionary operations did not regain their
prominence in British defense planning until the end of the Cold War brought yet
another reversal of defense priorities. The ensuing decade brought the rejuvenation of Britain’s aging amphibious fleet, and the navy once again emphasized the
value of amphibious forces and aircraft carriers as a means of projecting power
overseas. Joint warfare emerged from the shadows to become a key issue. The
result was the formation of a joint operational command, joint logistics organization, joint doctrine and concepts center, and joint staff college to replace the
single-service alternatives.77 Amphibious warfare remained a joint concern and
involved joint forces, but the Royal Navy and Royal Marines were clearly the
parent arms. This was reflected in the confidential 1997 publication The United
Kingdom Approach to Amphibious Operations, produced in collaboration between
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the Headquarters Royal Marines and the Royal Navy’s Maritime Warfare Centre.78
The latter was responsible for delivering a short Amphibious Planning Course,
once the responsibility of the JWE.79 The only course at the new joint staff college that focused explicitly on amphibious operations, the Advanced Amphibious
Warfare Course, was provided for Royal Marines officers.80 Operational responsibility for amphibious forces was vested in Commander, Amphibious Task Group
(a naval officer) and Commander, U.K. Amphibious Forces (a Royal Marine).
SUMMARY TO THE 1960s
Throughout the period covered by this article, the British viewed amphibious
operations as an activity involving joint forces. However, what this meant in
practice changed over time.
Immediately before the war, amphibious operations were considered within
a concept of combined operations that encompassed all forms of interservice
activity. Naval attempts to gain prime responsibility for amphibious warfare were
not successful.
The events of 1940 gave amphibious operations a new priority, as complex,
large-scale operations became a necessary precursor to eventual victory. To equip
themselves for this unexpected task, the British created a new, thoroughly joint
organization that developed a thoroughly joint approach. Amphibious operations
were the business of all three services, and major operations were conducted by
conventional forces, not a dedicated amphibious corps. Training and the development of equipment and doctrine were in the hands of an independent joint
organization, which also administered a number of combined-operations units
required for training, minor raids, or specialist tasks within major operations.
This model was retained at the end of the war, in the belief that the armed
forces as a whole had to be able to undertake amphibious operations and that this
was the best way to prepare to do so. Once again, attempts by the navy to take
primary responsibility (via the Royal Marines) were rejected. However, while the
joint model had worked well during the war—when amphibious warfare was a
high-priority task and COHQ enjoyed the patronage of the prime minister—it
was less successful after 1945. In the face of postwar austerity and ambivalence
on the part of the navy, British capabilities atrophied. COHQ could study, teach,
advise, and pressure, but it could not force the navy, or indeed the army and the
air force, to devote scarce resources to something they did not consider a priority. Moreover, the very existence of this independent organization appeared to
aggravate admirals, who did not appreciate being harassed by a junior partner
over something they felt should be the business of the navy.
That situation did not change until the navy found a role for amphibious forces
within an expeditionary strategy that could be used to justify the maintenance
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of a balanced fleet. This was associated with the change in the accepted model
for amphibious operations and an acceptance that, while amphibious operations
would retain a joint element, the Royal Marines and the Royal Navy would play
the predominant part. Fortuitously, this put the navy in control at the same time it
discovered a new self-interest in developing this role. A joint-service element was
retained, but amphibious warfare became what the admirals had argued consistently it should be: the primary concern of the navy and the marines, supported
by joint forces as required.
It is important to note that the joint institutions created in the 1960s were
very different from those that had gone before. In his semiofficial history of the
Combined Operations Organization, Brigadier Bernard E. Fergusson, British
army (Ret.), explained the difference as follows: “There is all the difference in
the world between an inter-service meeting, however amiable and co-operative,
from which all hands afterward return to their respective bases; and a combined
[i.e., joint] headquarters, where all hands live together, use the same washbasins,
and owe allegiance to a single chief.”81 The approach from 1940 forward was for a
joint organization independent of the army, navy, and air force. In theory at least,
those involved forgot the color of their uniforms and reflected the interests of
“combined operations” above those of their parent services. All involved pulled
in the same direction, under the authority of the Chief of Combined Operations.
As Fergusson put it, “You cannot paddle your own canoe when you are all in the
same boat.”82 It was a highly evolved form of jointery.
In the 1960s, this changed to an approach based on joint cooperation and collaboration, enabled by a joint committee, secretariat, and training establishment.
The new structure, founded on consensus among service representatives, put
control back in the hands of the army, navy, and air force. Members of the JWC
were representatives of their own services; they were no longer in the same boat,
and they paddled their own canoes. This was a less-evolved form of jointery, but
it produced better results. The joint institutions promoted thinking about joint
warfare and included within their remit the development and promulgation of
doctrine for amphibious operations. By design, they devoted less time and attention specifically to this subject than had AWHQ. This did not matter, as the
navy (and marines) had picked up the baton. From the mid-1950s onward, amphibious warfare was predominantly a naval-service responsibility, and the naval
service—unlike AWHQ—had the power to turn interest into action.
MORE-RECENT APPLICATIONS
The historical case study illustrates the difficulty faced by a joint organization
tasked with maintaining proficiency in a role to which the main provider (in
this case, the navy) does not accord a high priority. It is not difficult to find other
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examples of the same dynamic in action. Within the British context, the fate of
fixed-wing naval aviation within Joint Force Harrier (JFH) offers a cautionary tale.
JFH (known initially as Joint Force 2000) was established in April 2000. It
brought together the navy’s Sea Harrier FA2 and the RAF’s Harrier GR7/GR9
squadrons within a new joint structure, ultimately under the control of RAF
Strike Command. The approach was designed to create synergies and savings in
a situation in which both aircraft types operated from the navy’s three Invincibleclass aircraft carriers, the FA2s in an air-defense role and the GR7/GR9s for
ground attack.83 This case is not entirely analogous to the experience of the post1945 amphibious forces, as the structures were different, but the history of JFH
reveals the same central dynamic, in which joint approaches could not overcome
the entrenched and self-interested attitudes of a dominant service.
Within just two years of the establishment of JFH a decision was taken to
retire the navy’s Sea Harriers to prioritize limited resources toward the RAF Harriers, which were considered more valuable for the operations then envisaged.
The decision appears to have been taken against the wishes of the navy, whose
carriers (and thus the fleet) were left without a fixed-wing air-defense capability.
The decision was supported actively by the RAF and by the Deputy Chief of the
Defence Staff (Equipment), Air Vice-Marshal Sir Graham E. “Jock” Stirrup, who,
unusually for an airman, seemed confident in the ability of the navy’s surface-toair missiles to provide an appropriate alternative to fighter cover.84 Later, as (joint)
Chief of the Defence Staff, Stirrup also seems to have been instrumental in a decision during the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review to retire the entire
remaining Harrier force earlier than planned.85 Here the Harriers were offered
up as a cost-cutting sacrifice required to keep the RAF’s fleet of aging land-based
Tornado bombers in service for a few more years. The decision appears to have
been taken against naval advice and at the last minute, upon the personal intervention of Stirrup—who seems not to have forgotten the color of his uniform. It
left the navy with no fixed-wing aircraft able to fly from its carriers, contributing
to the early retirement of those vessels.86
RAF reluctance to divert scarce resources to naval aviation reflected a longstanding preference for land-based, fast jets over anything that operates from the
sea. The RAF desire to focus on established core roles, to the detriment of joint capabilities, may mirror the reluctance of the postwar Admiralty to divert resources
to amphibious forces in the years after 1945; both organizations felt they should
focus on other things, ones that reflected core service roles. It is not clear that any
type of joint institution could have changed this; the key requirement would have
been a parent organization able to recognize the importance of the joint capability.
The British currently are regenerating their fixed-wing carrier capability after an interregnum of almost ten years, with RAF and RN F-35B Lightning IIs
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operating from the two new Queen Elizabeth–class ships. The aircraft fall under
the control of a new joint organization, Lightning Force Headquarters, based
at RAF Marham, commanded by an RAF officer and under the control of RAF
No. 1 Group (the successor to Strike Command).87 This appears to be jointery
with one service in the ascendant. The analysis above suggests that this could be
a positive thing, provided the RAF recognizes the importance of this role and
identifies a self-interest in supporting it (as the Admiralty did with amphibious
operations in the late 1950s). Ongoing debates over whether Britain will supplement the initial buy of forty-eight F-35Bs with more of the same or, as many in
the RAF prefer, with F-35As unable to operate from British carriers may reveal
the extent to which joint imperatives can prevail.88 The history of RAF antipathy
toward carrier-based aviation does not promote optimism.
The contemporary U.S. armed forces have not adopted jointery to the same
degree as their British counterparts, although numerous joint initiatives have been
pursued since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The functional component commands (Cyber, Special Operations, Transportation, and Strategic Commands) provide an interesting example, as they came about because of the need
to coordinate joint elements and a fear that the parent services otherwise would
not devote enough attention to these areas. The similarity to COHQ is obvious;
however, differences also are apparent, most notably in terms of resources, power,
and status. The component commands are led by four-star officers—equal in rank
to the service chiefs. They have sizable budgets and access to Congress. They more
closely resemble the wartime COHQ at the height of its influence under Mountbatten than the neglected, truncated organization in existence after 1945.
Despite this, periodic conflict between these commands and the parent services is inevitable. Thus, for example, note the differences between U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and the U.S. Air Force over planned reductions
to the latter’s tanker fleet, with the commander of TRANSCOM (General Stephen
R. Lyons, USA) arguing against the Air Force position in front of the Senate
Armed Services Committee in early 2020.89 The established dynamic of a service
seeking to reduce emphasis on a joint capability so as to prioritize something else
is evident once again. Important differences here, compared with COHQ, are that
TRANSCOM is in a stronger position institutionally to advance its case, and also,
critically, that TRANSCOM provides a service that is recognized widely as important.90 Within this context, the joint approach has some chance of success and may
provide an important coordinating function akin to that of COHQ during the war.
This article has argued that joint imperatives prosper when they have the support of a powerful patron, or when key furnishers of support and material recognize the value of the service they provide and are willing to make sacrifices
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to maintain them. The most effective way to encourage this has been to link the
needs of the joint organization to the self-interest of the services.
The experience of COHQ shows that structures that work well in one context
(during a major war) may prove less advantageous once conditions and priorities
change (after the war). In the latter case, the situation for Combined Operations
might not have been so bad had it enjoyed the support and protection of a powerful Ministry of Defence, but the weakness of Britain’s central organization for
defense at that time, allied to severe resource constraints, militated against this.
With regard to responsibility for amphibious warfare, the analysis above appears to validate Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins’s assessment from the 1940s.
Amphibious capabilities were served best by a structure in which they became
the responsibility primarily of one service, and when that service recognized the
value in maintaining such capabilities. The American experience in this field,
both past and present, appears to reinforce that conclusion. In the United States,
proficiency in amphibious operations has been supported by the existence of a
powerful parent organization with a strong institutional imperative to focus on
such operations. The U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy have an impressive track
record in this respect—a case too well established to require further elaboration
here.91
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A “NEW LOOK” AT COLD WAR MARITIME DEFENSE
The Royal Canadian Navy’s Seaward Defence Report and the
Threat of the Missile-Firing Submarine, 1955
Michael Whitby

A

ntisubmarine warfare (ASW) during the First and Second World Wars
featured a relentless struggle of measure versus countermeasure as opposing forces sought a decisive edge. Examples abound from both world wars:
unrestricted submarine warfare bred convoys; surface attacks by submarines
spawned Q-ships; hull-mounted sonar triggered night surface attacks by U-boats;
the so-called Black Pit in the North Atlantic demanded very-long-range (VLR)
patrol aircraft; acoustic homing torpedoes begot towed decoy noisemakers; and
so forth. Some measures required immediate response, while others induced
more-subtle reactions; some required strategic adjustments, while others could
be met by innovative tactics.
The measure-countermeasure pattern continued into Cold War ASW, during which improvements to the performance,
Michael Whitby is senior naval historian at the Di- sensors, and weaponry of submarines forced
rectorate of History and Heritage, National Defence
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Canada’s Senior Naval Leadership in the 20th Cen- the Soviets were developing the capability to
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naval personnel tasked with investigating trends
in ASW—explained the problem as follows:
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“Confronted with quiet submarines of long endurance, a sufficiently accurate
means of navigation, and suitable weapons, a defense against shore bombardment by submarines becomes a huge problem. Even the partial defense of a
long coastline requires a very large effort.”1
The U.S. Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) arguably were the Allied navies that the missile threat impacted most. During the first years of the
Cold War, the Atlantic Ocean had provided a moatlike buffer against maritime
nuclear threats. Soviet strategic bombers could reach North America, but direct
nuclear attack from the sea was thought to be beyond the Soviets’ capability. That
changed when naval intelligence organizations forecast that the Soviets would
have the capability to deploy missile-firing submarines (SSGs) within range of
North American targets as soon as the late 1950s.2 The prospect of enemy missile
boats lurking within range of American and Canadian defense installations and
population centers—a Cold War PAUKENSCHLAG, or Барабанный Бой, if you
will—alarmed naval planners.3 Particularly troubling would be attacks on the
bases and command centers of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), which was
charged with delivering a nuclear response.
SSGs were a game changer, and planners and operators scrambled to develop countermeasures. In the spring of 1955, the RCN’s initial response was
enunciated in the only recently declassified Seaward Defence Report. Described
by one officer as a “new look” at the maritime threat confronting Canada, the
study concluded that then-emerging sound-surveillance systems were the key
to countering SSGs, and it enunciated the types of forces that should be used to
supplement the systems and how they should be employed.4 In short, the Seaward Defence Report provided a blueprint for how to conduct seaward defense
in the nuclear age.
The report is an invaluable historical tool. It reveals how a midsize navy with
comparatively limited resources charged with defending a long coastline and
valuable strategic targets proposed to cope with dramatically changing circumstances. It also shows what Canadian naval planners understood about the nature
of the Soviet threat in the mid-1950s, as well as their ability to counter it, at the
moment they confronted the challenge. And it demonstrates how they sought to
use these circumstances to further their ambitions. Importantly, the report also
allows a peek at probable American thinking, since the almost seamless cooperation that then existed between the RCN and the U.S. Navy suggests that their
plans may have been similar. Finally, examination of follow-on exercises allows
testing of the report’s hypothesis. The Seaward Defence Report, then, presents an
intriguing case study of how Cold War naval planners adapted to Soviet offensive
innovations in the maritime sphere.
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THE HISTORICAL AND STRATEGIC CONTEXT
In the mid-1950s, Canadian planning revolved around overlapping maritime
defense partnerships in the North Atlantic. (While the Pacific was not ignored,
the North Atlantic dominated thinking.) Since Canada was a founding member
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the RCN had obligations to
the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), including responsibility
for the Canadian Atlantic Sub-Area (CANLANT). The SACLANT commitment
was a cornerstone of RCN planning.
However, this relationship was matched, and occasionally overshadowed, by
Canada’s close defense partnership with the United States. Since the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement, Canada and the United States had cemented their military
cooperation through vehicles such as the Permanent Joint Board on Defense and
the Military Cooperation Committee. The relationship was not allowed to wither
after the war, and in February 1947 the two countries announced their intention
to continue with joint cooperation for continental defense. Demonstrating the
intimacy of the partnership, that August the RCN’s Director of Naval Plans noted
that “in view of the vital importance of the defense of North American war making ability in a future war, RCN planning will in future be largely based on the
Naval forces now envisaged in the [U.S./Canada] Basic Security Plan. This will
make desirable the standardization of the RCN and the USN by the time that the
Basic Security Plan must be ready for immediate implementation.”5
The creation of NATO in April 1949 led to the establishment of the CanadaU.S. Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG), which functioned in part as a liaison between the two North American navies and other NATO forces under
SACLANT. Importantly, although CUSRPG was part of NATO, for security
reasons the United States and Canada often were unwilling to share the details
of continental defense with European allies, in particular regarding information
about sound-surveillance systems.6 Beyond these relationships, the RCN preserved its umbilical cord with the Royal Navy (RN), although the U.S. Navy was
emerging as Canada’s predominant maritime partner.
In the mid-1950s, the RCN was in the early stages of a substantial modernization of its A/S assets. The destroyers and frigates that formed the backbone
of the postwar fleet were British designs of Second World War vintage.7 Destroyer strength consisted of seven Tribal-class and two each of the Valentine- and
Crescent-class intermediate designs; two of the latter had their A/S capability
significantly enhanced through a conversion similar to the Royal Navy’s Type
15 program, while another seven underwent the more limited Type 16 upgrade.8
Sixteen River-class frigates were scheduled to undergo the Prestonian conversion,
which, like the destroyer modernization, provided significant upgrades to their
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sonar, radar, weaponry, and other systems. The RCN’s lone aircraft carrier, the
light fleet carrier (CVL) Magnificent, also was of Second World War design, as
were its Grumman A/S-3 Avenger and Hawker FB-11 Sea Fury aircraft. These
ships and aircraft could prosecute moderately fast submarines but were challenged
by improved types with performance similar to those undergoing the U.S. Navy’s
new Greater Underwater Propulsion Power Program (i.e., GUPPY) conversions.9
However, enhanced capability was on the horizon. As part of the increase in
defense spending that came with the escalation of the Cold War in the late 1940s,
the RCN was building seven St. Laurent–class destroyer escorts, with seven similar Restigouche-class ships to follow. Scheduled to begin commissioning in 1955,
these ships ultimately would be considered among the finest A/S platforms in the
world. The new destroyers were to be accompanied by ships of the recently approved Vancouver-class frigate program, which was intended to provide replacements for the Prestonians as oceangoing escorts. In addition, the significantly
modernized CVL HMCS Bonaventure, equipped with advanced angled-deck,
mirror-landing, and steam-catapult systems, was due to commission in 1956,
with an air group composed of Grumman CS2F Tracker A/S aircraft and McDonnell F2H-3 Banshee fighters.10 Strides also were being made in the development
of ASW helicopters. Submarine strength was limited to two A-class boats on loan
from Britain’s Royal Navy. The fleet was rounded out by the light cruisers Ontario
and Québec, which were used as training ships and designated for reserve if war
broke out, as well as a cadre of minesweepers. Although the fleet possessed the
elements of a balanced capability, ASW was the RCN’s primary focus, and the
planners mulling over new concepts in naval warfare in the spring of 1955 did
so with the confidence that they were working from the basis of an increasingly
effective A/S component.11
Under the SACLANT war plans in place in the mid-1950s, if conflict erupted
Canada’s most potent A/S assets would be deployed immediately away from
home waters to the eastern Atlantic (EASTLANT) under the NATO strategy
emphasizing support to Europe. The aircraft carrier and fifteen escorts would
head overseas to form the nucleus of a joint RCN/RN A/S hunting group
based in Brest, France. The remaining oceangoing escorts were committed to
the protection of the transatlantic shipping that would reinforce Europe. Only
minesweepers would be allocated to Canadian waters, with the Algerine class
escorting coastal convoys while the smaller Bangor and Bay classes fulfilled local
minesweeping tasks.12
Although the Canadian government recognized that circumstances might
preclude the deployment of the core of its A/S strength overseas, the European
commitment remained paramount. But the new notions associated with seaward
defense would challenge that policy.
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THE SEAWARD DEFENCE REPORT
The Seaward Defence Report originated from a December 1954 request from the
Chiefs of Staff Committee that the navy investigate “the nature and extent” of
Canada’s seaward defenses at various stages of a war at sea. The focus was to be
on the period 1958–62 and, reflecting NATO’s conception of a two-stage war—
opening with a thirty-day nuclear exchange, followed by a period of conventional
warfare—it was to examine requirements “on M-day, M plus 30 days, and after
M plus 30 days.”13
This spawned the Seaward Defence Committee, composed of the senior officers at the head of the warfare and planning branches at Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) in Ottawa. The Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (ACNS) (Plans),
Commodore D. L. Raymond, led the group, with the ACNSs (Warfare) and (Air),
Commodores Kenneth L. Dyer and W. L. M. Brown, respectively, and the Director of Naval Plans and Operations (DNPO), Captain William M. Landymore,
the other members. A working group chaired by Landymore, with officers from
NSHQ’s antisubmarine, aviation, communications, and navigation directorates,
did the spadework preparing the numerous specialized studies that formed the
backbone of the report.14
Taking four months to complete, the study ultimately spanned some two hundred pages, including twenty-eight papers and thirteen annexes. Tight security
shrouded the report, which was protected on a strict need-to-know basis owing
to the “special security regulations” that protected information pertaining to
sound-surveillance systems.15
THE CONCEPT
The “new look” was driven by the nature of the threat that would confront the
RCN at the end of the decade. On the basis of shared intelligence, including “current American Canadian Agreed Intelligence papers,” it was acknowledged that
in the 1958–62 time frame the Soviets would have the capability to attack the
Canadian coast with aircraft, surface forces, and submarines.16 The report graded
these threats from “improbable” to “probable,” as follows:
(a) The following forms of attack are considered improbable:
		

(i) Attack by surface forces, by virtue of almost certain prospect of detection
and destruction

		 (ii) Attack by air on maritime targets other than major ports, due to there being
other targets of greater strategic importance
		 (iii) Attack inside local defenses by oceangoing submarines, due to the greater
risk of detection
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(b) The following forms of attack are considered possible:
		 (i) Commando-style attacks launched from submarines outside local defenses
		 (ii) Attacks by small battle units launched from submarines outside local
defenses
		 (iii) Minelaying by clandestine means in approaches to defended areas
(c) The following forms of attack are considered probable:
		 (i) Torpedo attacks from submarines on coastal convoys, in focal areas or on
coastal routes
		 (ii) Minelaying from submarines on coastal shipping routes in focal areas and
harbor approaches
		 (iii) Minelaying from submarines in approaches to defended areas
		 (iv) Missile attacks launched from submarines
		 (v) Air attacks on the major ports17

With the exception of missile attacks by submarines and air attacks on
major ports, these threats fell within the bounds of the traditional and were
almost identical to assessments made during the Second World War. Giving
priority to the probable threats and acknowledging the primary responsibility
of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) for air defense, the Seaward Defence
Report zeroed in on the submarine threat.18 It enumerated three main naval
tasks:
(i) To deny enemy submarines access to waters from which they can effectively
launch guided missiles
(ii) To provide protection to shipping within the Canadian coastal areas against
submarine attack
(iii) To provide protection to Canadian harbors and approach channels against penetration and all forms of attack from enemy submarines19

Given the gravity of the threat, the report was concerned mainly with missilefiring submarines. The RCN estimated that by 1960 the Soviets would be capable
of deploying eight long-range submarines to the Atlantic coast and six to the
Pacific coast, and they accepted British intelligence that the “Z” or Zulu-class
long-range boats would be capable of launching missiles. On this basis they
determined that the “most recent estimate available of the capability during the
period under review is that submarines will be able to launch a missile a distance
of 500 miles and that they will be able to control over 200 miles. A second submarine operating in conjunction with the launching submarine could increase
the controlled range to 400 miles.”20
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Interestingly, even though USS Nautilus’s initial exploits were well known,
the report made no reference to nuclear-powered submarines and the immense
capability they might bring to strategic or A/S roles.21 Regarding the missiles
SSGs would carry, intelligence sources concluded that the Soviets “had available
an improved V-1 type with a high explosive warhead” and “a larger twin pulse
Jet V-1 type.” Moreover, it was understood that the Soviet Union “had reached a
point in weapon technology at which it was capable of producing a wide variety
of weapon types and nuclear weapons for weapons other than bombs.”22 The threat
from the sea was serious: “The improved range, speed, and accuracy of the subsonic pilotless aircraft, which could be ready for mass production in 1955, would
greatly increase the number of good targets for submarine-launched attack. In
about 1958 the estimated nuclear warhead yield will approach compatibility with
the estimated accuracy of the weapon system and would greatly increase the likelihood of its use against such targets as air bases and coastal port facilities.”23 With
the possible exception of the number of boats the Soviets would be able to deploy
to North American coasts by 1960, these estimates proved accurate.24
COURSES OF ACTION
So, what to do? The challenge for A/S forces was driven by the necessity to destroy
SSGs before they launched their missiles; the value of dispatching them afterward
paled in significance. The hunt was made more difficult because A/S forces were
seeking individual, free-ranging submarines that were attempting to evade detection, instead of ones lying in wait for convoys or patrolling established shipping
lanes—there would be no “flaming datum” of the traditional variety.25 Complicating the problem was that since the Canadian seaward-defense zone now would
extend to the range of sound-surveillance systems (i.e., hundreds of miles out to
sea) the area to be defended would expand by thousands of square miles—and
this in the notoriously poor oceanographic conditions of the Canadian northwest
Atlantic. The conventional solution would be to use carrier hunter-killer (HUK)
groups or long-range maritime-patrol aircraft (MPA)—conventional submarines
dedicated to ASW (designated SSKs) were just coming into their own—but
without the advantage of intelligence like that provided by direction finding and
ULTRA during the Battle of the Atlantic the task of finding individual submarines
in the vast, open ocean would be difficult indeed.26
For Canada’s senior naval planners, the solution to this complex A/S problem
lay with pioneering sound-surveillance systems. These, it was thought, would
“give the earliest possible warning of impending attack” and “enable our forces
to locate and destroy the attackers.”27 Although the systems were still in the early
stages of development, Canadians had familiarity with them through informational exchange agreements with both the Americans and the British. Moreover,
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in November 1952 the U.S. State Department had approached Canada for permission to site a surveillance station on Sable Island off Nova Scotia to fill a gap
in the planned network along the Atlantic seaboard. After initial surveys revealed
Sable Island to be unsuitable, the two countries agreed to build a facility at Shelburne on Nova Scotia’s south coast.28
A high-level report described what became known as Station Fox: “The Sound
Research Station at Shelburne is planned to consist of an array of special devices
laid on the ocean floor in 1,000 fathoms of water, approximately 100 miles at
sea, with a tail cable laid from the array to Shelburne, where the equipment and
personnel would be housed. In addition to the deep water array, a shallow water
array is being laid for the purpose of research into the conditions met in cold,
shallow waters peculiar to the Canadian coastal areas.”29
Embracing the promise the technology represented, RCN planners made it the
foundation of the philosophy espoused in the Seaward Defence Report. The new
seaward-defense concept envisioned a combination of two sound-surveillance
systems. Under the designations then used by Canadian naval planners, these
were the LOFAR (for low-frequency analysis and recording) system, developed
by the Americans, and the CORSAIR (for co-relation of sound analysis and
recording) system under initial investigation in the United Kingdom.30 The
LOFAR system enabled the detection of submarines through the capture of
low-frequency acoustics by arrays of hydrophones extending far out to sea on
the ocean floor. The arrays were connected to naval shore facilities where the
acoustic data were analyzed digitally, with any resultant target data passed to
operational headquarters for prosecution. In 1950, personnel involved with the
U.S. Navy’s Project HARTWELL, which was investigating the viability of a longrange acoustic detection system, recommended the detection of submarines by
using real-time spectral analysis of radiated sound energy as holding the most
promise for a future A/S detection system. That November, the Western Electric
Company was contracted to develop the technology; it assigned the work to its
research organization at Bell Telephone Laboratories. Work proceeded quickly
and the first operational evaluation began in April 1952, with a forty-hydrophone
array installed in two hundred fathoms from Eleuthera in the Bahamas. The test
proved so successful that the U.S. Navy immediately called for the establishment
of a nine-station chain along the eastern coast of the United States, including the
future Station Fox.31
The British CORSAIR system was more of an unknown. The Admiralty
Research Laboratory had begun to work it up only in 1952 and oceanographic
evaluation still was under way, so the Seaward Defence Report acknowledged
that it was in “its very earliest stages for which no evaluation information is
available.”32
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020

123

120

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 1

The Seaward Defence Report explained the differences between the two systems. The LOFAR system was “a network of surveillance stations strategically
sited over the ocean approaches to the Coast,” built to form “a surveillance belt
which will detect and locate snorkeling submarines and thereby assist the ASW
forces in the protection of coastal shipping and defense against submarines capable of launching attack weapons against the mainland.” Spread evenly along
the coast, the stations of the network would form “a surveillance belt about 500
miles to seaward.” Performance would be affected by many variables, including
oceanography and the topography of the ocean floor; however, “ranges against
snorting submarines up to 500 miles may be experienced under favorable conditions on some bearings while on others it might not exceed 150 miles.”33 The
systems would produce the best results against snorkeling boats; “[s]hould the
submarine be on the surface or proceeding [submerged] on main motors, the
detection capability is drastically reduced.” CORSAIR, on the other hand, “has
been developed to determine the accurate location of submarines in comparatively shallow waters off the North Western European continental shelf by means
of hydrophones connected to a shore station.” Expected ranges were far less than
for LOFAR; preliminary evaluation indicated that “a submarine may be detected
snorting out to ranges of 50 miles” and “a submerged submarine doing 4 knots on
motors has been detected up to ranges of 10 miles.” Bearing accuracy would be
superior; however, unlike LOFAR, which could identify individual submarines by
their unique “signatures,” CORSAIR would be unable to provide specific targetclassification information.34
The report concluded that one system could backstop the other. The authors
envisioned an overlapping network of LOFAR and CORSAIR installations.
With LOFAR, the U.S. Navy proposed siting stations two hundred miles apart
to cover the required area and provide a degree of overlap to enable cross bearings
to be obtained for contacts. Following that model—the only one in existence, after
all—and taking “known conditions” into account, the Canadian report projected a
network of five LOFAR arrays on the Atlantic coast, to be located off Sable Island;
the southern and eastern extremities of the Grand Banks; Bonavista Bay, Newfoundland; and Hamilton Inlet, Labrador (see map 1). Some of these requirements
already had been addressed: Station Fox at Shelburne covered the area seaward of
Sable Island, and the RCN was aware of U.S. plans to site a shallow-water station
at Argentia, Newfoundland, to cover the southern Grand Banks. The three arrays
required on the Pacific coast would be located off Cape Cook at the northwest
extremity of Vancouver Island and at Cape Saint James and Cape Knox at the
southern and northern points of the Queen Charlotte Islands (see map 2).35
Shallow-water CORSAIR arrays would provide “a ‘road block’ inside the coverage obtained by the long range LOFAR system.”36 The report did not specify
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MAP 1
THE PROPOSED EAST COAST SOUND-SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

The large arcs represent LOFAR coverage; the small circles depict CORSAIR coverage.
Source: CNS, “Underwater Surveillance Requirements.”

the number of CORSAIR stations required, but the accompanying charts gave a
theoretical projection of as many as fifteen arrays on the east coast and five on the
west. These would monitor the approaches to the Strait of Belle Isle, the Strait of
Canso, and the Bay of Fundy on the Atlantic coast, and Dixon Entrance, Queen
Charlotte Sound, and the Strait of Juan de Fuca on the Pacific.37
Although the planners went “all in” on sound surveillance, they did not neglect
the need for other detection technologies. In particular, since they presumed that
Soviet submarine commanders would have to communicate with their headquarters
before launching a missile attack, reliable direction-finding and electronic countermeasures (ECM) capabilities would be essential. Nonetheless, the LOFAR/CORSAIR combination would constitute the primary trip wire, and it promised to “provide the necessary warning to cover the seaward approaches to our coastal areas.”38
FORCE REQUIREMENTS
The Seaward Defence Report considered in great detail the nature of forces required to intercept SSGs using the information provided by sound surveillance.
The situation confronting the planners was unprecedented; although the RCN
had plenty of experience hunting submarines off the Atlantic coast in both world
wars, never before had it faced a threat as grave as the missile-firing submarine.
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MAP 2
PROPOSED WEST COAST SOUND-SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

Source: CNS, “Underwater Surveillance Requirements.”

Consequently, the report’s authors understood that to avoid a catastrophic
nuclear scenario, A/S forces required the capability to prosecute any contact
swiftly. This placed a reliance on “offensive support” to the sound-surveillance
system. The report explained it this way: The nature of the threat, coupled with
the long-range detection capability of LOFAR, defined the characteristics required in offensive supporting units. These were as follows:
(i) Ability to locate the submarine as near as possible to the point of first detection
(ii) Ability to attack and destroy the submarine, with the smallest possible time delay,
by day or night, in any weather
(iii) Ability to patrol continuously the outer limits of the detection arc39

Mobility was key, requiring forces to have the ability “to locate, hold, attack,
and destroy the submarine”—quickly. The RCAF’s MPAs would form the backbone of the system, and they would require “all weather and long endurance
qualities.”40 Here, Canada was in good shape. The majority of the RCAF’s maritimepatrol squadrons were equipped with the Lockheed P2V-7 Neptune, which the
report suggested “would provide the best type for the roles envisaged.”41 But the
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Neptunes were only a temporary stand-in until the VLR Canadair CL-28 Argus,
arguably the most effective MPA of its generation, entered service in 1957. When
the Arguses became operational, naval CS2F Trackers would supplement the
RCAF effort by flying inshore patrols from shore bases or the carrier.42
Despite its substantial capability, the air umbrella required seagoing support.
The Second World War experience had shown that aircrews found it nearly impossible to confirm the results of attacks on submerged submarines, and the report concluded that since “the final destruction of the [missile-firing] submarine
must be assured, in this task both aircraft and ships are required.” The authors
determined that the ship designated for seaward defense “must be capable of
high speed (say 30 knots), it must have long endurance at medium speeds, and it
must be designed primarily to operate effectively under North Atlantic weather
conditions.” Other desired features included superior sea-keeping qualities; the
ability to operate sonar at high tactical speed; gun armament capable of destroying submarines and providing antiaircraft defense; effective A/S weaponry; radar
and communications systems able to control helicopters and provide long-range
air warning; and, because of the expected long duration of patrols, a high level of
comfort and habitability.43
The Second World War–era destroyers that then formed the most potent
element of the RCN’s A/S force had the speed and punch required, but lacked
endurance. The River-class frigates, Bangor- and Algerine-class minesweepers,
and Bird-class patrol boats that formed the remainder of the force were deemed
wholly inadequate. The report’s authors thought the RCN had the solution in
hand in the form of the new escorts about to join the fleet: “The destroyer of St.
Laurent type with speed, sea-keeping qualities, if provided with an adequate gun
armament, would most nearly meet the envisaged operational requirement.”44
How would this combination of air and surface forces, cued by sound surveillance, locate and destroy missile boats? At the time it was thought that, to launch
its missiles, a submarine would have to surface for little more than three minutes;
however, the estimated duration grew over time.45 Given current assessments of
battery capacity, it was estimated that a submerged submarine would be able to
penetrate about 175 miles into the three-hundred-mile LOFAR detection zone
before it had to expose itself to detection from sound surveillance by snorkeling. From that point, “a submarine would be required to transit the remaining
55 miles to an optimal firing position at snorkeling depth or on the surface. At a
snorting speed of 10 knots, time of transit would be approximately 5½ hours.”46
Owing to the probability that submarines would be vulnerable only once
they were well within the detection zone, a “perimeter type patrol” was deemed
unsuitable; instead surface forces should be positioned within the LOFAR zone.
Patrol areas for fixed-wing aircraft could be more variable and reserve aircraft
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could be held in readiness at their airfields. In terms of numbers, it was thought
that a “four ship support force for each LOFAR installation provides an efficient
unit,” which meant a force of twenty-four dedicated surface vessels on the east
coast and twelve on the west coast, for a total of thirty-six St. Laurents. For fixedwing aircraft, the minimum number required for the east coast was calculated to
be six on patrol and six at readiness, with half those numbers in the Pacific. These
numbers increased dramatically when maintenance and training requirements
were taken into account.47
Although mainly concerned with countering missile boats, the Seaward
Defence Report touched on tangential aspects of navy policy and operations.
Perhaps most importantly, although it did not question sacrosanct SACLANT
plans, the threat from missile boats raised the possibility that Canada might have
to reconsider sending the bulk of its A/S forces overseas to EASTLANT at the
outset of any conflict. The report also considered the implications of the U.S.
Navy / Air Force Lamplight study into requirements for the continental air defense of North America. The report noted that some of the warning systems the
American study recommended would complement the seaward-defense plan,
and suggested that RCN escorts could contribute as air-defense picket ships,
“both by providing information to the system and by acting offensively on the
information provided by it.” This meant the ships would require sophisticated
air-defense capability.48
Communications, command-and-control organization, base requirements,
and other vital factors also received consideration. In terms of sustaining seagoing forces, the RCN possessed only limited underway-replenishment capability
and no fast oilers; however, the committee thought this unnecessary for warships
operating in the LOFAR zone—which would seem to fly in the face of its stated
requirement for the ships to have long endurance.49 On the other hand, the committee recognized that A/S helicopters could play a critical role, either attacking
contacts located closer inshore or operating from a dedicated carrier.50
Mine clearance received considerable attention. Recent experience in the Korean War and ongoing intelligence emphasized the Soviets’ strong commitment
to mine warfare and their use of moored, ground, and drifting mines with varied
firing mechanisms, including contact and influence (magnetic, acoustic, and
pressure), combined with various delayed fuses. In view of this threat, the committee recommended that the “main ports” of Halifax, Sydney, and Esquimalt/
Victoria be kept open at all times, with forces available to clear “lesser ports”
within forty-eight hours.51
In terms of the traditional static components of seaward defense, the report
questioned whether there was any further need for coastal-artillery batteries
and suggested that net defenses could be reduced. The authors thought that
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1

128

Naval War College: Autumn 2020 Full Issue

WHITBY

125

controlled minefields and indicator loops still had utility, but the need for them
could be reconsidered once the sound-surveillance system was developed.52 In
terms of coastal convoys, the report suggested they would not be required on
Canada’s west coast but “will be required on the East Coast unless long range
detection devices with adequate supporting forces can be developed.”53 In many
areas, therefore, the potential of the new sound-surveillance system promised a
transformation in seaward defense.
THE SHORTCOMINGS
Notwithstanding the presentation of a realistic concept to counter missile-firing
submarines, the Seaward Defence Report suffered a number of shortcomings.
Some of these can be attributed to patchy intelligence or a lack of concrete information about the actual capability of sound-surveillance systems, but others
stemmed from oversights or flawed thinking. In his cover letter, the Chief of the
Naval Staff (CNS), Vice Admiral E. Rollo Mainguy, explained that the report took
no account of the costs or personnel implications associated with the concept.54
Despite this, the authors stated some specific requirements, such as additional
surveillance arrays, and the precise numbers needed to bring air and seagoing
forces up to the proposed strength. Naval leaders also used the report’s findings
as a rationale for procuring additional St. Laurents. Consequently, the lines were
blurred on whether the plan was a conceptual think piece or a road map to a
specific objective.
Certain operational factors also were not taken into account. There was no
statement regarding when the forces providing offensive support to the soundsurveillance system would be deployed. Would they be on constant patrol as
a deterrent, or deploy only in an emergency? That, of course, would affect the
numbers of ships and aircraft required, but also would depend on Soviet capabilities. Would the Soviets mount standing patrols in peacetime or only surge
into missile-firing positions just before or at the outbreak of any conflict, thus
likely providing a degree of warning? As mentioned previously, the report also
surprisingly made no mention of the possibility of the Soviets adopting nuclear
propulsion; if they could mate nuclear warheads with missiles, surely they could
do the same with nuclear propulsion and submarines. By ignoring such issues,
the report lost an element of rationality. As will be seen, senior defense officials
did take these factors, and others, into account.
There was subtext to the Seaward Defence Report, which may help to explain
its deficiencies. Since its establishment in 1910, the RCN had struggled to thrive
in the face of government and public indifference. With budgets tightening with
the end of the Korean conflict, the report offered an opportunity to allay the
impact of cuts on the navy. Continental air defense was a primary reason the
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RCAF captured a major portion of the defense budget. By inserting a maritime
component into the continental-air-defense equation in the form of the missilefiring submarine, naval leaders hoped to obtain a greater share of the financial
pot. In his cover letter to the report, Admiral Mainguy emphasized that vital
targets within the range of SSGs “may be in just as much danger from thermonuclear attack delivered by submarine as from the same attack delivered by
aircraft.”55 Surely, when the specter of nuclear war lay at the forefront of defense
considerations and was very much in the public eye, the government could not
ignore the threat of nuclear attack from the sea? Naval leaders clearly hoped that
their seaward-defense concept would enable them to take advantage of a real and
substantial national concern and affirm the navy’s increased relevance to continental defense. It also presented an opportunity to upgrade the fleet. Although
the recently approved Vancouver-class frigate program promised to deliver a
useful oceangoing escort, the senior staff had become concerned by its limited
performance and lack of general-purpose capability. The Seaward Defence Report
made the case for replacing the Vancouvers with additional St. Laurents, which
would strengthen the fleet.
Although the report’s authors did not express these ambitions directly, they
clearly were in play. Given the chronic uncertainty that had shrouded much of the
RCN’s history, it is hard to blame the authors for playing these cards.56
THE U.S. NAVY’S APPROACH
The U.S. Navy also grappled with the SSG threat. An attack-at-source approach
by carrier strike forces against Soviet submarine bases and the use of HUKs on
barrier patrols were key elements of its existing ASW plans; however, like the
RCN, the U.S. Navy envisioned sound-surveillance systems as “the most promising solution” to SSGs. As a December 1954 report to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) from the Anti-Submarine Plans and Policies Group explained,
HUKs “were not created to search wide areas of ocean in the hopes of discovering
an enemy submarine.” “It is our earnest hope,” the report continued, “that the
LOFAR stations which form our Sound Surveillance System in the Atlantic and
Pacific will furnish us with the necessary operational intelligence and will give
us the advance warning that we need to meet the threat of a mass nuclear guided
missile attack launched from submarines.”57
The report referenced exercises using MPA/destroyer teams to chase down
contacts detected by sound surveillance, while carrier HUK groups patrolled
beyond the range of the detection system farther out to sea.58 Although it is not
known whether the two allies consulted one another at this early stage of the SSG
problem—it seems likely that they did, given the cooperation over Station Fox
and other matters—the concept showed that USN thinking paralleled that of the
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RCN; the main difference was that the RCN was prepared to position its carrier
group inside the LOFAR detection zone. Beyond this overall tactical harmony,
the United States, like Canada, was shifting more of its A/S focus from overseas
to home waters in response to the SSG threat; in October 1955, a senior Canadian official reported that the U.S. Navy had reassigned forty-four destroyers and
destroyer escorts from EASTLANT (headquartered near London, England) and
IBERLANT (Lisbon, Portugal) to WESTLANT (Norfolk, Virginia).59
The fact that the U.S. Navy had dozens of escorts to shuttle among theaters
underscores the greatest difference between the two navies: although the RCN
could match its ally in terms of quality, it paled with regard to quantity. The
U.S. Navy simply had the ability, and willingness, to devote more resources to
the SSG problem. For example, in the summer of 1956 the U.S. Navy’s Project
Nobska study emphasized the potential of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs)
for ASW.60 SSNs evolved into arguably the most effective A/S platform; however,
while the RCN pushed hard to acquire them in the late 1950s, the Canadian
government considered them beyond its means. In another example, in 1959
the U.S. Navy formed Task Group (TG) Alfa to evaluate new A/S concepts. Consisting of an A/S carrier, a destroyer squadron, A/S submarines, a shore-based
MPA squadron, and abundant research support, Alfa rivaled the capability of
the RCN’s entire Atlantic fleet.61 The resources the U.S. Navy could apply were
unmatched—and in anti-SSG warfare, numbers mattered.
DENUNCIATION
The Seaward Defence Report received mixed reviews when it was evaluated by senior naval and departmental leadership. Since most of the senior RCN leadership
had been involved with the study, it is not surprising that the navy gave it closeto-universal acceptance. The only debate revolved around the recommended
cancelation of the Vancouver-class frigates, a program for which the navy had
fought long and hard; however, the argument for more St. Laurents eventually
won out.62
From there the plan encountered rough seas. When RCN leaders presented
the Seaward Defence Report to senior defense officials in the autumn of 1955, they
asked for an additional twenty-five St. Laurents on top of the fourteen already
approved, as well as funding for surveys for a sound-surveillance system. The
Chiefs of Staff Committee and senior defense officials agreed to the cancelation
of the Vancouvers and endorsed a limited survey plan, but they balked at the
numbers of additional St. Laurents; in a tortuous five-year process, the government ultimately approved only an additional six of the class.63
And that was as good as it got; other elements of the report’s findings encountered heavy criticism from those who had to grant final approval. At an
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October 1955 Chiefs of Staff meeting, Lieutenant General Charles H. Foulkes
and Deputy Minister of National Defence Frank R. Miller, the senior military
and departmental leaders, respectively, questioned the assumptions on which the
naval staff had based its planning, particularly on the likely course of nuclear war.
They thought it “improbable” that the Soviets would deploy missile submarines
to North American waters in advance of any conflict, because of the danger of
provocation, and they noted the uncertainty within NATO about how a nuclear
war actually might unfold. They also were dismayed by the lavish recommendations for additional ships and aircraft, believing the plans were based on numbers
and not actual need. As Deputy Minister Miller put it, “What was required was
a force to do the job rather than a specific number of ships,” with the navy using
“effectiveness as a yardstick rather than numbers when considering the building
programme”; since the new ships were vastly more capable than the old, should
the navy not be able to get by with fewer of them?64
The air force was more critical. The RCAF consistently had questioned the
need for naval aviation in the Canadian context, so it was not surprising that
the chief of the air staff, Air Marshal C. Roy Slemon, opposed the navy’s plans.65
He complained that the RCAF had not been consulted, and insisted that aircraft
alone could support the sound-surveillance systems, negating any need for additional ships. Slemon also noted that, according to his information, the Soviets
would not possess seagoing nuclear-missile technology for another five years—
which, of course, was precisely the window on which the RCN had focused.66
These criticisms crippled the navy’s plans, and the final nail in the coffin was
hammered home a few weeks later when the naval staff sought additional funds
to fulfill some of the measures recommended by the Seaward Defence Report. The
members of the powerful departmental finance committee were unmoved by the
navy’s arguments and rejected a budget increase to cover the cost of additional
St. Laurents or to fulfill any other measures associated with the plan. Although
senior defense officials acknowledged that they were taking a risk in the face of
the SSG threat, the navy’s plan simply was beyond what the government was willing to devote to maritime defense.67
OPERATIONAL TRIALS
If the acquisition and budgetary aspects of the Seaward Defence Report largely
went unachieved, its operational concepts proved enduring. In early 1956, NSHQ
formed the Naval Warfare Study Group to investigate further how the RCN
would fight a war at sea under the agreed NATO strategy, designated M.C. 48.
The new group’s core, including Commodore Raymond and Captain Landymore,
had been influential contributors to the Seaward Defence Committee.68 Foremost among the new group’s aims was determining how to defend against the
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“Principal Threat: Attacks on inland and Coastal targets by submarine-launched
guided missiles with nuclear warheads.” One decision, obviously based on the
deliberations of the Seaward Defence Committee, was to divide the seawarddefense area into three zones: “an inner firing zone (where submarines might fire
[missiles] upon shore targets, a middle combat zone (where submarines might be
destroyed), and an outer harassing zone (where submarines could be prevented
from snorkeling).”69 The distance of the zones from the coast would vary according to conditions, but the idea was to force submarines to snorkel well before they
reached launching positions, to be detected by the sound-surveillance system,
which would cue offensive forces onto the contact.
The RCN tested these concepts in a series of exercises called BEAVERDAM.
More than anything, the exercises revealed the near impossibility of destroying
missile boats before they launched their payloads. BEAVERDAM 3, carried out off
Nova Scotia in March 1959, provided stark evidence of the challenges confronting A/S forces.
The exercise executed the so-called BEARTRAP plan, which anticipated an
emergency situation in which missile attacks from submarines were “imminent.” For this scenario, the plan assumed the SSGs had penetrated the soundsurveillance net to reach their firing positions, with the objective of reducing
Allied “retaliation capacity” by attacking SAC bases, with ports and population
centers secondary targets. “Hostilities are assumed to commence,” the exercise
orders explained, “with the first firm knowledge that a missile has been launched
or with the discovery of a fully surfaced submarine in a position from which
the Primary and Secondary targets could be effectively attacked.” Until those
conditions prevailed, “submerged or snorting intruders can only be tracked and
heckled—no live-load weapon attacks could be pressed home by anti-submarine
forces.”70 By this time it was thought that boats would have to surface for ten
minutes to launch their missiles, and BEARTRAP called for “the concentration of
surface and air forces within what are deemed probable missile launching areas,
in such density as to ensure that a submarine can be observed and attacked within ten minutes of surfacing. This, of course, necessitates some calculated risks
because of limitations imposed by the forces which are expected to be available.
Equal intensity coverage could not be planned throughout the entire CANLANT
area.” For BEAVERDAM III, the exercise was confined to an area amounting to
one-third of the full CANLANT zone, with participating air and surface assets
limited by the same proportion. Three submarines formed Orange, while Blue
comprised the aircraft carrier Bonaventure, nine escorts, three maritime-patrol
squadrons, and Station Fox.71
BEAVERDAM III tested counter-SSG tactics in the so-called inner firing zone,
and the positioning of the Blue forces reflected the Seaward Defence Report’s
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concept of an immediate offensive response. In line with how it was thought the
Soviets would mount such an operation, the three Orange submarines, HMS Alderney and Ambush and USS Redfin, targeted specific U.S. air bases: Redfin was
to hit Loring Air Force Base (AFB) in northeast Maine; Ambush was assigned
Ernest Harmon AFB at Stephenville, Newfoundland; and Alderney targeted
Argentia Naval Air Station on Newfoundland’s south coast.72 It was thought that
SSGs would have to approach to within visibility range of a geographic feature
such as a headland to fix their position to input accurate navigational guidance
for their missiles; accordingly, Blue surface groups were deployed on either
“fixing point patrols” off obvious landmarks or “surface force patrols” in highprobability launch areas farther out to sea. Blue-force MPAs saturated the same
areas. Bonaventure, with CS2F Trackers embarked, was positioned to seaward of
the MPA patrols; the carrier was escorted by only a single plane-guard destroyer,
since planners assumed an SSG would avoid attacking such a target before hostilities broke out.73
The main aim of BEAVERDAM III was to determine whether an MPA orbiting
within ten minutes’ flight time of a surfaced SSG could detect and attack it before
it launched its missiles. The postexercise analysis declared that “a measure of
success was achieved”; however, that measure was small indeed. Of the eighteen
opportunities MPAs had to detect surfaced submarines during the three phases
of the exercise, two boats were detected within two minutes and killed, another
was killed during the ten-minute launch window, another kill occurred just after
launch, and in two instances air patrols prevented boats from surfacing. Thus,
only three launches definitely were thwarted—which meant that as many as fifteen nuclear-armed missiles rocketed toward their targets.74
The performance of the surface groups was even more dismal. Most ships
failed to approach within a dozen miles of a submarine, and in the one close
encounter, although Ambush sighted the new destroyer Restigouche through its
periscope when passing within 2,800 yards, the ship’s sonar failed to detect the
SSG. Two summaries give a flavor of the encounters. At 0950 on 12 March:
Alderney surfaced in position 44-44N 59-36W, and at 1000 simulated firing her first
missile at Argentia. Assessed as a successful missile launch. This launch was made
22 miles from the center of Area 2, in the close proximity of a fleet of approximately
30 fishing vessels. The area was being surveyed by Summerside Neptune Y4X04. At
1025, Alderney surfaced in the same position and at 1035 simulated firing her second
missile at St. John’s, NFLD. Assessed as a successful missile launch.

At about the same time:
Ambush surfaced in position 43-45N 59-36W, and at 1003 simulated firing her first
missile at Stephenville. Assessed successful missile launch. This launch was made 7
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miles from the center of Area 3 which was being surveyed by Bonaventure Tracker 34
Dressing Room. Ambush dived and surfaced again at 1018 to prepare her second missile for launch at 1031. She sighted Bonaventure Tracker 34 Dressing Room closing
90 seconds before scheduled launch time; however, Ambush remained on the surface,
altered end-on to the aircraft, and simulated firing on schedule, again at Stephenville.
She dived immediately on firing and was attacked with depth charges 30 seconds
after submerging. 34 Dressing Room attack assessed possible kill.75

The exercise analysis found numerous reasons why the SSGs carried out their
missions virtually unscathed. The notoriously poor ocean environment off Nova
Scotia hindered the performance of sonar; the dozens of fishing vessels in the
area clogged radar screens and provided cover for submarines; aircraft failed to
use ECM; and communication between ships and aircraft was poor or nonexistent. Interestingly, although it was thought that poor weather would hamper not
only the MPAs but the SSGs as well, the submarines still were able to fix their
launch positions from features ashore. “Consequently, even though adverse conditions appear to create a stalemate, any reliance upon unfavorable circumstances
to discourage missile attacks, would be wishful thinking.”76
The grim results of BEAVERDAM III were mirrored in other exercises in the
series. This suggested that any optimism about defeating SSGs was itself “wishful
thinking.”
TO THE FUTURE
Appearing before Congress in 1958, American naval leaders warned of the
gravity of the SSG threat. Rear Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, Assistant Chief for
Nuclear Propulsion at the Bureau of Ships, testified as follows:
We know [the Soviets] have operational missiles which are good for at least 200 miles
and probably more. I would anticipate that in the not too distant future they will
have operational missiles with a range of up to 600 to 700 miles. Therefore, with a
large number of submarines that can carry missiles fitted with atomic or hydrogen
warheads, they have the capacity to operate off our coasts and destroy our cities. . . .
[This] is the gravest immediate threat that faces the United States.77

The threat was indeed ominous, but a lot of flesh had been put on the bones
of solutions to the SSG problem since the RCN had produced the Seaward Defence Report three years earlier. Intelligence had a firmer grasp of Soviet strategy
and capability; sound-surveillance systems maintained their abundant promise;
tactics had matured, through exercises such as BEAVERDAM III; and new and
evolving countermeasures—such as A/S submarines, the Jezebel passive acoustic
processor, magnetic anomaly detection, Julie explosive echo ranging, and nuclear
depth charges—had increased the probability of killing missile boats. Canadian
maritime forces and the U.S. Navy also arrived at a unified strategy to deal with
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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the SSG problem.78 Against that, the Soviets were ready to deploy their first wave
of SSGs with more-advanced missiles, and had developed another potentially
devastating weapon in the nuclear torpedo.79
Yet despite the relentless march of measure and countermeasure, the basic
contentions introduced in the Seaward Defence Report remained valid. Any hope
of intercepting SSGs before they launched their missiles required a reliable, longrange means of detecting them and the ability to respond quickly and decisively
to the information.
When the Cold War threatened to explode during the tense weeks of October–
November 1962’s Cuban missile crisis, Canadian maritime forces used the concepts of the Seaward Defence Report to defend the eastern seaboard of North
America. MPAs saturated potential submarine launch positions, while surface
groups were positioned to provide offensive support to the sound-surveillance
arrays at Shelburne and Argentia; later in the crisis Canadian sea- and airborne
forces moved south to help defend U.S. assets.80 Although it is unknown whether
the Soviets deployed SSGs or other boats into the Canadian northwest Atlantic
during the crisis (current research suggests they did not), if they did so Canadian
maritime forces, by implementing the concepts of the Seaward Defence Report
and working seamlessly with their USN allies, were at least well positioned to
intercept them; whether they could have destroyed them before the critical moment of missile launch is another question.81
Nonetheless, using the information at their disposal at the dawn of the SSG
threat, the authors of the RCN “new look” delivered a sound, innovative defensive
concept. And that concept proved adaptable and enduring.
The process of formulating a seaward-defense plan in the shadow of an emerging
nuclear threat, as well as the operational concept at which naval planners arrived,
has utility beyond the scope of this article. In terms of the planning process, three
avenues for further analysis present themselves.
First, what does the RCN and USN response to the SSG threat say about the
two services’ ability to handle dynamic strategic and tactical circumstances? In
particular, the U.S. Navy has served as a useful model of how such institutions
deal with change; and, depending on the availability of historic documentation,
an examination of its organizational response to the ASW challenges confronting
it in the 1950s could be instructive in this regard.82
Second, the stark contrast between the resources the two navies could apply
to the SSG problem would make for useful analysis into how organizations with
varying levels of fiscal, political, and public support cope with such dynamic
change. Small- and medium-size navies such as the RCN simply cannot adjust to
such circumstances in the same way the U.S. Navy can. Given that the U.S. Navy
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1
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has striven to enhance relationships with allies—to build what one CNO referred
to as a “thousand-ship navy”—comparative analysis of how such relationships
might be affected by the inability of other navies to meet change at the same pace
as their American ally—which could result in a critical “capability gap”—would
seem germane.83
Finally, the measures of the seaward defense plan and the application of the
forces potentially involved invite study in terms of their viability in the face of
some of the challenges facing today’s naval planners. For instance, since aspects
of the plan can be applied to the notion of antiaccess warfare, it can be used to
weigh both defensive and offensive perspectives of the concept.84
In the end, it is probably best that we do not know whether the seaward defense plan, or any similar plan, would have been successful if tested by actual
nuclear attack. Nonetheless, studying the plan has value in both the historical
and contemporary contexts.
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PEAK OIL, PROGRESSIVISM, AND JOSEPHUS
DANIELS, 1913–21
Roger Stern

T

his article describes the management of an imaginary oil-scarcity crisis by
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. The affair arose in response to “peak
oil” claims by scientists of the U.S. Department of the Interior between 1908 and
1920. With increasing vehemence over those years, these scientists forecast—
mistakenly—that a decline of domestic oil production was imminent, with total
exhaustion to follow by the 1930s. Progressivism was the political ideology from
which Interior’s peak-oil science sprang, and Progressivism likewise guided
Daniels’s effort to protect the Navy from the ostensible peak-oil crisis.
Early-twentieth-century Progressivism was a movement for social and economic reform. Progressives of that era were alarmed over industrialization and
urbanization and resented the power wielded by new, giant business organizations such as oil, automobile, and steel corporations. Progressives sought to reduce the great concentration of wealth that such new kinds of businesses had put
into the hands of a few. They also resented the unfamiliar new workers in their
midst: black laborers from the South and immigrants from Ireland and eastern
and southern Europe.
Today, Progressivism is mainly an urban, racially diverse movement, but in
Daniels’s time it also was a rural one. Many ProRoger Stern retired in 2017 from his position as a
gressives were deeply racist; for southern ProgresFaculty Fellow of the School of Energy Economics,
Policy and Commerce at the University of Tulsa Col- sives especially, white racial supremacy was both
lins College of Business. He earned a PhD in geoga belief and a political objective. Josephus Daniels
raphy and environmental engineering from Johns
Hopkins University in 2007.
was one such Progressive. He grew up in a rural
North Carolina still smarting from Confeder© 2020 by Roger Stern
ate defeat in the Civil War. Daniels was deeply
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2020, Vol. 73, No. 4
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affronted by the indignity (to him) of life in a society in which blacks could vote
and hold high office. All his life, Daniels nurtured hostility against blacks and
their ostensible sponsors—northern Republicans. He became a newspaperman,
and his business acumen was such that by the age of twenty-one he owned three
newspapers. Later, as owner and publisher of the Raleigh News & Observer, he
led North Carolina’s white-power movement. Daniels’s role in the triumphs of
southern Progressivism brought national attention.1
Both political parties espoused Progressive ideals in the early twentieth
century. Theodore Roosevelt was a Republican, yet his administration began the
antitrust lawsuit that would lead to the breakup of Standard Oil of New Jersey
in 1911. Roosevelt also set in motion an effort to use science as an instrument
of politics. The idea of advancing civilization through scientific knowledge was
an important tenet of Progressivism. Roosevelt believed that the conservation
movement he did so much to advance should be guided by science. It was not
simply that forests, wetlands, and wildlife were disappearing in an industrializing
landscape; Americans, Roosevelt argued, would need these resources as
the United States fought against other states for survival. In other words, to
Progressives like Roosevelt, conservation was a national-security project.2
In 1908, Roosevelt proclaimed that domestic coal, oil, and iron ore were
near exhaustion. The venue was a “Conference of Governors,” which Roosevelt
convened at the White House. The prestigious audience he gathered to his
conference was a measure of the importance Roosevelt attached to conservation.
In attendance were most of the nation’s governors, most members of Congress
and the Supreme Court, and top business and labor leaders. Such a powerful
conclave of Americans never had met before and never has again.
Impending exhaustion of fossil fuels and iron ore, the president warned, was
“the weightiest problem now before the nation,” because “these resources are the
final basis of national power and perpetuity.” It was “ominously evident that these
resources are in the course of rapid exhaustion.”3 Although Roosevelt cited no
evidence for his extraordinary claims, they drew legitimacy from the environmental
destruction that Americans could see all around them. If fish were dying and forests
disappearing, it made sense that minerals could be disappearing too.
Roosevelt initiated a scientific megaproject to confirm his peak-mineral theories
and advance other scientific efforts that he deemed critical to American survival.
Interior’s first peak-oil forecast appeared in the scientific publication resulting from
this project, a gigantic three-volume tome that covered diverse societal problems
and their ostensible solutions. Along with prescient public-health and biologicalconservation recommendations, the report called for ghastly eugenic measures
such as forced sterilization and state intervention in citizens’ choice of marriage
partners.4 With respect to the oil problem, United States Geological Survey (USGS)
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1
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geologist David Day asserted that since new oil fields were unlikely to be found,
U.S. production probably would cease by the mid-1930s.5
However, several USGS geologists cautioned that British scientists had been
predicting exhaustion of Britain’s coal production—mistakenly—since 1866,
and saw no reason to expect exhaustion of American coal or iron ore. They also
pointed out how easy it was to overlook how new technology steadily uncovered
previously unimaginable volumes of mineral resources.6 The rest of government
ignored these insights.
Although Woodrow Wilson did not share Roosevelt’s enthusiasm for forests
and wildlife, he was no less committed to the use of science as a tool of government. As a young Bryn Mawr College professor in 1887, he wrote a paper advocating that a “science of administration” could reform American governance.
Scientists, Wilson argued, should govern almost all aspects of society, free from
the messy business of democratic compromise, and applying best practices wherever found. “If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow
his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to
commit murder with it; and so, if I see a monarchist dyed in the wool managing
a public bureau well, I can learn his business methods without changing one of
my republican spots.”7 This was a formulation that depended on perfect behavior
by administrative scientists; Wilson trusted that they never would abuse the great
power he proposed they should have by putting personal or bureaucratic interests
ahead of verifiable truths.
Elected president as a Democrat in 1912, Wilson granted this kind of great
power to scientists to manage the imaginary problem of peak oil. He also granted
great power to his executive departments to persecute labor unionists, anarchists,
and, in the end, anyone who questioned government policy. He oversaw passage
of coercive laws—the Sedition Act, the Espionage Act—that criminalized criticism of the war effort. Sanctioned by the Department of Justice, a vigilante force
known as the American Protective League harassed labor unionists, pacifists,
and immigrants.8
Ostensibly, science provided the rationale for a foreign adventure promoted
by Wilson’s Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, who contrived the first
iteration of “oil-scarcity ideology”—the ostensible imperative to do something
aggressive to avert a peak-oil crisis. When Mexico experienced an extended
period of banditry and revolutionary violence in its oil fields, Bryan wrote to
President Wilson on 9 April 1914 to argue that the instability threatened oil
exports to the United States. Interior’s peak-oil forecast bore directly on this
problem. As Bryan explained to Wilson, peak oil made Mexican oil strategic:
“These fields are furthermore regarded as the inevitable source from which, in
the near future, the supply of oil for the United States Navy will largely be drawn.”
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Bryan recommended that Wilson intervene to control the oil-producing region
around Veracruz.9
Wilson obliged, sending a USN flotilla to that city. On 21 April 1914, American naval infantrymen and Marines went ashore and subdued the port; they
suffered few casualties, but over a hundred Mexican soldiers, naval cadets, and
civilians died defending the city. Wilson had secondary motivations in invading,
one of which was to restore the recognized Mexican president, José Venustiano
Carranza, to office. However, occupation restored neither order to the region nor
Carranza to office; rather, the presence of foreign troops on Mexican soil gave
the warring factions the only thing they ever could agree on: that the American
invaders should leave. Opposition to occupation even came from the Carrancista
faction that Wilson sought to help.10 After seven months, nineteen U.S. combat
deaths, and at least two hundred Mexican combat deaths, American forces withdrew.11 Thus peak oil, as imagined by Theodore Roosevelt and constructed by
Interior, became the proximal rationale for America’s first adventure to secure
foreign oil. The subject of this article, however, is a more unusual instance of U.S.
aggression rationalized by oil-scarcity ideology: aggression directed not against
foreign oil-producing countries but against domestic oil firms, in a campaign
directed by Josephus Daniels.
There has been relatively little scholarship on Daniels. When scholars do
mention him, he sometimes is lauded as a Progressive hero for his battle to repatriate mineral patents adjoining Naval Oil Reserve lands.12 A relatively recent
biography gives a more balanced account of his life and times.13 This article offers
a novel assessment of Daniels via a study of how he procured fuel for the oilpowered Navy he helped bring into being.
Daniels’s time in office can be understood as a response to two ideals: Progressivism; and peak oil, the great oil-related fear of the Wilson years. Expectation of
peak oil moved Daniels to do all he could to avoid drawing down the Naval Oil
Reserve, which, according to his plan, was to sustain the Navy after the rest of the
world’s oil fields ran dry. To preserve the Naval Oil Reserve, Daniels ultimately
resorted to seizing oil, always at a below-market price and sometimes without
compensation at all. As will be shown, the secretary’s campaign to save the Navy
from both peak oil and the ostensible predations of “big oil” would end in a lawless fiasco; during his last months in office, Daniels oversaw fuel-oil seizures from
California refinery wharves, led by armed Marines.
Daniels saw the Navy not only as an instrument of war but also as a venue for
moral improvement. He decried the depravity of the rich and famous of Newport,
Rhode Island, whose bad example threatened the moral well-being of sailors
stationed there.14 Moral purpose also propelled Daniels’s oil policy. Daniels had
a straightforward attitude toward all Navy procurement terms—that they were
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unfair until proved otherwise—a view that reflected Democratic Party suspicions
of war profiteering undimmed since the Civil War.15 Daniels went to extraordinary lengths to contest perceived corporate exploitation of the government—a
posture that would have a negative impact on the wartime oil supply.
Daniels generated controversy throughout his tenure as secretary. One
manifestation was hearings in 1919 by the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, in
which leading naval officers such as then–Vice Admiral William S. Sims aired
their grievances against Daniels’s unorthodox practices. A book by Lieutenant
Tracy Barrett Kittredge, USN, a Sims aide and a historian, that summarizes the
hearings declares that Daniels “was concerned solely with purely peace activities;
with economy in expenditure, with semi-socialistic enterprises such as the
establishment of industrial plants to manufacture armour, guns, clothing, etc.;
with measures advertised as inspired by a desire to improve the lot of the enlisted
men.”16 This behavior, Kittredge asserted, left the Navy unprepared for World
War I.
Although this article also reaches negative conclusions about Daniels, some
of his legacy is emphatically positive. He committed the Navy to oil propulsion
sometime around 1913, catapulting the United States into the front rank of naval
powers. Then, in 1920, he sent some of the new oil-powered warships to home
ports on the Pacific coast. This made the Navy a truly two-ocean force for the
first time since the advent of coal propulsion; previously, coal-burning warships
would have remained confined during wartime to a relatively narrow sailing
radius near the Pacific coast. The establishment of an oil-powered Pacific Fleet
was a brilliant policy, yet Daniels’s radicalism turned this triumph into a debacle
of internal piracy.
PEAK OIL AND NAVAL PLANNING
Although oil was a superior fuel that would not require a network of far-flung
coaling stations—which Britain had and America did not—the new oil-powered
Navy still had a fueling problem, at least according to certain geologists of the Department of the Interior. U.S. oil production, they claimed, would be exhausted
completely by about 1935, leaving the Navy to rely on imported oil to operate.17
Because the United States produced the vast majority of world oil at the time
(69 percent in 1918, for example), the prospect of descending from this position
to a future of import reliance was a fearful one, especially in an era that prized
autarchy.18
Daniels’s activism over petroleum-product prices began after his decision
to commit the Navy to oil propulsion in 1913.19 Before committing the Navy
to oil, Daniels consulted Interior about whether the oil supply from the federal
lands that were planned as an oil reserve would be sufficient for the needs of the
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oil-powered fleet in the future. Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane assured
Daniels that the Naval Oil Reserve then anticipated contained more than enough
oil for all warships planned or under construction during their projected twentyyear life span. Lane cautioned, however, that the price would rise as oil ran out
in the 1930s.20 As Secretary Bryan had with respect to Mexico, Daniels took
Interior’s oil findings seriously. The prospect of peak oil would shape Daniels’s
decisions about the naval oil supply for his entire tenure in the administration.
Daniels’s plan was to lock away the Naval Oil Reserve against the time when
all other American fields were exhausted. A dwindling supply must mean higher
oil prices, as Secretary Lane had warned, and higher prices already were worrying the Navy’s General Board. The board’s president was Admiral George Dewey,
whose close brush with the bottom of his coal locker in the 1898 Battle of Manila
Bay would seem a strong qualification for analyzing the Navy’s fuel supply. Unfortunately, in 1911 Dewey accepted Interior’s peak-oil dogma without question,
as did some other flag officers. The chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering,
for example, anticipated “[t]he probability of an eventual demand for petroleum
greatly exceeding the supply,” recapitulating Interior’s position on peak oil.21 This
perspective led the board to the worrying conclusion that if price increases continued “oil producers might not care to bid for naval contracts, or if they did their
prices would be practically prohibitive.” The board’s report, entitled “A Supply of
Oil at a Reasonable Price,” asserted that only via establishment of the Naval Oil
Reserve and refining operation could the Navy be protected from profiteers.22
Daniels enthusiastically adopted these recommendations, which, in addition
to addressing peak oil, embodied suspicions regarding capitalism that were
endemic to the era. Adding a tone of urgency to his advocacy for an oil operation
of the Navy’s own, he declared, “[T]o-day [in 1913] the United States Navy is
paying over twice as much as it did for its oil in 1911. The only relief possible from
what will be a staggering item in the expense account of the Navy in the future is
the control of oil wells, and the refining of its own oil by the Navy department.”
Until the Navy had its own oil company, Daniels pleaded, government could not
“escape the charge of willful waste of public money if it continues to purchase oil
at prices which may fatten the pockets of a few oil companies.”23
Of course, a rising price was also what would be expected under peak oil, as
Secretary Lane had explained. This presented a paradox that Progressives such as
Daniels never tried to reconcile; that is, as oil became scarcer during the peak-oil
crisis that supposedly was already in progress, the price must increase, yet Progressives also were certain that any price increase must be the result of profiteering by greedy, monopolistic oil firms.
Uncomfortably for Daniels, a price collapse in 1915 forced him to redefine
why, with oil now abundant, peak oil was still a threat and his campaign for Navy
oil operations was still necessary. Daniels declared that the market was cyclical,
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then followed this unremarkable observation with a colossal non sequitur. “With
the present methods of producing and marketing oil, there will be periods of
overproduction, low price, and extended use of oil, and periods of shortage of
oil production, high price, and limited use of oil, so that as a final result the oil
resources of the country will be rapidly depleted.”24 Daniels offered no evidence
for this remarkable idea—that market cyclicality induced resource exhaustion.
Daniels’s proposal to Congress for a Naval Oil Reserve was equally astonishing. “[The reserve] would not be drawn upon when oil could be purchased on
the open market at a fair price, but when the decreased production and increased
price had shut off all other sources of oil for the Navy, then the reserves could
be drawn upon and the United States Navy would have a supply of fuel for many
years, whereas the navies of other nations that had not made a similar provision
for a fuel oil supply would be forced to depend on coal as a fuel.”25 Implicit in
this scenario was that peak oil would strike all over the world at the same moment, leaving the U.S. Navy with the last oil on earth, in the form of the Naval
Oil Reserve. In scientific debates it sometimes is said that extraordinary claims
require extraordinary evidence; Daniels offered none. Not even the peak-oil
scientist-advocates at Interior had gone so far as to assert that peak oil would occur simultaneously throughout the world.
When the price began to rise again in 1916, Progressives were quick to call
for intervention to rein in Standard Oil of New Jersey (SONJ, often referred to as
“Jersey”), the world’s largest oil firm, which they assumed must be responsible.
Prohibition Party congressman Charles Randall offered a resolution to nationalize
the oil industry.26 Yet ultimately, Daniels found himself defending the idea of
naval oil operations from opposition from within his own party. In March 1916,
California senator James Phelan offered a bill to legalize patents within Naval Oil
Reserve No. 2. Patents were legal rights to minerals on federal lands that were
given to private claimants in the late nineteenth century or were granted to later
claimants who promised to prospect for minerals. Phelan’s goal in attempting to
legalize the patents was to stimulate California oil-production growth, which had
declined during a legal campaign by Daniels to repatriate the patents, because oil
developers were enjoined from working patent claims. Daniels bitterly opposed
Phelan’s bill, claiming it would strip the Navy of the fuel it must have in the future,
thus forcing a return to coal.27 Since the Navy’s other two reserves ostensibly held
just five years of wartime supply, Daniels argued, the viability of the fleet was at
stake if patents to Reserve No. 2 could not be obtained. Phelan dismissed Daniels’s
characterization of coming scarcity as absurd.28 And history proved him right;
when Reserve No. 2 was sold eight decades later, in 1998, it already had produced
four times the amount Daniels believed it held, yet still brought $3.7 billion.29
Navy oil production was but one of Daniels’s ambitious plans to defeat profiteering. He also sought government ownership of telephone, telegraph, radio,
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coal, steel, and merchant-shipping industries.30 After Germany’s resumption of
unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917, however, Daniels’s nationalization campaign took a back seat to war planning. As the country’s mood shifted
from isolationism to war, Congress passed and Wilson signed a declaration of war
against Germany in April 1917.
DANIELS AT WAR
Daniels’s proclivity for dramatic economic action intensified once the United
States entered World War I. The Navy suddenly stopped paying for fuel oil, or
at least stopped paying market price.31 It is unclear whether Navy nonpayment
began as a dispute over price or as an effort to overawe the large oil firms that
Daniels saw as a threat to society.
It also is possible that Daniels anticipated passage of the Food and Fuel Control Act, known as the Lever Act, which would occur in the summer of 1917. This
wartime law would give the president authority to requisition food or fuel for
military use at a “fair” price. Daniels may have felt that he already knew the price
of oil was unfair and, with President Wilson’s recent reelection as a mandate, believed he could withhold payment while waiting for Lever to pass. As prices for
commodities rose through the early summer of 1917 owing to war demand and
war inflation, Daniels alerted Wilson that he had asked the arch-Progressive Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to determine a “reasonable price” for oil.32 Wilson
apparently endorsed Daniels’s combative approach, as two days later the secretary
“threw down the gauge of battle to the producers of commodities needed by the
navy in the prosecution of the war.” The Navy, Daniels announced, would collaborate with the FTC to determine the cost of coal, copper, cement, iron ore,
and oil. “I am going to know what these things cost and give the producers liberal
profits, but beyond that I am not going to pay.”33
The Lever Act passed in August 1917. It warned vendors not to “exact excessive prices” and explicitly forbade “excessive profits,” but it did not define fair or
excessive. The act allowed government commandeering (as did wartime laws in
many countries), but it stipulated that in disputes over price government agencies must pay what they believed fair, leaving the ultimate price to be adjudicated
later.34 Although Lever was meant to give the government leverage to procure war
goods, it did not allow agencies to pay nothing for goods—which, as we will see,
is what Daniels had the Navy do, in many cases.
The records of the Petroleum War Service Committee (PWSC), a voluntary
body composed of industry executives whom the government had organized
to support war logistics, chronicle an oil industry in submission to government
coercion. In public, the oil industry kept silent on nonpayments for three years,
perhaps for fear that complaints would revive calls for nationalization. From PWSC
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1

150

Naval War College: Autumn 2020 Full Issue

STERN

147

meeting minutes, we know that oil-industry executives mentioned the nonpayment
problem only twice before late October 1918—almost the end of the war.
However, even before the problem appeared in official PWSC records a federal
official named Mark L. Requa had begun to address it. Requa was director of
the oil section of a wartime agency called the U.S. Fuel Administration. Requa
engaged an engineering firm, Sanderson & Porter, to report on “the costs of
and prices for petroleum refinery products in the United States and relating
especially to the fair prices for fuel oil taken by the United States Navy for the
1917–1918 federal fiscal year.”35 This may be the earliest official record that a
petroleum price dispute existed and that seizures were involved. How Requa
became aware of the Navy’s nonpayment habits is unclear, but he was in almost
daily communication with PWSC leaders, who may have communicated the
nonpayment problems informally. Whatever the case, Requa clearly grasped that
under Daniels’s leadership Navy commercial behavior might precipitate political
or market crises. An independent price analysis, Requa may have thought, might
resolve the problem quietly.
Daniels’s nonpayment policy put the Navy on the wrong side of the law. Yet in
the days just before passage of the Lever Act, the secretary had gone even further.
In New York Harbor, Navy vessels seized two cargoes of fuel oil destined for the
Public Service Gas Company of New Jersey.36 The Navy’s grounds, as reported
to a USGS geologist with the U.S. Shipping Mission, were that “they could not
get what they wanted in New York.”37 This probably was a reference to SONJ’s
refineries on the New Jersey side of New York Harbor.
The Navy’s seizure of oil from a public utility was brazen, to say the least, and
attracted the attention of Attorney General (AG) Thomas Gregory. The AG was
alarmed enough to urge a public-relations campaign to convince Americans to
see the petroleum industry more positively. As things stood, he worried, the
public tended to regard oilmen as “slackers,” usually a pejorative for anarchists
and radical trade unionists viewed as lawless enemies of the state.38 Gregory
well understood how powerful such discourse could be; a decade before, he
himself had used it skillfully in a legal assault against a Jersey subsidiary in Texas.
Gregory’s client at the time was the State of Texas, which successfully sought to
exclude an SONJ subsidiary from operating there.39
Now that he was attorney general of the United States, Gregory seemed to
fear that private citizens might follow the Navy’s example, raiding property and
making business more difficult for companies of all kinds. As AG, Gregory was
the titular head of the American Protective League, whose 50,000–350,000 volunteers already were breaching the civil rights of Americans and immigrants; it
might take very little for them to move on to trashing oil companies. Although
he had been Jersey’s archenemy in Texas, Gregory now grasped that the taint of
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corruption, once focused only on Standard Oil, had come to apply to any firm
and any person in the oil business. As two energy historians put it, “the onus so
successfully attached to Standard Oil gradually extended to cover all large oil
companies and, ultimately, the entire oil industry.”40 The Navy’s action against the
New Jersey utility cargo signaled that industry had become too easy a target, and
Gregory feared where it all might lead. In a final indignity related to this seizure,
the PWSC was asked to clean up Daniels’s mess by finding replacement cargoes
for the power company.41
The PWSC refrained from official discussion of Navy nonpayment for fuel oil
until late June 1918, when its members finally agreed that “[a]s to the Navy fuel
price question, someone should see Mr. Requa and go over the whole situation
with him.”42 The PWSC seems to have been unaware that Requa already had
engaged Sanderson & Porter to investigate a fair price. The consultant duly
reported in late August 1918 that the oil firms were asking for generally fair
market prices.43
But on 7 October 1918, Daniels rejected the consultant’s report in a letter
to Requa’s boss, U.S. Fuel Administrator Harry A. Garfield, because, among
other things, it did not account for large profits on crude oil by “big low-cost
refiners and the general increase in refining profits over pre-war periods.”44
Daniels’s rejection of the consultant’s report finally moved the PWSC to a “very
considerable discussion on the subject of unpaid bills for the United States Navy.”
Some bills, wrote SONJ chairman A. C. Bedford, “extend back to the time when
the United States entered the War.”45 This was the first complaint from the PWSC
during seventeen months of nonpayment, and it was made in private.
The Sanderson & Porter report on Navy fuel-oil prices mainly supported
industry positions. Among its many criticisms of the Navy’s approach, the most
important concerned the pricing scheme the FTC had devised. Sanderson &
Porter found flaws in FTC cost-accounting systems that tried to weight profits
across all products or across all refineries. Using such methods to determine a fair
price, so as to limit the profits of the most profitable firms, would have regressive
effects, the consultant maintained. Less profitable refineries, already struggling to
make unprofitable aviation gasoline, might be forced out of business if they had
to accept a lower price devised from a weighted average skewed by larger profits
of larger, more-efficient firms.46
Daniels’s rejection of the Sanderson & Porter report came despite this warning
from the consultant, apparently because the report did not sufficiently punish
the most profitable firms for exceeding a “fair” price. Daniels’s real objection,
as he made clear to Fuel Administrator Garfield, was that no remedy besides
government control would do; “the only satisfactory solution can be found in
complete, uniform government control over both production and distribution
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of the commodity affected.”47 Daniels failed to recognize that his obsession with
“fair price” was becoming a readiness issue. The U.S. oil industry was straining
to keep up with war demand from Europe, rampant inflation, and a burgeoning
market for oil at home. The loss of any smaller, less profitable refiners would have
a debilitating effect on the entire Allied military, whose main oil supplier was the
United States.
Daniels meanwhile continued to refuse to pay refiners, even after passage of
the Lever Act obliged the Navy to pay at least the price it believed fair. Sanderson & Porter related that prior to July 1917 the Texas Company and Gulf Refining Corporation had been supplying most oil to the Navy on the Gulf Coast.
Around this time it became apparent that these companies could not meet
“their quotas for the fuel oil needs of the Navy and Allies owing to the heavy
demands on the oil supplies and to the lack of ships for transportation.” The
Navy then asked other companies to bid, yet rejected all offers received because
it deemed the proposed prices too high.48 On this basis—because firms did not
want the Navy’s business at the low price Daniels was willing to pay—seizures
continued as war raged.
The consultant also disclosed that from 1 July 1917 to 12 July 1918 the Navy
had seized five million barrels of oil, which probably was about 1.5 percent of
U.S. production during federal fiscal year 1918 (FY18).49 However, the burden
of Navy seizures was borne by just eighteen companies, which meant that their
losses were considerably greater than 1.5 percent. For obvious reasons, the Navy
targeted only large firms with refining, storage, and loading operations at tidewater. Conveniently for Josephus Daniels, the big firms at tidewater also were
the ones he believed most in need of punishment for the capitalist misdeed of
seeking market prices for their products. The brunt of the seizures thus was
borne by SONJ and its affiliates, followed by the Texas Company, Gulf Refining
Corporation, and Atlantic Refining Company. Seizures from the Texas Company
are of interest in that this firm had very close ties to Texas Democrats in the cabinet—most notably AG Gregory and Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson, as
well as Wilson’s close adviser “Colonel” Edward M. House.50 Daniels was a zealot,
however; full payment was withheld from all the large oil firms, no matter their
political connections.
The market value of the nonpayments was substantial. SONJ, for example,
lost 1.54 million barrels to seizures in federal FY18, which was 5 percent of its
refinery runs over the period.51 The impact to gross earnings probably exceeded
10 percent.52 Of interest is that two large second-tier firms with tidewater operations escaped seizures; these were Sinclair Oil and Mexican Petroleum, whose
principals, Harry F. Sinclair and Edward L. Doheny, respectively, later were implicated, though not convicted, in the Teapot Dome scandal. After Mark Requa
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left government, he became a Sinclair executive. These circumstances suggest,
but do not show, collusion, as does Doheny’s strong support for Senator Phelan
in California politics. Future historians may learn more.
THE PETROLEUM WAR SERVICE COMMITTEE GETS RESTLESS
During a PWSC meeting in late October 1918, the committee asked the federal
fuel administrator, Mark Requa, to express his views on a fair price, now that
Daniels had rejected the estimate from Sanderson & Porter. Uncharacteristically,
Requa recommended confrontation, and determined to take the matter to the
highest level he could. He suggested that a report be made to Bernard Baruch’s
Price Fixing Committee, which would argue for the companies’ compensation
claims. The Price Fixing Committee and its predecessor, the War Industries
Board, “were perhaps the most important” among government price-regulating
agencies during World War I.53
As the possibility of victory in the war came more firmly into sight, industry’s
willingness to keep quiet about the seizures waned. PWSC members eagerly committed themselves to collecting detailed reports from aggrieved firms and giving
them “to Mr. Requa for whatever action he might deem wise to take.”54 A month
later, the PWSC adopted a formal, yet still private resolution supporting Requa’s
effort to resolve the companies’ claims, and another resolution calling for the
FTC to desist investigating oil prices.55
By the time the Treaty of Versailles was agreed to in June 1919, most government agencies had stopped wartime procurement practices under Lever Act
authority. The act remained in force, however, because the United States never
ratified the treaty; technically, America was still at war. This allowed Daniels
to persist in coercing procurements from oil firms. Something had changed,
however—one firm fought back in court. Within a day of the conclusion of the
Versailles agreement, Atlantic Refining sued the Navy for $2.2 million (over $30
million in 2020 dollars) in compensation for fuel oil taken to date.56
NAVY-INDUSTRY CONFLICT IN CALIFORNIA
The likelihood of a Navy-industry confrontation was mounting at a moment that
otherwise was auspicious for American naval power. The end of the war meant
that some oil-powered dreadnoughts could be reassigned from the Atlantic to
the Pacific. This radically altered the Pacific balance of power in America’s favor.
To understand how great a change this was, consider that back in 1897 Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt had asked then-Captain French
E. Chadwick what it would take to “smash the Japanese Navy” if it attacked
Hawaii, not yet a U.S. territory. The limited range of coal-powered warships
made Roosevelt’s question almost unanswerable. Coal-powered warships from
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West Coast home ports barely could reach Hawaii before having to turn around
to refuel.57 There simply was no way to stand and fight a “battle of Hawaii.” All
this changed on 26 July 1919, when five oil-powered superdreadnoughts of the
newly constituted Pacific Fleet completed their first transit of the Panama Canal,
making the United States a Pacific superpower.58 The fleet’s progress northward
was celebrated in California with patriotic headlines such as “Giant Guns Thunder Salute to Navy Chief; San Diego Wild with Enthusiasm as Imposing Armada
Steams before Daniels.”59
It seems safe to infer that before the Pacific Fleet’s arrival in San Diego the
Navy’s fuel-oil requirements on the West Coast were modest. Anticipating that
requirements would rise, Daniels announced that the Navy would “commandeer
fuel oil and gasoline required for the Pacific fleet because of unsatisfactory bids.”
The so-called necessity to commandeer arose, as it had during the war, because
Daniels was unwilling to pay market price. The Navy had a stark choice, Daniels
maintained: either it could seize the oil it needed, as it had during the war, or it
could abandon plans for a Pacific Fleet.60 With this false dichotomy as apparent
justification, Daniels announced a plan to procure fuel oil in California that was
very like the plan established in 1917 for the Atlantic, under Lever Act authority.
“Under the navy orders placed today the west coast concerns will be required to
supply the navy’s demands and to accept a price to be fixed later after the navy
department has carefully investigated the cost of production and delivery at Pacific coast points.”61
By 16 August 1919, it became clear that Daniels meant for the FTC to conduct
an investigation to determine West Coast production costs. From this, Daniels
ostensibly could determine what fuel-oil price would be “fair.” California oil
marketers resisted loudly and in public. As the Oil & Gas Journal reported, citing
an undated issue of the Petroleum Reporter, “the producers see in the proposed
investigation an attempt on the part of Secretary Daniels to whitewash his action
in forcing the companies to sell to the navy at 86 cents a barrel here, although
[the companies themselves] pay $1.53 at tidewater for the same product.” One
producer averred that it was unfair that the Navy could force a 67-cent loss on
the marketers on every barrel sold and threaten that “if they refuse they risk
government seizure.”62
The Navy soon escalated, threatening large firms with seizure of their
refineries. This attracted national attention, albeit from a quarter friendly to the
industry. The Wall Street Journal reprinted a protest by Standard Oil of California
(Socal) against the seizures:
The oil companies have refused to execute the requisition agreements [from the
Navy]. The necessities of the war are over and they decline voluntarily to submit to
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the further taking of their property without just compensation. The marketing companies have expressed their readiness and desire to supply the Navy’s requirements
under ordinary commercial conditions, but they have declined to make deliveries
upon the Navy’s confiscatory terms except under duress and compulsion of force
used by the Navy. . . . Refusal to deliver the product commandeered has been met
with the formal threat of an immediate seizure not only of the products in question
but also of the plants at which they are produced.
In the meantime, the indebtedness of the Navy to the oil companies piles up. . . . Its
bills are being paid to unwilling sellers by promises of adjustment now more than two
years old. . . . It is a serious matter when a great agency of the government embarks
on a policy of confiscation without hindrance by Congress or the Chief Executive.63

Public awareness was no barrier to Daniels’s aggression; he continued to prey
on the companies, apparently confident that he still could seize oil if he could
not buy it at the price he wanted. Beginning in January 1920, however, Daniels
acquired a vocal and influential adversary in Admiral Sims, whose critique of the
secretary’s war management caused an immediate sensation. Sims accused the
secretary of having been laggard in adopting modern naval-warfare tactics and
of several other managerial failures. The Senate Committee on Naval Affairs began hearings on Daniels’s management that would last until the end of May. The
committee recorded over 3,500 pages of testimony, much of it in vehement opposition to Daniels. By the time 1920 ended Lieutenant Kittredge had completed
his 450-page book excoriating Daniels, basing his analysis on the Naval Affairs
Committee testimony.64
However, as those hearings began in March, Daniels—perhaps to demonstrate
his resolve—threatened to commandeer still more fuel oil if the companies refused to offer contracts at “reasonable prices.” As they had done in 1919, the companies tried to evade supplying the Navy by bidding on only a tiny fraction of the
volume sought.65 In April 1920, Daniels’s management was implicitly condemned
in recommendations by the Naval Affairs Committee for a complete reorganization of the Navy. Defiant, Daniels advertised that he would step up seizures in
anticipation of repeal of the Lever Act, whose authority he continued to invoke
even in the second year of peace.66
In late June, the General Petroleum Company began what would become the
most forceful resistance yet to Navy commandeering. Up to that moment, only
the Atlantic Refining Company had resisted by taking the United States to court
over Navy confiscations.67 After General Petroleum won a temporary federal
restraining order protecting the firm from seizures, a rumor circulated that
“unless the company agreed to sell oil to the navy at the navy department’s price”
Marines would be landed to seize fuel oil physically from General’s refinery in
Los Angeles Harbor.68
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The rumor was “nonsense,” according to Admiral Hugh Rodman, commander
of the Pacific Fleet, who pushed responsibility for any commandeering of oil up
the chain of command. This took little time, as Secretary Daniels was aboard
Rodman’s flagship New Mexico in Los Angeles Harbor. The pride of the fleet, the
two-year-old, oil-powered dreadnought had returned only recently from ferrying
President Wilson to sign the Versailles Treaty (which the Senate declined to
ratify). Now Rodman and his boss were about to take New Mexico on a jaunt to
San Francisco to attend the Democratic Party national convention.69
General Petroleum’s suit singled out Daniels; Rear Admiral Samuel McGowan,
the Navy’s paymaster general; and a few other officers. It argued that the oil they
sought at $1.11 would cost $1.42 to replace, and that the firm had contracts
with buyers for the same oil at $1.85. The Navy, in short, was seeking a price
per barrel 22 percent below wholesale. The U.S. attorney defended the Navy,
calling these “quibbling reasons,” and asserted that the Navy “had merely set a
figure as a temporary price for an advance payment.” On Lever Act grounds,
Rodman challenged the company’s right to sue, because without ratification of a
peace treaty the United States was still “technically at war.” The Navy also noted
that the Pacific Fleet faced a fuel-oil shortage, which moved a supply officer
“to declare that the oil would be commandeered, by force if necessary, and that
marines might be landed to seize the oil.”70 Rumors of the use of force, it seemed,
might come true. Daniels thus was sticking with the tactic he had used with such
success ever since Lever’s enactment; that is, the Navy would pay nothing or a
price well under market, evade the price adjudication that Lever mandated, and
then attempt to use FTC estimates to justify a lowball price. What was new was
the threat to use the Marines to enforce the scheme.
General Petroleum’s bid for a permanent injunction against seizures ultimately
was dismissed, on the reasonable grounds that naval readiness could be at risk.
Yet the presiding judge, Benjamin Franklin Bledsoe, evaded the core price adjudication problem, calling instead for just compensation “according to the usual
rules and principles that obtain in courts of law.”71 The problem was that there
never had been anything “usual” in the Navy’s seizures, nor any provision for how
the price disputes that led to them were to be settled.
Judge Bledsoe also ruled that force could be used to compel the company to
deliver oil at $1.11 per barrel, even though the Navy already had contracted for
a small quantity (two thousand barrels) at the much higher per-barrel price of
$2.85 then prevailing. The judge, however, insisted that only a jury could decide
what the price for new procurements should be, and further muddied the issue
of price adjudication by referring, vaguely, to a “judicial tribunal” that should
determine the price.72 Since the Lever Act was silent on precisely how prices
should be adjudicated, this left Daniels with the upper hand.
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The companies’ economic fight with the Navy continued around San Francisco
Bay a few days later. On 7 July, the Union Oil Company refused to deliver a tiny
quantity of oil at $1.60 per barrel to the Mare Island Naval Station in Vallejo. A
Union official declared that “it was unjust for the Navy to attempt the use of a war
time measure to extract a more favorable price than other customers were paying, the market figure being $2.60.” The official also hinted at a passive-aggressive
tactic that evidence suggests large California oil firms may have employed widely
in the second half of 1920. “The navy may take oil from us and fix its price, but it
cannot compel us to continue to refine oil at navy prices or sell at navy figures.”73
What this meant was that Union was minimizing fuel-oil production to avoid lossmaking seizures; other firms probably were too. Perhaps for that reason, on 17 July
Mare Island Station sent a demand for more fuel oil to four of the five California
firms from whom the Navy had been seizing oil since 1917, offering $1.72 per barrel; the fifth firm, General Petroleum, already had been subdued in Los Angeles.
Although the Navy’s $1.72 was slightly higher than its offer from two weeks before,
a reporter noted that market price was “steadily rising above that figure.”74
The California supply never had been tighter than in the summer of 1920,
and meanwhile nationwide consumption was growing at 25 percent a year.
Rapidly growing legions of California automobile owners pushed gasoline
demand ahead of refinery capacity, while fine weather extended the driving
season. To contend with the demand surge, the oil industry in California,
Oregon, and Washington adopted a remarkable and comprehensive suite of
demand-suppression measures. These included demand prioritization, tiered
pricing, rationing, forced substitution to lower grades of fuel, and proselytizing
for conservation. The companies also held down price and, as we will see,
sold some grades at a loss. In a study of this unusual market, economists Alan
Olmstead and Paul Rhode hypothesize “that the oil companies held prices down
because they were afraid of hostile government actions.”75 The Navy’s fuel-oil
seizures, as revealed in the present article, strongly appear to be the “hostile
government actions” that Olmstead and Rhode inferred had intimidated the
oil companies into forgoing price increases.
The convergence of rapid demand growth, regional scarcity, and Daniels’s
anticorporate aggression created a strong incentive for California oil companies
to do two things: (1) maximize gasoline production, which happened to require
minimizing the refining of fuel oil, and (2) avoid supplying fuel oil to the Navy
at a loss. For example, Union Oil’s tactic of declining to refine fuel oil, which
the other large California firms appear to have followed, seems to have been a
response to both the general scarcity of gasoline and the desire to avoid supplying
the Navy. Navy behavior also explains oil-industry reluctance to advance West
Coast gasoline prices in line with national upward trends. The firms seem to have
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feared that raising prices would harden public opinion further against them, thus
allowing the Navy’s economic aggression to intensify.
Meanwhile, the combination of crude shortages and company efforts to avoid
further seizures was affecting Navy readiness in the Pacific. By late July, fuel oil
was so scarce that the Navy began burning coal in three oil-powered dreadnoughts
based in California home ports. Then the unthinkable happened: on or shortly before 24 July 1920, one of six destroyers en route from San Diego to San Francisco
ran out of fuel oil at sea and had to be rescued by a coal-burning tugboat.76
This moved the Navy to act even more aggressively against the companies.
The Department of Justice was consulted, after which AG A. Mitchell Palmer
instructed the U.S. district attorney to assist the Navy if necessary. Then a
“high officer” of the Twelfth Naval District, headquartered at Mare Island,
threatened that the companies’ refusal to sell would result in either cancelation
of a reservists’ training cruise in the six destroyers or the seizure of 150,000
gallons of fuel oil so the cruise could proceed.77 The companies would not sell
at $1.72 per barrel; hence seizures by armed force began on 26 July 1920 against
northern California oil companies. Once the six destroyers from San Diego
reached San Francisco Bay, they carried out a “threat to seize fuel oil from four
companies [Socal, Union, Associated, and Shell] which had refused to sell at
the price of $1.72 a barrel.”
Associated was targeted first. Ignoring the firm’s protest, Navy vessels snatched
not 150,000 gallons, as threatened, but five hundred thousand gallons (about
twelve thousand barrels); “[t]he Navy virtually seized the fuel,” Associated’s plant
manager declared, “because it has the men to make good its threat to take this
oil.” He complained that the cost of crude oil at the wellhead, two hundred miles
away, was $1.60 per barrel, so the notion that it could be transported from there
to San Francisco, then refined, stored, and sold for $1.72 was “ridiculous.” The
Navy’s long habit of such behavior was why Associated earlier had declined to
bid on new tenders. As the manager put it, “[W]e could not meet the price the
Navy demanded without losing money.”78 Naval officers admonished the firm “to
resort to court action” if it wanted a higher price for the confiscated oil.79
With AG Palmer on his side, the following day Daniels took even-moreaggressive steps. At Naval Coaling Station La Playa in San Diego, a four-millionbarrel storage facility was nearly empty, apparently because firms were unwilling
to bid at a price the Navy would accept. So more than twenty warships from La
Playa raided Union and Socal refinery wharves, paying $1.72 per barrel.80 Two
days later, a subdued Socal agreed to a three-month contract for three hundred
thousand barrels at $2.00.81 Apparently Socal, to avoid future confrontations, was
willing to accept payment that was well below market price. The price of fuel oil
increased steadily for the remainder of the summer of 1920, which made Socal’s
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price concession ever more painful to sustain. However, although no one knew it
at the time, the oil price bubble soon would burst; the thirty-year price maximum
was just a few months in the future.
Shell was the last firm willing to risk physical resistance to the Navy. Daniels
may have regarded the Anglo-Dutch giant as the least pliable of the five big West
Coast firms, and saved his assault on it for last. Oil prices had continued to rise
all summer, but in response to Shell’s asking price of $2.35 in early September the
Mare Island commandant led a party of Marines into the Shell refinery at Martinez. On 11 September, they smashed heavy locks on outlet valves, apparently set
in anticipation of the Navy’s arrival. After a formal request to purchase at $2.00
per barrel, the raiding party drew off two thousand barrels.82
After that, Shell seems to have ceased refining, in an effort to avoid further
losses. When the Navy tanker Chenwa arrived in Martinez on 20 September to
procure a large order of fuel oil, Shell employees offered no resistance—nor any
assistance. Soon after Chenwa’s pumps began to work, however, the sailors recognized to their horror that the oil they were drawing was “unfit of use owing to
insufficient refining.”83 Shell apparently had left unrefined heavy crude in the storage tank it expected the Navy to raid. The Navy understood Shell’s action as the retaliation it was, and Daniels’s campaign of economic intervention via armed force
escalated in response. As of 24 September, “[a]rmed marines are today standing
guard over the plant of the Shell Oil Co. at Martinez. Following the failure of the
navy to procure the oil through forcible seizure because the company is said to
have diverted its oil, Rear Admiral [Joseph L.] Jayne, commandant of the Twelfth
naval district, detailed an armed guard to watch the oil plant. The guard has been
instructed to prevent all shipment of oil by the company until the navy obtains
its supply.”84 Since Shell refused to deliver as expected, the Navy explained, these
measures were necessary to ensure that the company supplied “its pro rata share
and as an act of justice to other companies and their customers.” Shell, for its part,
insisted it had no agreement with the Navy.85
Thus, company resistance to the Navy was long in coming, beginning only late
in 1919, by Atlantic Refining, and intensifying in California during 1920—more
than three years after nonpayments and underpayments began. As the California
companies began to resist, they were engaged simultaneously in a costly program
of retail price restraint and rationing to suppress gasoline demand growth. The
California firms understood that, politically, they could not raise the price of
gasoline while the Navy was confiscating their products and berating them for
profiteering, regardless of the economic reality that they lost money on every
barrel seized.
Armed seizures from domestic businesses during peacetime by a U.S. military
force were something new in American history—akin to internal piracy. Seizures
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without force began before the Lever Act gave the Navy any sliver of legality and
continued after fuel administrator Requa’s failed effort to establish a fair price. At
Daniels’s direction, things escalated from there.
PEAK OIL AND THE COURSE THAT WAS FOLLOWED
Republican Warren G. Harding’s landslide victory in the November 1920
presidential election dashed any hope Daniels had of remaining in government
via the good offices of his former assistant secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
who was the losing Democratic Party candidate for vice president. Daniels’s
most ruthless ally, AG Palmer, also was a lame duck. Faced with impending
replacement by a Republican appointee and with his public humiliation in the
Senate hearings a recent memory, Daniels may have been moved by the prospect
of further accountability to a change of political style. After eight years of either
lambasting his critics or ignoring them, Daniels suddenly began trying to explain
himself. In so doing he revealed the remarkable plan he had followed for eight
years, in anticipation of the peak-oil crisis that Interior had predicted.
The secretary’s revelation came in response to a pointed critique from
Thomas A. O’Donnell, president of the newly constituted American Petroleum
Institute (API). The Los Angeles oilman had worked closely with Requa on the
PWSC, but ultimately resigned in exasperation at obstacles the government had
thrown in the path of wartime production. In a long and combative speech to
the API, O’Donnell rejected Interior’s peak-oil theory and blamed the Navy
and the FTC for the dire supply problems on the West Coast. A trade-journal
reporter summarized O’Donnell’s message as follows: “The only danger to the
maintenance of an adequate supply that he sees is in continuation of agitation
fomented by foolish politicians and pseudo-scientists against the industry, restrictions placed on the oil man by the government, and barring the American
oil man from development of foreign fields [as Britain, the Netherlands, and
some oil-producer states were doing].”86
O’Donnell also attacked Interior’s assertion that present shortages constituted
evidence of peak oil. While acknowledging that there was “a serious world-wide
shortage of petroleum” at that moment, he delivered the following explanation:
Important discoveries are continuing to occur in this country and, I believe,
additional discoveries will be made long after the time limit set for exhaustion by
some of our experts. . . . The present shortage has not been caused by any serious
exhaustion of the petroleum deposits, but has been caused by extraordinary increased
consumption. In the United States the production of petroleum has increased about
25 per cent in a little over a year. . . . Agitation by government officials, statesmen,
or politicians is just as dangerous as governmental regulation and interference. It
destroys stability, credit, and confidence.87
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O’Donnell was rightly confident that recent price increases would call
forth more than enough new production, and he was particularly critical of
Navy land withdrawals to create the Naval Oil Reserve. The land withdrawals
negated millions of dollars invested there and discouraged further investment.
As O’Donnell put it, “[T]he attitude of the navy department toward Pacific
coast producers, coupled with agitation for governmental investigation of the
industry, nearly always by men not familiar with the subject and frequently with
preconceived prejudice, has had a destructive influence on the development of
petroleum resources on the Pacific coast.” Alluding to the oil seizures of the past
summer and fall, O’Donnell complained, “While an armistice has been signed
with the Germans, no armistice has been offered to the oil producers by the Navy
Department.”88
Daniels responded to O’Donnell vigorously, revealing much about the centrality of the theory of peak oil to Wilsonian oil policy. Daniels maintained that he
had had no choice but to act as he did. Referring to his consultation with Secretary Lane in 1915, Daniels wrote to O’Donnell, reminding him that “[b]efore we
adopted the policy of burning oil, the question of the adequate supply for future
use was thoroughly investigated and assurances received . . . from the Interior Department that such a supply would be available.” As Daniels saw it, there was no
alternative to his policy of oil seizures and mineral-patent repatriation. As he told
the oilman, “I cannot see how any other course could have been followed when
the unprecedented conditions following the war resulted in a world shortage of
oil. It would have been suicidal to have opened up our reserves set aside for the
future to meet a temporary situation in the present.”89
With respect to peak oil, Daniels’s declaration was elliptical in comparison
with his bold assertion of 1915 that the entire world would run out of oil at the
same time, leaving the Naval Oil Reserve as the last oil on earth. Yet peak oil was
still on the secretary’s mind. The reserves, he told O’Donnell, were “set aside for
the future,” and not even the present severe shortage—in which a Navy warship
had run out of oil at sea—was critical enough to open them. Implicit but clear was
that the future for which the Naval Oil Reserve was being saved was one in which
American oil production was exhausted.90 Thus, what O’Donnell protested as
Navy lawlessness was, to Daniels, an inevitable necessity if the Naval Oil Reserve
was to be protected until peak oil arrived.
It was ironic that oil price was the issue that led to so many seizures.
Progressives’ ire against the oil companies over high prices rang hollow even
at the time; prices of everything had increased greatly between 1916 and 1920,
as economist Alvin H. Hansen explained in a 1920 article.91 The prices of
naval stores (a category including pitch, paint, resin, tar, turpentine, and pine
oil), as but one example, rose 300 percent in 1918 alone.92 In 1919 prices rose
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still higher. In both years, industry observers compared the naval stores price
increases to “the phenomenal prices of the Civil War period, when the supplies
of turpentine and rosin were cut off by the armies of the South.”93 Why oil prices
should be considered too high for the Navy when the entire economy was racked
by rampant postwar inflation was something Daniels never tried to explain.
Interior’s peak-oil activism, meanwhile, was becoming more fevered. “[N]othing
is more certain,” declared USGS chief geologist David White, than that U.S.
production would begin its terminal decline within two to three years.94 The price
of oil, therefore, should rise. To an ultra-Progressive such as Daniels, however,
an oil-price increase could have but one explanation: profiteering, which must
be opposed as a matter of patriotism. Daniels thus maintained to O’Donnell that
he had had no alternative but to act as he did: lowballing California producers,
withholding their compensation, and ultimately seizing their oil by force. Daniels
also claimed that the Navy had tried to obtain “so far as possible, oils from other
than American fields.” This claim may be true, but research for this article found
no records or discussion of procurements or seizures from the most conspicuous
importer in California, Doheny’s Mexican Petroleum Company.
Lastly, Daniels reminded O’Donnell that California firms had been paid a
“tentative price . . . until such time as just compensation could be determined.”
This was not false, but it hid more than it revealed. First, only Socal had been
offered “just compensation”; second, no method of adjudication had been established; and third, Daniels long since had rejected Sanderson & Porter’s methodology for fair price estimates. So firms had to consider the possibility that the
“tentative price” might be the last one the Navy ever would offer. In any case,
Daniels concluded to O’Donnell, his hands were tied; “I don’t see how we could
have done anything else in this matter.”95
Two extreme ideologies found expression in Josephus Daniels’s management
of the naval oil supply. The first was Progressivism, which to Secretary Daniels
meant an assumption that in any relation between a large, private business
and the Navy the business had an unfair advantage that he was duty bound to
overcome. The second was oil-scarcity ideology—that is, the peak-oil theory
that Daniels absorbed from scientists of the Department of the Interior, and
the inference drawn from peak oil that an aggressive policy was needed to avert
terminal scarcity.96
Following the ostensible imperatives of these ideologies, Daniels fashioned
an unusual, confrontational, and almost delusional oil policy. To compensate
for what he thought was the impending exhaustion of American oil production,
Daniels created and defended the Naval Oil Reserve, which had to be kept untouched until the day when all the world’s oil fields ran dry simultaneously. Yet
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Daniels never defined how the Navy would know that peak oil was near or what
the criteria were for opening the Naval Oil Reserve. Having an oil reserve was, of
course, not a bad thing, but Daniels had no policy other than to protect it against
the presumptive day when exhaustion was near.
To preserve the reserve, Daniels determined to take oil at the price he
considered fair—always below market price—or withhold payment from the
oil companies altogether. This policy began even before the 1917 passage of the
Lever Act allowed the government to seize fuel if a price could not be agreed on.
Daniels’s campaign of oil seizure continued throughout America’s participation
in World War I and right up until Daniels’s last months in office. Some firms
went unpaid or underpaid for three and a half years, from spring 1917 to late
fall 1920.
Daniels’s transfer of oil-powered warships to West Coast home ports was
strongly positive for the growth of American naval power in the Pacific Ocean,
but their arrival in California during a severe gasoline shortage provoked the secretary to harsher measures to secure oil. After the Navy began using force to enter
the refineries of firms unwilling to sell at a price Daniels would pay, companies appear to have responded by minimizing their production of fuel oil. One firm even
tricked the Navy, placing crude oil the Navy could not use in the tank it expected
the Navy to raid. This defiance moved Daniels to surround the offending refinery
with armed Marines so that, if the Navy could not get oil by seizure, no one else
could get any by purchase. Daniels’s most extreme acts took place in the summer
and fall of 1920, during the run-up to the presidential election in November—
which Republican candidate Warren G. Harding won. Daniels may have called
an end to seizures once he knew Harding would take office; there is no direct
evidence of this, but a California newspaper database that returned much useful
information about seizures between 1917 and October 1920 returned nothing for
the short portion of Daniels’s tenure that came after the election.
While Daniels’s oil-seizure campaign was an aberration in Navy history, it was
not so unusual in the context of Wilsonian interventionism. Wilson normalized
lawlessness against those whom Progressives considered unpatriotic or alien.
However, that lawlessness mainly was directed downward, against the weak
(e.g., labor unionists, blacks, and immigrants); Daniels, by contrast, used the
imaginary peak-oil crisis to direct the power of the state upward, against large oil
corporations. This use of peak oil as the rationale to do something aggressive is
the essence of “oil-scarcity ideology,” a thought system that has had a profound
impact on American foreign policy.97
The 1914 U.S. invasion of Veracruz, Mexico, was typical of aggressive policies
rationalized by oil-scarcity ideology. These were foreign policies adopted to secure
a supply for the United States and to preempt other countries from doing so for
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themselves to the detriment of the United States. Daniels’s use of scarcity ideology
was unusual in that his aggression was directed inward, against corporations of his
own country; it was more typical for such force to be exerted outward.
The most significant later policy rationalized by scarcity ideology was the
Carter Doctrine of 1980. It asserted that the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf
constituted an American national interest, and that flow was to be defended by
force, if necessary. The policy was based on a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
peak-oil theory. By the mid-1980s, the agency claimed, the United States would
be out of oil, along with many other countries; only the Middle East would have
any oil left. This argument was put to President Carter in the days before he
proclaimed the doctrine that now bears his name.98 But the CIA was wrong, and
for the same reasons that Britain’s eighteenth- and nineteenth-century peakcoal forecasts were wrong, which were the same reasons that Interior’s peak-oil
forecasts of 1908–20 were wrong: their models assumed that there would be no
technological progress, and that rising prices would not stimulate investors to
look harder for oil than they had when prices were low.99 The CIA also concluded
that an oil-starved Soviet Union would invade Iran to replace its own failing supply; however, it was fairly obvious from Western energy journals that the USSR
faced no oil crisis.100 Nonetheless, to deter the anticipated Soviet attack on Iran
that peak oil supposedly would provoke, a large USN force was sent to the Persian
Gulf in 1980, where it remains to this day.101
Josephus Daniels hardly was alone in falling under the influence of a destructive and persuasive strain of bad science—perhaps the worst ever practiced. In a
sense, he was a victim of the scientists who concocted an analysis that asserted
that the United States would run out of oil by the 1930s. One might fault Daniels
for ignoring the oil industry’s consistent rejection of the peak-oil theory, but no
other federal official questioned peak oil either, save for the four geologists who
in 1908 challenged the plausibility of mineral-exhaustion forecasts but were ignored. One lesson of this affair is that American political leaders are vulnerable to
persuasion that oil is running out and are willing to take extreme action, including attacks on their own nation’s oil industry, to avert even imaginary oil crises.
The other is that scientists are as willing as anyone else to invoke the specter of
implausible catastrophe to enhance their personal or bureaucratic authority.

NOTES

1.	Lee A. Craig, Josephus Daniels: His Life &
Times (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina
Press, 2013), chaps. 2–4. Daniels used his
newspapers to campaign for white supremacy,

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020

which meant subverting the enfranchisement of black voters that the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, the latter two
of the three known as the Reconstruction

165

162

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 1

amendments, had established. Daniels, like
many Southern intellectuals and politicians of
the era, sought to devise state- and local-level
work-arounds that could defeat the Reconstruction amendments’ intent without actually
repealing them, which would have been
impossible politically. His white-supremacy
campaign first required strengthening the
North Carolina Democratic Party to overcome
the so-called Fusionists, an alliance of blacks,
poor whites, and Republicans. Daniels was
crucial to the success of this effort; by fanning
the flames of racial hatred in the pages of the
Raleigh News & Observer (N&O), he helped
pull poor whites away from the Fusionists.
The N&O became the intellectual source
for North Carolina politicians campaigning
against blacks’ rights to vote and serve in
government; against local governments led
by blacks; and against the social mingling of
the races. He was lauded for his oratory; one
agitator redirected praise for his own success
to Daniels: “Any man can make speeches if
he would read the News and Observer.” The
de facto and de jure disenfranchisement of
black North Carolinians that this campaign
achieved resulted from acts of terror against
blacks, gerrymandering, revocation of local
government authority in black-majority jurisdictions, and poll taxes and literacy tests. Poor
whites could avoid the last two mentioned via
a grandfathered right to vote.
2.	Proceedings of a Conference of Governors
in the White House, Washington, D.C., May
13–15, 1908, H.R. Doc. No. 60-1425, pp. 3–12
(W. J. McGee ed., 1909).
3.	Ibid.
4.	Henry Gannett, ed., Report of the National
Conservation Commission (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909).
5.	David T. Day, “The Petroleum Resources of
the United States,” in ibid.
6.	Marius R. Campbell and Edward W. Parker,
“Coal Fields of the United States”; C. W.
Hayes, “Iron Ores of the United States”; and
W. Lindgren, “Resources of the United States
in Gold, Silver, Copper, Lead, and Zinc”;
all in Report of the National Conservation
Commission, ed. Gannett.
7.	Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly 2, no. 2
(1887), p. 220.

8.	Joan M. Jensen, The Price of Vigilance
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969); David C.
Unger, The Emergency State: America’s Pursuit
of Absolute Security at All Costs (New York:
Penguin, 2012), pp. 24–25.
9.	William J. Bryan to Woodrow Wilson,
9 April 1914, General Records of the
Department of State, 1763–2002, Record
Group [RG] 59, National Archives and
Records Administration, Washington, DC
[hereafter NARA].
10. Jonathan C. Brown, Oil and Revolution in
Mexico (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press,
1993), chap. 3.
11. Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow
Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1967), p. 103.
12. Paul Sabin, Crude Politics: The California
Oil Market, 1900–1940 (Berkeley: Univ. of
California Press, 2005), pp. 195–96.
13. Craig, Josephus Daniels.
14. “Naval Charges Denied,” Los Angeles Herald,
21 June 1917, p. 1.
15. Some profiteering was real but much was
imagined. The coexistence of profiteering
with legitimate practices is a recurring theme
in Mark Wilson, The Business of Civil War:
Military Mobilization and the State, 1861–
1865, Studies in the History of Technology
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2006).
16. Tracy Barrett Kittredge, Naval Lessons of
the Great War: A Review of the Senate Naval
Investigation of the Criticisms by Admiral Sims
of the Policies and Methods of Josephus Daniels
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1921), p. 452.
17. Day, “The Petroleum Resources of the United
States.”
18. David White, “The Petroleum Resources of
the World,” Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 89 (May 1920),
p. 126.
19. U.S. Navy Dept., Annual Reports of the Navy
Department for the Fiscal Year 1913 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1914), pp. 14–16.
20. Estimates Submitted by the Secretary of the
Navy, 1916: Hearings before the H. Comm.
on Naval Affairs, 64th Cong., p. 3604 (1916)
(statement of Josephus Daniels, Secretary of
the Navy).

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1

166

Naval War College: Autumn 2020 Full Issue

21. From a letter to the Secretary of the Navy,
cited in John A. DeNovo, “Petroleum and
the United States Navy before World War I,”
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41, no. 4
(1955), p. 647.
22. Ibid., p. 650.
23. U.S. Navy Dept., Annual Reports of the Navy
Department for the Fiscal Year 1913, pp.
14–15.
24. U.S. Navy Dept., Annual Reports of the
Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1915
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1916), p. 63.
25. Ibid.; U.S. Navy Dept., Annual Reports of the
Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1913, pp.
14–15.
26. H.R. Res. 175, 64th Cong. (1916); “Report
Made on Gasoline,” Federal Trade Reporter, 15
April 1916, pp. 237–38; “Gasoline Question
in Congress,” Federal Trade Reporter, 15 April
1916, pp. 238–41.
27. Estimates Submitted by the Secretary of the
Navy, 1916, pp. 3602–609 (statement of Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy).
28. “Daniels in Defense of Navy Oil Reserve:
Asks President to Block Legalizing of Entries
on the Land Withdrawn by Taft; Secretary
Says Claim, If Allowed, Would Leave Only
Fuel for Five Years of War,” New York Times,
20 May 1916, p. 6.
29. “Naval Petroleum Reserve #1 and #2, California,” Center for Land Use Interpretation, clui
.org/; Chris Kraul, “Occidental’s $3.7-Billion
Bid Buys Elk Hills Field,” Los Angeles Times, 7
October 1997.
30. Manley Rutherford Irwin, Silent Strategists:
Harding, Denby, and the U.S. Navy’s TransPacific Offensive, World War II, rev. ed.
(Lanham, MD: Univ. Press of America, 2013),
pp. viii, 19.
31. PWSC meeting minutes of 13 September
1918 record that SONJ president Walter
Teagle had submitted bills “which extend
back to the time the United States entered
the War” but that the Navy had rebuffed
him. This would make the unpaid bills about
seventeen months old. “Minutes of the 31st
Meeting of the National Petroleum War
Service Committee, Held in the Office of the
Chairman, 26 Broadway, Friday, September 13th, 1918, at 11 O’Clock A.M.,” Mark

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020

STERN

163

L. Requa Papers, box 3, Univ. of Wyoming
American Heritage Center, Laramie, WY
[hereafter Requa Papers]. PWSC records, and
much else pertaining to oil logistics during
World War I, reside in this collection. Requa
was director of the Oil Division of the U.S.
Fuel Administration. His job was to regulate
oil production and coordinate transportation
to keep both the domestic economy and the
Allied war effort supplied. Requa worked
closely with oil executives as well as then–
Vice Admiral William S. Sims, who, among
his other wartime duties, directed the U.S.
Shipping Mission in London.
32. Josephus Daniels to Woodrow Wilson, 18
June 1917, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed.
Arthur S. Link (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1966), vol. 42, pp. 534–35.
33. “Daniels to Battle for Navy Supplies,” Los
Angeles Herald, 20 June 1917, p. 2.
34. From section 4 of the Food and Fuel Control
Act of 1917, known as the Lever Act. Text of
the act is reprinted as an appendix in George
Otis Smith, ed., The Strategy of Mineral:
A Study of the Mineral Factor in the World
Position of America in War and in Peace,
(New York: D. Appleton, 1919).
35. Cover letter to the submission of a report,
“Prices of Petroleum Products Including Fuel
Oil for the United States Navy: Report to
Mark L. Requa, Esq., General Director, Oil
Division, United States Fuel Administration,
Washington, D.C. from Sanderson & Porter,
Engineers,” Requa Papers, box 4 [hereafter
S&P report]. Emphasis added.
36. Mark L. Requa to A. C. Bedford, National
Petroleum War Service Committee, 8 August
1918, Requa Papers, box 3.
37. Memorandums for Mr. Naramore, 2 August
1918, United States Fuel Administration,
Records Relating to U.S. and British Oil
Policy, 1918–1920, Great Britain, vols. 1, 2,
box 2, RG 67, NARA.
38. Ibid.
39. John Mason Hart, Revolutionary Mexico: The
Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1989),
pp. 162–63.
40. Roger M. Olien and Diana Davids Olien, Oil
and Ideology: The Cultural Creation of the
American Petroleum Industry, Luther Hartwell

167

164

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 1

Hodges Series on Business, Society, and the
State (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina
Press, 2000), p. 117.
41. For a description of Gregory’s suit against
Jersey affiliates in Texas, see Evan Anders,
“Thomas Watt Gregory and the Survival
of His Progressive Faith,” Southwestern
Historical Quarterly 93, no. 1 (July 1989), pp.
1–24; Requa to Bedford, 8 August 1918.
42. “PWSC Minutes of the 22nd Meeting of the
National Petroleum War Service Committee, Held in the Office of the Chairman, 26
Broadway, N.Y. City, Friday, June 21, 1918,”
Requa Papers, box 3.
43. S&P report.
44. Josephus Daniels to Harry A. Garfield, United
States Fuel Administrator, 7 October 1918,
Josephus Daniels Papers, container 518, reel
36, Library of Congress, Washington, DC
[hereafter Daniels Papers].
45. A. C. Bedford, National Petroleum War Service Committee, to M. L. Requa, 18 September 1918, Requa Papers, box 6.
46. “Costs of Refining,” sec. 13 in S&P report, pp.
60–70.
47. Daniels to Garfield, 7 October 1918.
48. S&P report, p. 142.
49. Volumes of seizures in ibid., p. 243. FY18
production estimated from an average of 1917
and 1918 total calendar year U.S. production,
so as to reflect the federal fiscal year, 1 July
1917–30 June 1918. Total U.S. production
from E. Russell Lloyd, “Petroleum,” in
Mineral Resources of the United States, 1918,
pt. 2, Nonmetals (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1921), pp.
969–1170.
50. John Mason Hart, Empire and Revolution:
The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2002), p.
306.
51. Total U.S. production was estimated as in
note 49. Jersey refinery runs for the federal
fiscal year were averaged from data for 1917
and 1918 in table 8 in the SONJ company history. George S. Gibb and Evelyn H. Knowlton, History of Standard Oil Company (New
Jersey), vol. 2, The Resurgent Years, 1911–1927
(New York: Harper, 1955), app. 2.

52. SONJ gross earnings data go back only as
far as 1919, when they were $455 million.
The firm’s losses for the federal fiscal year
1918 were $42 million, from a lower total
production than 1919. Seized-oil-volume
data taken from S&P report, p. 144. SONJ
financial data from Gibb and Knowlton, The
Resurgent Years, app. 2, table 2.
53. Paul F. Hannah, “Some Aspects of Price
Control in Wartime,” Cornell Law Review
27, no. 1 (1941), p. 21. The Price Fixing
Committee originated within the War
Industries Board, which was headed by
Bernard M. Baruch. To give it more authority,
the committee was made independent in
May 1918, so it could act “as the personal
representative of the President, exercising
such prestige or authority as he might
have as President of the United States and
commander in chief of the Army and Navy.”
The Price Fixing Committee chairman was
Robert S. Brookings. Membership included
such luminaries as Baruch; F. W. Taussig;
Harry Garfield of the Fuel Administration;
W. B. Colver, chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission; and one representative each
from the Army and Navy. In C. F. Stoddard,
“Price Fixing by the Government during the
War,” Monthly Labor Review 10, no. 5 (1920),
pp. 1–24.
54. “Minutes of the 37th Meeting of the National
Petroleum War Service Committee Held Friday October 25th, 1918, at 11 O’Clock A.M. at
26 Broadway, N.Y.,” Requa Papers, box 3.
55. “PWSC Minutes of the 40th Meeting of the
National Petroleum War Service Committee
Held Friday, November 22, 1918, at 26 Broadway, N.Y.,” Requa Papers, box 3.
56. “Coal Association Wants Tariff on Oil,” Oil &
Gas Journal 18, no. 5 (1919), p. 64.
57. See Peter A. Shulman, “Empire of Energy:
Environment, Geopolitics, and American
Technology before the Age of Oil” (PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), pp. 195–96.
58. “No Hitch in Fleet Voyage: Ready to Go
through First Stage in Panama Canal Journey,” Sacramento Union, 26 July 1919, p. 1.
59. “Big Pacific Fleet in Review: Giant Guns
Thunder Salute to Navy Chief,” Los Angeles
Evening Herald, 7 August 1919, pp. 1, 13.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1

168

Naval War College: Autumn 2020 Full Issue

60. “Daniels to Seize Fuel for Ships,” Washington
Herald, 1 July 1919, p. 1.
61. “West Concerns to Supply Navy Oil,”
Sacramento Union, 1 July 1919, p. 7.
62. “Oil Operators Are Ready to Meet Their
Accusers,” Oil & Gas Journal 18, no. 12 (22
August 1919), p. 69.
63. “Navy Threatens Seizure of Coast Oil Refineries,” Wall Street Journal, 20 August 1919,
p. 1.
64.	Kittredge, Naval Lessons of the Great War.

65. “Fuel Seizure Is Threat. Daniels Says Navy
Will Commandeer Supply If Necessary,”
Morning Oregonian, 12 March 1920, p. 17.
66. “Senate Committee Will Urge Complete Navy
Reorganization,” Los Angeles Evening Herald,
10 April 1920, p. A1.
67. “Coal Association Wants Tariff on Oil,” p. 64.
68. “Navy Has No Intention of Using Force to
Secure Oil,” Sacramento Union, 20 June 1920,
p. 2; “Secretary Daniels to Be Present Dem.
Convention,” Red Bluff (CA) Daily News, 19
June 1920, p. 2.
69. “Navy Has No Intention of Using Force,” p. 2;
“Secretary Daniels to Be Present,” p. 1.
70. “Refused Navy Oil in War, Charge in L.A.
Court: U.S. Fights Suit of Company against
Fleet Commandeering Petroleum,” Los Angeles Herald, 21 June 1920, p. 1.
71. “Injunction Is Refused in Oil Seizure Matter,”
Oil & Gas Journal 19, no. 5 (1920), p. 89.
72. “Navy Gains Point in Oil Controversy,” San
Pedro Daily News, 22 June 1920, p. 1.
73. “Oil Price Dispute Goes to Daniels,” Sacramento Union, 8 July 1920, p. 2.

STERN

79. “Destroyers Take 500,000 Gallons Oil
at Frisco—Six Destroyers Ordered to
Commandeer Big Plant If Necessary,”
Columbus (GA) Enquirer Sun, 27 July 1920,
p. 1.
80. Ibid.
81. “Navy to Pay $2.00 for Oil—Standard Company’s Proposal Accepted; Ends Long Contest
over Price,” Sacramento Union, 30 July 1920,
p. 1.
82. “Latest News—U.S. Marines in Big Cal. Oil
Seizure,” Los Angeles Herald, 11 September
1920, p. 1.
83. “Inferior Fuel Halts Navy Oil Seizure,” Los
Angeles Herald, 20 September 1920, p. A11.
84. “Armed Marines Put over Cal. Oil Plant,”
Los Angeles Herald, 24 September 1920,
p. 1.
85. “Armed Marines Guard Oil Plant—Shell
Company Fails to Make Big Delivery for Naval Vessels,” Sacramento Union, 24 September
1920, p. 8.
86. Thomas A. O’Donnell, “Oil Supply Sufficient
If Wildcatter Is Unrestricted,” National
Petroleum News 12, no. 47 (1920), pp. 53–54.
87. Ibid.; “Say Oil Supply Good for Years—Prominent Petrol Men Declare Resources of World
Nowhere near Exhaustion,” Miami Herald, 20
November 1920, p. 5.
88. O’Donnell, “Oil Supply Sufficient If Wildcatter Is Unrestricted”; “Say Oil Supply Good for
Years.”
89. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy,
to Thomas O’Donnell, 19 November 1920,
Daniels Papers, containers 566–67, reel 64.
90. Ibid.

74. “Navy Demands Supply of Oil—Mare Island
Orders 14,400 Barrels from Companies at
Former Price,” Sacramento Union, 18 July
1920, p. 9.

91. Alvin H. Hansen, “The Sequence in War
Prosperity and Inflation,” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 89 (May 1920), pp. 234–46.

75. Alan L. Olmstead and Paul Rhode, “Rationing
without Government: The West Coast Gas
Famine of 1920,” American Economic Review
75, no. 5 (1985), pp. 1044–55.

92. “Naval Store Prices in 1918 Unprecedented,”
1918 Year Book of the Oil Paint and Drug
Reporter (1919), pp. 231–33.

76. “Navy Awaiting Order to Seize Oil for Ships,”
San Francisco Chronicle, 24 July 1920, p. 3.

93. “Naval Stores in 1919,” 1919 Year Book of the
Oil Paint and Drug Reporter (1920), pp. 214–15.

77. Ibid.

94. White, “The Petroleum Resources of the
World,” p. 115.

78. “Seize Oil for Navy,” Los Angeles Times, 27
July 1920, p. I-5.

95. Daniels to O’Donnell, 19 November 1920.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020

165

169

166

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 1

96. Roger J. Stern, “Oil Scarcity Ideology in US
Foreign Policy, 1908–1997,” Security Studies
25, no. 2 (2016).
97. Ibid.
98. Fritz Ermarth and Marshall Brement, “Memorandum for Brzezinski: CIA Assessment
of Future Soviet Policy in Southwest Asia,”
18 January 1980, NLC 6-82-7-14-3, Jimmy
Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, GA.
99. Nuno Luis Madureira, “The Anxiety of
Abundance: William Stanley Jevons and

Coal Scarcity in the Nineteenth Century,”
Environment and History 18 (2012), pp.
395–421.
100. One example, among many, was published by
high-echelon Soviet engineers. S. A. Orudjev
and V. I. Muravlenko, “Integrated Planning
for Exploration Development, Production
and Transportation for Rapid Expansion of
Oil Field Operations,” Petrolieri International
24, no. 12 (1977), pp. 29–40.
101. Stern, “Oil Scarcity Ideology in US Foreign
Policy.”

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1

170

Naval War College: Autumn 2020 Full Issue

BOOK REVIEWS

“THE ART OF WAR IS SIMPLE ENOUGH”—U. S. GRANT
The Kremlin Letters: Stalin’s Wartime Correspondence with Churchill and Roosevelt, ed. David Reynolds
and Vladimir Pechatnov. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2018. 660 pages. $35.

The distinguished Cambridge University
professor of international history and
specialist in twentieth-century history David Reynolds has joined with
Vladimir Pechatnov of the Moscow State
University of International Relations to
produce this major contribution to the
history of the Second World War. The
volume is a carefully edited collection
of documents embedded within an
archival-based interpretive narrative
analysis of Stalin’s wartime correspondence with Prime Minister Winston
Churchill and President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt between 1941 and 1945.
Scholars have known the text of many
of the letters for some time. Winston
Churchill included some of Stalin’s letters
to him in his six-volume memoir The
Second World War. U.S. State Department
historians printed the texts of most of
those addressed to Franklin Roosevelt
in the volumes of the State Department’s
documentary series, Foreign Relations
of the United States. In 1957, the Soviets
published the Russian-language texts
with an English translation, but without
further contextual details. Interestingly,
Stalin originally initiated the Soviet
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project in 1950 as a means to counter
what he considered Churchill’s highly
selective use of their correspondence
and to serve as a rebuttal to what he
called the Western “falsifiers of history.”
In 1951, the project fell into abeyance,
but eventually reemerged in 1957 during
Khrushchev’s regime, with Soviet foreign
minister Andrey Gromyko as editor.
In the mid-1970s, many Western archives
began to open their collections of
documents relating to the Second World
War. Benefiting from this, the journalist
and Eleanor Roosevelt biographer Joseph
P. Lash underscored the importance of
the Roosevelt-Churchill relationship
with his book Roosevelt and Churchill,
1939–1941: The Partnership That Saved
the West (1976). This was followed by
Professor Warren F. Kimball of Rutgers
University, a former instructor at the
U.S. Naval Academy and rising academic
expert on the Second World War, who
published his meticulous, three-volume
edition Churchill & Roosevelt: The
Complete Correspondence (1984). These
works relied on archival research that
allowed historians to understand the full
context in which the Churchill-Roosevelt
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correspondence took place, including
information on the drafts and staff
discussions related to some of the
letters and the issues involved.
For many Western historians, the popular
emphasis in the English-language literature on Churchill and Roosevelt obscured
a full appreciation and understanding
of Stalin’s role in the Western alliance.
Although West German scholars at the
German Armed Forces Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt had begun their
pioneer work in the analysis of the history
of Germany’s wartime eastern front
during the Cold War, their work was
not widely appreciated until the English
translations appeared. The simultaneous events of the Cold War, during
which these initial Western historical
interpretations developed, by and large
did not provide fertile ground for the
growth of sympathetic appreciations of
Stalin or of the Soviet role in the war,
despite some efforts in that direction.
Between 22 June 1941, when Germany
invaded the Soviet Union, and Roosevelt’s death on 12 April 1945, Churchill,
Roosevelt, and Stalin exchanged 682
messages in the form of secret enciphered
telegrams. The messages normally were
sent in the originator’s language and
translated into the recipient’s language.
The common practice of the time
of changing the order of words in a
sentence to make enemy decryption
difficult led to misunderstandings
and misinterpretations even beyond
those presented by translation itself.
The project that produced this volume
lasted a decade and involved careful
research in British, American, and newly
opened Russian archives. The editors
and their team developed a database
of more than five thousand documents
that included all the surviving drafts and
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records of staff discussion relating to the
writing of the messages. The editors have
presented in this volume about 75 percent
of the total correspondence; they intend
eventually to publish the full correspondence in an online edition. The editors
have given here the English-language
version of the letters that Roosevelt and
Churchill received, including errors of
translation and transmission, explaining
in the accompanying text the issues
involved. Reynolds and Pechatnov
have selected documents that show the
character of these leaders as illustrated
in their exchanges with each other, their
plans to meet each other in the wartime
conferences at Tehran and Yalta, and
all the principal issues they discussed.
This volume very successfully merges
documentary scholarship with a clearly
written and engaging history of the
interrelationships between these three
“unlikely musketeers.” Practitioners and
students of international relations, policy,
and strategy as well as the general audience of readers interested in the Second
World War will find this an invaluable
contribution to their understanding of
the complex relationships among these
three important wartime leaders.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF

The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future
of High-Tech Warfare, by Christian Brose. New
York: Hachette, 2020. 320 pages. $28.

The author, Christian Brose, worked
closely as an aide to Senator John
McCain, and therefore is well situated to
write knowledgeably about the current
and future challenges facing the military
forces of the United States. The result is
a profoundly challenging and important
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book that should be required reading for
defense scholars and military officers.
Brose offers a full-throated critique of the
existing structures of American military
forces, the acquisition systems that supply
those forces, and the established assumptions that have guided U.S. defense policy
through a historically abnormal period
of American geopolitical dominance. He
argues forcefully that those established
ways of doing business already are
failing, and that they threaten to fail
catastrophically amid the foreseeable
return of great-power tensions and
possible conflict, with Russia to some
degree, but more importantly with China.
The United States has relied on large,
very expensive, and eminently targetable
platforms, such as aircraft carriers, and
relatively short-range fighter aircraft,
which are dependent on equally target
able refueling platforms. The proliferation
of large numbers of defensive missiles
and better sensors by China and Russia
renders such platforms unsurvivable
in any direct military engagement. The
American assumption that it will have
months to flow forces from the continental United States, unimpeded by potential
adversaries, is equally insupportable,
he argues. Historically, he maintains,
U.S. defense planning has focused on
platforms (which are usually extremely
expensive, human operator intensive, and
irreplaceable in any short time frame).
The future of war will be less about platforms and more about sensor fusion and
networked situational awareness—software rather than hardware, as he puts it.
No stranger to the ways of Congress,
Brose clearly dissects the political
and economic reasons why changing a slow, inflexible, excessively
bureaucratic, and backward-looking
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defense-acquisition process will be
difficult; but, he argues, not impossible.
It will require, however, that the services
be far more politically savvy than they
generally have been historically.
Committed to more than diagnosis, Brose
offers what he considers “cures.” Future
forces must rebuild a healthy relationship
with the high technology from which,
he argues, the Defense Department has
become alienated. Future forces must
rely heavily on autonomous systems,
linked decentralized networks, and
artificial intelligence if we are to create
the swarms of systems and decentralized
networks that will be able to survive in
a battle space in which we vie with a
peer competitor or, in the case of China,
perhaps even a technologically superior
adversary. Advances in additive technologies and on-site manufacturing may
make it possible to replace destroyed but
expendable, relatively low-cost systems
in the field, greatly reducing logistics
chains and reducing costs. Absolutely
contemporary, Brose offers a balanced
critique of the Trump administration’s
treatment of allies (agreeing that some are
freeloading to a degree, but also noting
that the United States rarely accepts serious allied assistance in real combat, and
also arguing for the absolute necessities
of keeping and reworking our alliance
system to face serious peer competitors).
Whether in the end a reader agrees
completely with Brose or not, this work
is a bracing challenge to American
complacency resting on the American
experience of unchallenged military
dominance since World War II, and offers
a wake-up call that defense planners and
military officers should take seriously.
MARTIN L. COOK
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A New Conception of War: John Boyd, the U.S.
Marines, and Maneuver Warfare, by Ian T.
Brown. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Univ.
Press, 2018. 311 pages. Available for download at
usmcu.edu/. Free.

There is more folklore associated with
John Boyd than perhaps any other
military thinker of the last fifty years.
Maverick fighter pilot, iconoclast,
conceiver of the now-ubiquitous “OODA
loop,” Boyd never fit neatly in anyone’s
mold. Knife fighting his way through the
Pentagon bureaucracy, Boyd reshaped
a generation of U.S. fighter aircraft,
influenced key acquisition programs,
and changed the way American military
officers thought about combat—amassing along the way a distinguished
list of senior enemies. His influence,
while profound, usually was indirect
and always difficult to characterize.
It is ironic that Boyd had his most
sweeping impact outside both aviation
and the Air Force that he served for thirty
years. Maneuver warfare—the defining
characteristic of Marine Corps combat
doctrine for three decades—was in no
small part a product of Boyd’s thought.
While Boyd has been the subject of
several books, in A New Conception of
War Marine major Ian Brown provides
the first complete account of Boyd and
the Marine Corps. In the process, he
crafts a case study in military institutional
change that deserves wide attention.
Brown asserts that the road from Boyd’s
ideas to maneuver warfare doctrine
required four essential and distinct
elements: need, idea, internal advocacy,
and leadership. First, the Marine Corps
of the 1970s and ’80s recognized that it
needed a new institutional approach. The
end of the Vietnam War left the Corps
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struggling to find its way in a world
newly refocused on great-power competition with the Soviet Union. Advances
in military technology had rendered
familiar Marine Corps operational
approaches questionable. Not interested in being relegated to constabulary
operations outside the main fight, the
Corps was looking for a way to leverage
what it believed were its distinctive
strengths in support of high-end combat.
The second essential element was Boyd
and his ideas. Brown, like all writers who
have sought to capture the essence of
Boyd’s thinking, struggles to capture the
shifting intellectual journey that marked
Boyd’s life. Boyd’s seminal work was a
briefing entitled “Patterns of Conflict.”
Delivered over the course of hours, each
presentation expressed Boyd’s thinking at
that moment. By never putting his ideas
fully into print, Boyd could (and routinely
did) deflect criticism by remaining the
sole arbiter of his meaning. Nonetheless,
Brown manages to capture the sweep of
Boyd’s ideas. Readers familiar with the
common simplistic summary of Boyd’s
observation, orientation, decision, and
action (OODA) loop model will be
intrigued by the full scope of this idea
and how Boyd extended its implications
to the breadth of human conflict.
However profound, Boyd’s ideas would
not have had influence without advocacy
within the Marine Corps. Brown excels in
describing the small group of influencers
who became the key internal advocates
for Boyd. Each occupied a sweet spot in
the Corps hierarchy: senior enough to be
credible, but not so senior that he could
not critique the service; experienced
enough to see the need for change;
knowledgeable and confident in his own
thinking; and positioned at an overlap
between the Corps and sources of outside
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ideas. One key influencer, Colonel
Michael Wyly, came to occupy key positions in the Marine Corps educational
establishment, where Boyd’s ideas crystallized into maneuver warfare doctrine.
The Corps’s internal advocates eventually
found senior leadership willing to push
the service in a new direction, most
importantly General Al Gray. In 1989,
Commandant Gray issued Fleet Marine
Force Manual 1. Entitled simply Warfighting, FMFM-1 made maneuver warfare the
key defining characteristic of the Corps’s
operational approach; it has remained
so for thirty years. It is significant to
note, however, that the senior leaders
who adopted maneuver warfare did
not become converts as senior officers;
rather, they had become interested in
these ideas years before, ascended the
ranks, then moved to implement their
vision—an observation consistent with
other studies of institutional reform.
The story of how a rogue Air Force
fighter pilot shaped the core ideas of
the Marine Corps is a case study in how
militaries learn and change. Many similar
case studies oversimplify this messy and
imperfect process, creating a clean narrative of progressive heroes and resistant
villains. Brown avoids this trap—a success
all the more impressive given the strong
opinions that still surround Boyd. In so
doing, Brown has produced a book that
will take its place alongside Rosen’s Winning the Next War and Bergerson’s The
Army Gets an Air Force as a foundational
study of military institutional change.
A New Conception of War skillfully brings
an extraordinary, historic episode to a
new generation of Marine Corps leaders
and, in a larger context, to any leader
who is contemplating leading change.
DALE C. RIELAGE
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The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and
Civil-Military Relations, by Christopher J. Lamb.
Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
330 pages. Available for download at jcs.mil/.
Free.

Khmer Rouge forces boarded and took
control of the U.S.-registered merchant
vessel Mayaguez on 12 May 1975,
then released the crew three days later.
Coming just two weeks after the fall of
Saigon, the move was considered a brazen challenge to the U.S. commitment
in the region. Ultimately the American
response resulted in the release of
the crew and their ship, at the cost of
forty-one American servicemen killed
and dozens wounded. Christopher J.
Lamb, a distinguished research fellow at
National Defense University, has written
a thorough and evenhanded history of
the crisis, demonstrating a command of
existing literature and original sources.
In the immediate wake of the invasion
and collapse of South Vietnam, the
overwhelming motivation among
decision makers was to demonstrate
American resolve. President Ford and
Henry Kissinger—the latter wearing
both the national security advisor (NSA)
and Secretary of State hats—were fully
in charge, but Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger, Deputy NSA Brent
Scowcroft, White House chief of staff
Donald Rumsfeld, and other key actors
all agreed with Ford and Kissinger that
forceful action was necessary to reassure
allies, to show Beijing that Washington
would remain engaged in the region,
and above all to deter Pyongyang. North
Korean aggression was a real concern,
as was a repeat of the 1968 Pueblo
incident or the lesser-known EC-121
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incident of 1969, in which North Korea
shot down a USN surveillance plane,
killing all thirty-one servicemen aboard.
Kissinger in particular saw the U.S.
response to that outrage as weak-kneed.
This desire to demonstrate resolve
led to three waves of bombings of the
mainland, a Marine assault on an island
where it was thought the crew might
have been taken, and a blockade in
which Cambodian craft were plinked
whenever possible. On these courses
of action there was general agreement early on; however, as the crisis
rolled into its third and then fourth
and final day, fissures emerged.
One issue was how long to continue
bombing once Phnom Penh signaled
an interest in dealing, and then fairly
rapidly released the crew. After two
successful bombing runs against the
mainland, Schlesinger, his military
assistant, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, and the chairman’s military
assistant wanted to divert planned third
and fourth attacks to Tang Island, where
a too-small number of Marines were in a
desperate battle to regroup, gather fallen
comrades, and evacuate. The military
also argued that the bombing’s objectives
had been attained without loss of life
up to that point. Against Kissinger and
Ford, Schlesinger lost the argument
for diverting the third wave, but then
won the argument on the fourth, which
was in fact diverted. As Lamb points
out, since the president and Secretary
of State / NSA were still intent on
demonstrating toughness, this probably
cost Schlesinger his job. Ford would
believe, with Kissinger’s encouragement,
that Schlesinger had dragged his feet on
bombing the mainland, which was not
exactly the case; the Secretary of Defense
was all in favor of bombing the mainland
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until he learned that the crew was on its
way to safety. After that, he was more
concerned about the undermanned
Marine contingent fighting on Tang.
A more serious disagreement occurred
on the issue of whether to continue
plinking Cambodian ships once Mayaguez’s crew was safe. Schlesinger agreed
with his senior military advice that this
would endanger U.S. military personnel
unnecessarily and also risk hitting the
ship carrying the Mayaguez crew. He
therefore stonewalled the White House
for several hours, then defended orders
given by senior officers not to sink the
ships. This probably sealed his fate as a
soon-to-be-retired Secretary of Defense.
Lamb’s approach is to address the
chronology first and then deal with
theory, an approach that works well.
As someone who has written on the
subject in the past, he points out where
interpretations should be adjusted on the
basis of new evidence. He finds that his
earlier work, which argued the existence
of a belief system that created a focus
on demonstrating U.S. resolve, generally holds up, but that there should be
increased appreciation for several important issues: insubordination regarding
the sinking of Cambodian ships; the
willingness of Ford and Kissinger to
risk the lives of the crew by pursuing
mainland bombing even after they knew
the crew was being transported to safety;
and Kissinger’s dominant role, including
such actions as withholding a message
from Tehran indicating Phnom Penh’s
willingness to release the crew. Elsewhere Lamb points out the willingness of
senior military officers to accept Pacific
Command’s optimistic interpretation
of the degree of resistance on Koh Tang
rather than the Defense Intelligence
Agency’s more realistic estimate, as
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well as the Marines’ failure to ask for
an additional twenty-four hours and
more troops to prepare for the assault.
This is an enjoyable history and analysis
of an interesting interlude in America’s
engagement with East Asia. One could
argue that in the end Phnom Penh’s
rapid move toward releasing the crew
ran up against Washington’s perceived
need to demonstrate resolve. Were
that mind-set not so entrenched, it is
possible that the attack on Koh Tang
could have been either avoided or
executed with appropriate force.
The ultimate measures of effectiveness of the U.S. response are whether
Pyongyang was deterred from action it
would have taken otherwise and whether
our allies were meaningfully reassured.
On these matters the evidence is mixed.
JOHN GAROFANO

The Modernisation of the Republic of Korea Navy:
Seapower, Strategy and Politics, by Ian Bowers.
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. 239 pages.
$79.99.

For a state frequently described as a
“geostrategic island,” South Korea’s
maritime security remains a chronically
understudied aspect of order in the AsiaPacific. Ian Bowers’s The Modernisation
of the Republic of Korea Navy goes
some way toward filling this gap, with
a persuasive account of the forces that
have facilitated and shaped the last three
decades of expansion of the Republic
of Korea (ROK) Navy (ROKN) into
an actor of regional significance.
Bowers argues that a combination of
material and ideational changes were pursued in the development of the modern
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ROKN. In physical terms, the addition
of around twenty new classes of naval
vessels in the last thirty years—combined
with construction of a new base on Jeju
Island and changes to hardware, training,
and operational structure—has reflected
the desire for a comparatively small but
potent force that can be wielded effectively in pursuit of the South’s growing
set of peninsular and regional maritime
interests. Ideationally, Bowers sees
post-1988 democratization in the South
as a crucial underlying factor behind
increased emphasis on the ROKN’s role.
As the South Korean army’s political and
cultural power waned during this period,
the ROKN tapped into the peninsula’s
maritime history to foster a burgeoning
naval identity among South Korean foreign policy elites and the public at large.
Bowers also describes a changing
international context for ROKN development, highlighting the shifting role of the
United States and China’s own emerging
status as a dominant naval power in
the region. A particularly persuasive
chapter of the book is devoted to an
assessment of the strategic and financial
logic behind Washington’s shift from
restricting ROKN development in favor
of the South’s land forces to its new role
as a facilitator of an expanding ROKN.
Notably, The Modernisation of the
Republic of Korea Navy challenges key
aspects of a common narrative of ROKN
naval development that pits blue-water
ambitions against an obligation to defend
peninsular waters from the existential
North Korea threat. For Bowers, these
tasks are not as contradictory as they may
appear, given the multifunctionality of
naval platforms that can be used in both
local and regional contexts. Bowers cites
the example of the ROKN’s KDX-III destroyers having been fitted with the Aegis
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system, enabling these larger platforms to
play a key role in the South’s management
of the North Korean missile threat (p. 6).
The greatest strength of this book
is to be found in Bowers’s depiction
of the overlapping layers of South
Korea’s strategic maritime environment.
Challenges include Pyongyang’s attempts
to identify and exploit weaknesses in
the ROKN’s now-dominant capabilities
in peninsular waters, increasing regional uncertainty caused by Chinese and
Japanese expansion, and Seoul’s wariness
concerning the vulnerability of its sea
lines of communication amid contestation in the South China Sea and beyond.
Bowers also offers an appraisal of each
postdemocratization ROK administration’s impact on naval development. However, this ends somewhat prematurely, in
2013, with but a single sentence allocated
to former president Park Geun-hye and
no mention of current president Moon
Jae-in. Bowers explores the ROKN’s
embrace of a distinctively South Korean
naval identity, but does not connect it
clearly enough to larger shifts in national
identity and policy, beyond the observation that the ROKN seeks to be a naval
force “commensurate with an independent, responsible middle power” (p. 6).
The Modernisation of the Republic of
Korea Navy ultimately succeeds in
providing a holistic account of the factors
driving that force’s transformation. As a
Royal Danish Defence College professor,
Bowers offers considerable insight on
this topic, marshaling an impressive
array of evidence amassed over a decade
of research (this book was based on his
doctoral thesis, which might explain
its more cursory treatment of the most
recent political developments). It is
necessary reading for academics and
practitioners seeking to better understand
the contemporary complexity—and likely
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future trajectory—of maritime security
around the Korean Peninsula, and in
the broader Northeast Asian region.
ALEXANDER M. HYND

From the Sea to the C-Suite: Lessons Learned from
the Bridge to the Corner Office, by Cutler Dawson,
with Taylor Baldwin Kiland. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2019. 132 pages. $21.95.

Retired vice admiral Cutler Dawson
brought lessons learned from a
thirty-four-year naval career to his
fourteen years of business-world success
as president and CEO of the Navy
Federal Credit Union. From the Sea
to the C-Suite explores some of those
lessons. This short book is as genuine
and thoughtful as it is instructive
for leaders at all career stages—and,
frankly, in any profession. It illustrates
why many businesses and nonprofits
seek out former military leaders to
advise and lead their organizations.
Each of From the Sea to the C-Suite’s
pithily titled eleven chapters develops
a key leadership theme derived from
Dawson’s naval career. Using examples
from his six sea commands, he explains
leadership lessons first in their naval
context before demonstrating their
practical application in a civilian
setting. True to his naval roots, Dawson
then ends each chapter with a “foot
stomper” summary—evoking a
military practice signaling a concept
that one will need to remember later.
Among the book’s foot-stomping
lessons are the following:
• Go to the deckplates. “As a leader you
need to intimately understand your organization—its people, its products, its
processes, its customers. To do so, you
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have to ‘go to the deckplates’” (p. 12).
Good leaders lead and learn from the
front lines. For Dawson, learning a new
assignment on a ship entailed learning
from enlisted sailors. Similarly, when
he was chief executive officer of Navy
Federal, this entailed visiting branches
and asking probing questions.
• Create a safe harbor. Good leaders
want to hear the unvarnished truth so
they can make the best-informed decisions. Sailors and employees both need
a culture in which they feel comfortable speaking candidly; they need a
safe harbor where they can offer leadership the full story. And good leaders
want to know not only the good but
also the bad.
• If you don’t risk, you can’t win. A
willingness to evaluate hazards and
then take risks is an American naval
tradition harking back to John Paul
Jones. Dawson advises risk taking “if
it benefits other people” (p. 27). Moreover, leaders who know their crews’
strengths and weaknesses are better
able to evaluate risks.
• Listen like a sonar tech. Good leaders
are curious and carefully attend to
their business, so they listen to understand. This is how leaders begin truly
to understand the requirements of the
ship or the needs of the business.
• Get in the bosun’s chair. A leadership
concept related to listening like a sonar
tech and going to the deckplates, getting in the bosun’s chair entails understanding the perspective of the other
person. This can provide the proper
frame of reference needed when giving
an order or introducing a new product
to market. Dawson describes several
instances in which researching the
impact on customers improved Navy
Federal’s service to them.
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Finally, From the Sea to the C-Suite
encourages leaders to follow their North
Star—those “immovable principles”
and “unwavering values” that guide
proper behavior. Dawson’s North Star
is “all about the people”: “taking care
of them, setting an example for them,
and being the type of leader whom
you would want to emulate” (p. 126).
Readers familiar with leadership theory
will recognize several leadership- and
character-development frameworks used
in this book. Dawson demonstrates how
effective leaders value and empower employees, creating relationships that support both mission success and personal
development. Indeed, Dawson states that
young “professionals need to go through
the process of arriving at the right
answers on their own” (p. 93). This is the
process of coaching followers to become
leaders themselves. “If you have carefully
chosen and trained your crew members
for the task at hand, you should trust
them to do the job well—to do the
right thing” (p. 79). The leadershipdevelopment process empowers others.
Dawson’s examples are easily understood, and his foot stompers summarize
each well. As an extrovert, his examples
are heavy on interpersonal relationships.
While those are important, Dawson
could have devoted more time to the
intrapersonal realm, exploring and
relating those inner attributes that
allowed him to operate so successfully
on the relational side. Nonetheless,
this little book is recommended for
current and prospective leaders,
especially military members transitioning to civilian leadership roles.
ED GILLEN
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And the Whole Mountain Burned, by Ray McPadden. New York: Center Street, 2018. 288 pages.
$26.

And the Whole Mountain Burned is
a well-written novel that chronicles
the exploits of Army private Danny
Shane on his first combat tour, in the
mountains of eastern Afghanistan. It
is no wonder that Ray McPadden won
the 2019 W. Y. Boyd Literary Award for
Excellence in Military Fiction for this
work. The book is a patchwork quilt
of the highs and lows that American
forces in combat face every day,
including intense pressure, uncertainty, and even boredom. Although
it is fiction, it is a poignant reminder
of the traumas and tragedies of war.
The novel starts with a flashback by
Sergeant Nick Burch, Shane’s squad
leader and mentor. Burch remembers
a young Afghan boy making chipas,
or french fries, to sell to American
soldiers—in the midst of a horrific
firefight with enemy insurgents. Burch
sees the young boy, nicknamed Sadboy,
years later when he is conducting a raid
with Shane and other members of his
squad. During the raid, the American
soldiers kill Sadboy’s father and apprehend his mother. Extremely distraught,
Sadboy eventually joins the insurgents
because the American soldiers brutalized his family. Sadboy’s character
haunts Burch throughout the story.
McPadden does a great job showcasing
the different relationships and emotions
that Shane experiences during his time
in Afghanistan. His compassion for a
young, disabled Afghan boy who cannot
take care of himself is heartwarming,
as Shane gives the boy food and tries to
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help him when other Afghan children
bully him. Eventually, however, Shane
is forced to shoot the boy because he
participated in an ambush. Shane also
befriends the platoon’s physically handicapped Afghan interpreter, Billy, and
helps him get money for an eye operation. Shane’s long-distance relationship
with his girlfriend, Candy, is complicated. She is a stripper and Shane gives
her access to his bank account and sends
her money. She subsequently leaves him,
empties the bank account, and destroys
their apartment. This is a colorful aspect
of the book, but an accurate reminder
to readers that those who serve the
nation in combat face domestic, as well
as combat and deployment, challenges.
Burch’s character also is complex, and
Shane’s relationship with his sergeant is
one of the consistent themes throughout
the book. Initially, Shane looks up
to Burch as a mentor and seeks his
approval; however, eventually he sees the
impact of prolonged combat in the form
of Burch’s changed attitude, as well as his
impaired judgment as a result of posttraumatic stress disorder. Even while
home on leave Burch is not himself; he
thinks continuously about the war and
his squad in Afghanistan, he cannot
relax, and he is haunted by demons
and dreams of war. Burch is relieved
to return to Afghanistan and finally
get back to the fight with his troops.
Shane’s relationship with local villagers
is also a common theme. The villagers
depend on selling timber from the
surrounding forests for their livelihood.
While searching for insurgents in the
forests, Burch’s squad gets ambushed;
as the battle progresses, Burch calls for
white phosphorous artillery rounds to
kill the enemy. The trees burn. “The
fire followed a ridgeline, and before
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long the whole mountain burned” (p.
247). Not surprisingly, the fire upsets
the locals, and the insurgents use
that unhappiness to garner increased
support to attack the American camp.
On the squad’s final mission, when
the unit is taking fire from multiple
enemy positions, Shane is shocked
when Burch calls in an A-10 attack
on his own position. Shane tries to
save his squad leader but is killed in
the process, while Burch survives the
firestorm. Although saddened by Shane’s
death, it is in this instant that Burch
realizes that the insurgents never will
quit, and the carnage will continue.
McPadden’s rendition of the plight of
American infantrymen in Afghanistan,
as well as his description of the terrain
and life on patrol, are so realistic that
the reader feels he actually is there. The
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reader easily sees and feels what Private
Shane experiences while humping
patrols in mountainous terrain and
treacherous weather conditions. Shane
and his squad accomplish objectives
and hold terrain, only to see it occupied by enemy forces shortly after
they depart for their base camp.
More than a story, the book highlights
the personal challenges of combat and
the range of emotions experienced
before and after combat by many
who serve their nation. This is a
classic war novel and a must-read
for those who want to get a firsthand
account of combat on the ground
in Afghanistan. McPadden’s recent
combat experience as an Army Ranger
gives his writing instant credibility.
THOMAS J. GIBBONS
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T

he advent of social media has provided many platforms on which writers can
express their ideas, often to very wide audiences. Weblogs (known as blogs)
exist to promote ideas on subjects ranging from gardening to romance. Some focus purely on entertainment, but others play a more serious role. I long have been
impressed by a blog called From the Green Notebook (fromthegreennotebook
.com), founded and edited by Naval War College alumnus Joe Byerly, a serving
officer in the U.S. military. The focus of the blog is on developing leaders, and the
concept of professional reading is at the heart of many of its discussions. A recent
post entitled “Why We All Need to Develop a Daily Habit of Reading” is one of
the best arguments I have ever read on the value of professional reading, and the
paragraphs below are an abridged version of the larger article.
When it comes down to it, the purpose of a military is to fight and win its nation’s wars. And war is complex. When lives or national interests are at stake the
outcome is never certain, and events can unfold in a manner that no one foresaw.
This level of complexity requires military leaders to possess a certain level of
aptitude when stepping onto the battlefield. So, let’s back up a bit and do a quick
thought experiment.
Imagine if someone told you that a year from today you would be required
to take a test in which every wrong answer would result in the loss of a human life. How would you approach studying for the test? Would you study for
twenty to thirty minutes every night, or would you wait until a week before the
test and start cramming? You probably think this is a no-brainer, and that you
would spend a year studying in small increments so you’d get a perfect score
and nobody would die.
While the logic is clear-cut in this scenario, it is lost on many leaders in their
professional military careers. Many go their entire careers without dedicating
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time to the study of war and warfare. Let’s be honest, the military places little
extrinsic value on self-study. We don’t get rewarded on our officer and NCO
evaluation reports for spending time on self-development. Some leaders even go
twenty years without reading a single book outside of professional military education—and boast that they were promoted to brigade-level command.
The problem is that, as time marches forward in our military careers, we run
the risk of the professor walking through the door and handing us the test when
we least expect it. The test is a practical exercise called “war.” The questions are
hard and the stakes are high. If we aren’t prepared, the results can be devastating.
That brigade commander might not take his unit into combat, but he could get
promoted to general officer when the next war comes along, and by that point
there’s not enough time to start reading books on war.
But we don’t have to waste lives needlessly by approaching the test cold. Author and habits expert James Clear points out in his book Atomic Habits that time
can be either an enemy or an ally, magnifying the margin between success and
failure. In other words, how we choose to spend—or not spend—our time has
consequences. So when it comes to professional reading, we can make time either
an ally or an enemy. When we look at it through this lens, three truths regarding
time come into focus. First, there is a cumulative effect when we invest small
amounts of time in reading. Second, there also is a cumulative effect when we
neglect it. And finally, once time is gone, there is no getting it back.
In the documentary Bookstores: How to Read More Books in the Golden Age
of Content, blogger Tim Urban points out that if the average person spent only
thirty minutes a day reading (that could be fifteen minutes before work and fifteen minutes before bed), he or she could read a thousand books in a lifetime.
Imagine how many insights we would gain from making those minor daily investments—and how much better prepared for war we would be. In doing so, we
make time our ally.
Unfortunately, many in the military, throughout their careers, do not invest
time in self-study. Then when the time comes, many of these leaders fail to perform at the required level because they neglected their own development. They
may survive as platoon leaders, company commanders, even battalion commanders, but none of these individuals thrive, because they approached each
assignment with a limited perspective.
Neglect has a cumulative effect. When we fail to prepare ourselves mentally for
combat we increase the risk of failure and, even worse, of losing members of our
own teams. We can’t wait until the eleventh hour to start cracking the books open.
Out of all the commodities we are given in life, time is the only one we can’t get
back. This importance of time also was recognized by Napoléon Bonaparte, who
wrote in a letter, “Space I can recover, time never.” Once time has passed, it’s gone
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020

183

180

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 1

forever. It doesn’t do a colonel with twenty-four years of service in the Army any
good to look back on a career and wish he or she had read more when earlier in
life. Many start cramming, but by then you cannot make up for lost time.
There is one more insight I’ve picked up over the years. The outbreak of war
typically catches a nation and its armies by surprise. None of us knows if or when
we will be called upon to lead formations in battle. That’s why time is so critical.
We need to make it our ally.
So, start today. Pick up a book and spend ten to twenty minutes reading, highlighting, and taking notes. It’s a small investment, with a great return!
Thank you, Joe, for reinforcing the argument that the Reflections on Reading
series has sought to make for the past forty-seven articles!

JOHN E. JACKSON

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/1

184

